


CovertAction

QUARTERLY

Under Siege, Fighting Back



An act of torture is an act of terrorism. I must press for justice, or others will die as my husband did, either thrown from a helicopter or dismembered and scattered across a sugar cane field, all paid for by U.S. tax dollars and protected with U.S. secrecy. Here it must end. —Jennifer K. Harbury, Esq. (pages 20, 23)

**George Soros; Coverup in Jenin; Balkanization, American-Style;
The End of Posse Comitatus; Tiger Cages Revisited;
Bush II War Machine; Betraying the Kurds; Argentina at
the Abyss; U.S.-Dominated Tribunal for Rwanda**

USA \$5.95 CAN \$8.95





Sara Flounders

May 2002. Jenin, Palestine.

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Cover: Monday, March 18, 2002. Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, DC. **Jennifer K. Harbury** on the steps of the court following her argument before the Justices that functionaries of a government allegedly "of the people, by the people, for the people" must not be allowed to lie to the people to cover up crimes of state.

When Harbury's husband, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, a Guatemalan popular leader, was captured by Guatemalan government forces in March 1992, Harbury immediately sought information regarding his whereabouts and condition, including verification of reports that he was undergoing torture by paid agents of the CIA. The answers were all lies.

Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson argued for the Bush II administration that the Court must use "utmost caution" before interpreting the Constitution as guaranteeing citizens a truthful response to inquiries of the government... (Dennis Cook/AP Photo)

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George Soros, Imperial Wizard

MASTER-BUILDER OF THE NEW BRIBE SECTOR,
SYSTEMATICALLY BILKING THE WORLD

Heather Cottin



December 10, 2001. New York, New York. Irene Diamond, left, David Rockefeller, center, and George Soros, three of eleven recipients of the inaugural Carnegie Medals of Philanthropy, indulge in a round of self-congratulation.

“Yes, I do have a foreign policy... my goal is to become the conscience of the world.”¹

This is not a case of narcissistic personality disorder; this is how George Soros exercises the authority of United States hegemony in the world today. Soros foundations and financial machinations are partly responsible for the destruction of socialism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. He has set his sights on China. He was part of the full court press that dismantled Yugoslavia. Calling himself a phi-

lanthropist, billionaire George Soros' role is to tighten the ideological stranglehold of globalization and the New World Order while promoting his own financial gain. Soros' commercial and "philanthropic" operations are clandestine, contradictory and coercive. And as far as his economic activities are concerned, by his own admission, he is without conscience; a capitalist who functions with absolute amorality.

Soros is a leading figure on the Council of Foreign Relations, the World Economic Forum, and Human Rights Watch (HRW). In 1994, after a meeting with his philosophical guru, Sir Karl Popper, Soros ordered his companies to start investing in

Central and Eastern European communications. The Federal Radio Television Administration of the Czech Republic accepted his offer to take over and fund the archives of Radio Free Europe. Soros moved the archives to Prague and spent over \$15 million on their maintenance.² A Soros foundation now runs CIA-created

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Heather Cottin is a writer, lifelong political activist, and recently retired high school history teacher. She lives in Freeport, NY, and was for many years married to the late scholar and activist Sean Gervasi.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty jointly with the U.S. and RFE/RL, which has expanded into the Caucasus and Asia.³ Soros is the founder and funder of the Open Society Institute. He created and maintains the International Crisis Group (ICG) which,

GEORGE SOROS WAS BORN IN HUNGARY IN 1930 TO JEWISH PARENTS SO REMOVED FROM THEIR ROOTS THEY ONCE VACATIONED IN NAZI GERMANY.

among other things, has been active in the Balkans since the destruction of Yugoslavia. Soros works openly with the United States Institute of Peace—an overt arm of the CIA.

He thrusts himself upon world statesmen and they respond. He has been close to Henry Kissinger, Vaclav Havel and Poland's General Wojciech Jaruzelski.⁴ He supports the Dalai Lama, whose institute is housed in the Presidio in San Francisco, also home to the foundation run by Soros' friend, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.⁵

When anti-globalization forces were freezing in the streets outside New York's Waldorf-Astoria hotel in February 2002, George Soros was inside addressing the World Economic Forum. As the police forced protesters into metal cages on Park Avenue, Soros was extolling the virtues of the "Open Society" and joined Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama and others.

WHO IS THIS GUY?

George Soros was born in Hungary in 1930 to Jewish parents so removed from their roots that they once vacationed in Nazi Germany.⁶ Soros lived under the Nazis, but with the triumph of the Communists moved to England in 1947. There, Soros came under the sway of the philosopher Karl Popper, at the London School of Economics. Popper was a lionized anti-communist ideologue and his teachings formed the basis for Soros' political tendencies. There is hardly a speech, book or article that Soros writes that does not pay obeisance to Popper's influence.

Knighthood in 1965, Popper coined the slogan "Open Society," which eventually manifested in Soros' Open Society Fund and Institute. Followers of Popper repeat his words like true believers. Popperian philosophy epitomizes Western individualism. Soros left England in 1956, and

found work on Wall Street where, in the 1960s, he invented the "hedge fund."

*...hedge funds catered to very wealthy individuals...The largely secretive funds, usually trading in offshore locations...produced astronomically superior results. The size of the "bets" often became self fulfilling prophecies: 'rumors of a position taken by the big hedge funds prompted other investors to follow suit,' which would in turn force up the price the hedgers were betting on to begin with.*⁷

Soros organized the Quantum Fund in 1969 and began to dabble in currency manipulation. In the 1970s, his financial activities turned to:

*Alternating long and short positions...Soros won big both on the rise of real estate investment trusts and on their subsequent collapse. Under his 20-year stewardship, Quantum returned an amazing 34.5% a year. Soros is best known (and feared) for currency speculation...In 1997 he earned the rare distinction of being singled out as a villain by a head of state, Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad, for taking part in a highly profitable attack on that nation's currency.*⁸

Through such clandestine financial scheming, Soros became a multibillionaire. His companies control real estate in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico; banking in Venezuela; and are some of the most profitable currency traders in the world, giving rise to the general belief that his highly placed friends assisted him in his financial endeavors, for political as well as financial gain.⁹

George Soros has been blamed for the destruction of the Thai economy in 1997.¹⁰ One Thai activist said, "We regard George Soros as a kind of Dracula. He sucks the blood from the people."¹¹ The Chinese call him "the crocodile," because his economic and ideological efforts in China were so insatiate, and because his financial speculation created millions of dollars in profits as it ravished the Thai and Malaysian economies.¹²

Soros once made a billion dollars in one day by speculating (a word he abhors) on the British pound. Accused of taking "money from every British taxpayer when he speculated against sterling," he said, "When you speculate in the financial markets you are free of most of the moral concerns that confront an ordinary businessman...I did not have to concern myself with moral issues in the financial markets."¹³

Soros has a schizophrenic craving for unlimited personal wealth and a desire to

be thought well of by others:

*Currency traders sitting at their desks buy and sell currencies of Third World countries in large quantities. The effect of the currency fluctuations on the people who live in those countries is a matter that does not enter their minds. Nor should it; they have a job to do. Yet if we pause to think, we must ask ourselves whether currency traders...should regulate the lives of millions.*¹⁴

It was Soros who saved George W. Bush's bacon when his management of an oil exploration company was ending in failure. Soros was the owner of Harken Energy Corporation, and it was he who bought the rapidly depreciating stocks just prior to the company's collapse. The future president cashed out at almost one million dollars. Soros said he did it to buy "political influence."¹⁵ Soros is also a partner in the infamous Carlyle Group. Organized in 1987, "the world's largest private equity firm" with over twelve billion dollars under management, is run by "a veritable who's who of former Republican leaders," from CIA man Frank Carlucci to CIA head George Bush, Sr. The Carlyle Group makes most of its money from weapons expenditures.

THE PHILANTHROPIST SPOOK

In 1980, Soros began to use his millions to attack socialism in Eastern Europe. He financed individuals who would cooperate with him. His first success was in Hungary. He took over the Hungarian educational and cultural establishment, incapacitating socialist institutions throughout the country. He made his way right inside the Hungarian government. Soros next moved on to Poland, aiding the CIA-funded Solidarity operation and in that same year, he became active in China. The USSR came next.

It is not coincidental that the Central Intelligence Agency had operations in all of those countries. The goal of the Agency was exactly the same as that of the Open Society Fund: to dismantle socialism. In South Africa, the CIA sought out dissidents who were anticommunist. In Hungary, Poland and the USSR, the CIA, with overt intervention from the National Endowment for Democracy, the AFL-CIO, USAID and other institutions, supported and organized anticommunists, the very type of individuals recruited by Soros' Open Society Fund. The CIA would have called them "assets." As Soros said, "In each country I identified a group of people—some leading personalities, others less well known—who shared

my belief..."¹⁶ Soros' Open Society organized conferences with anticommunist Czechs, Serbs, Romanians, Hungarians, Croatians, Bosnians, Kosovars.¹⁷ His ever-expanding influence gave rise to suspicions that he was operating as part of the U.S. intelligence complex. In 1989, the *Washington Post* reported charges first made in 1987 by the Chinese government officials that Soros' Fund for the Reform and Opening of China had CIA connections.¹⁸

TAKING ON MOSCOW

After 1990, Soros funds targeted the Russian educational system, providing the entire nation with textbooks.¹⁹ In effect, Soros ensured the indoctrination of an entire generation of Russian youth with OSI propaganda. Soros foundations were accused of engineering a strategy to take control of the Russian financial system, privatization schemes, and the process of foreign investment in that country. Russians reacted angrily to Soros' legislative meddlings. Critics of Soros and other U.S. foundations said the goal of these maneuvers was to "thwart Russia as a state, which has the potential to compete with the world's only superpower."²⁰ Russians began to suspect Soros and the CIA were interconnected. Business tycoon Boris Berezovsky said, "I nearly fainted when I heard a couple of years ago that George Soros was a CIA agent."²¹ Berezovsky's opinion was that Soros, and the West, were "afraid of Russian capital becoming strong."

If the economic and political establishment in the United States fear an economic rivalry from Russia, what better way to control it than to dominate Russian media, education, research centers and science? After spending \$250 million for the "transformation of education of humanities and economics at the high school and university levels," Soros created the International Science Foundation for another \$100 million.²² The Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) accused Soros foundations in Russia of "espionage." They noted that Soros was not operating alone; he was part of a full court press that included financing from the Ford and Heritage Foundations; Harvard, Duke, and Columbia universities, and assistance from the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence services.²³ The FSK criticized Soros' payouts to 50,000 Russian scientists, saying that Soros advanced his own interests by gaining control of thousands of Russian scientific discoveries and new technologies to collect state and commercial secrets.²⁴

In 1995, Russians were infuriated by the insinuation of State Department opera-

tive Fred Cuny into the conflict in Chechnya. Cuny's cover was disaster relief, but his history of involvement in international conflict zones of interest to the U.S., plus FBI and CIA search parties, made clear his government connections. At the time of his disappearance, Cuny was working under contract to a Soros foundation.²⁵ It is not widely known in the U.S. that the violence in Chechnya, a province in the heart of Russia, is generally perceived as the result of a political destabilization campaign on which Washington looks favorably, and may actually be directing. This assessment of the situation is clear enough to writer Tom Clancy that he felt free to include it as an assertion of fact in his best-seller, *The Sum of All Fears*. The Russians accused Cuny of being a CIA operative, and part of an intelligence operation to support the Chechen uprising.²⁶ Soros' Open Society Institute is still active in Chechnya, as are other Soros-sponsored organizations.

Russia was the site of at least one joint endeavor to enhance Soros' balance sheet, arranged with diplomatic assistance from the Clinton administration. In 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright blocked a \$500 million loan guarantee by the U.S. Export-Import Bank to the Russian company, Tyumen Oil, on the grounds that it was contrary to U.S. national interests. Tyumen wanted to buy American-made oil equipment and services from Dick Cheney's Halliburton Company and ABB Lummus Global of Bloomfield, New Jersey.²⁷ George Soros was an investor in a company that Tyumen had been trying to acquire. Both Soros and BP Amoco lobbied to prevent this transaction, and Albright obliged.²⁸

NURTURING LEFT ANTI-SOCIALISM

Soros' Open Society Institute has a finger in every pot. Its board of directors reads like a "Who's Who" of Cold War and New World Order pundits. Paul Goble is Communications Director; he was the major political commentator at Radio Free Europe. Herbert Okun served in the Nixon State Department as an intelligence adviser to Henry Kissinger. Kati Marton is the wife of former Clinton administration UN ambassador and envoy to Yugoslavia, Richard Holbrooke. Marton lobbied for the Soros-funded radio station B-92, also a project of the National Endowment for Democracy (another overt arm of the CIA), which was instrumental in bringing down the Yugoslav government.

When Soros founded the Open Society Fund he picked liberal pundit Aryeh Neier to lead it. Neier was the head of Helsinki Watch, a putative human rights organiza-

tion with an anticommunist bent. In 1993, the Open Society Fund became the Open Society Institute.

Helsinki Watch became Human Rights Watch in 1975. Soros is currently on its

SOROS' ACTIVITIES ECHO NED'S ALLEN WEINSTEIN: "A LOT OF WHAT WE DO TODAY WAS DONE COVERTLY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO BY THE CIA."

Advisory Board, both for the Americas and the Eastern Europe-Central Asia Committees, and his Open Society Fund/Soros/OSI is listed as a funder.²⁹ Soros is intimately connected to HRW, and Neier wrote columns for *The Nation* magazine without mentioning that he was on Soros' payroll.³⁰

Soros is intimately involved in HRW, although he does his best to hide it.³¹ He says he just funds and sets up these programs and lets them run. But they do not stray from the philosophy of the funder. HRW and OSI are close. Their views do not diverge. Of course, other foundations fund these institutions as well, but Soros' influence dominates their ideology.

George Soros' activities fall into the construct developed in 1983 and enunciated by Allen Weinstein, founder of the National Endowment for Democracy. Weinstein said, "A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA."³² Soros is operating exactly within the confines of the intelligence complex. He is little different from CIA drug runners in Laos in the 1960s, or the mujahedin who profited from the opium trade while carrying out CIA operations against socialist Afghanistan in the 1980s. He simply funnels (and takes home) a whole lot more money than those pawns, and he does much of his business in the light of day. His candor insofar as he expresses it is a sort of spook damage control that serves to legitimize the strategies of U.S. foreign policy.

The majority of people in the U.S. today who consider themselves politically left-of-center are undoubtedly pessimistic about the chances for a socialist transformation of society. Thus the Soros "Decentralization" model, or the "piecemeal" approach to "negative utilitarianism, the attempt to minimize the amount of misery," which was Popper's philosophy, appeals to them.³³ Soros funded an HRW study that was used to back California and Arizona legislation

relaxing drug laws.³⁴ Soros favors the legalization of drugs—one way of temporarily reducing awareness of one's misery. Soros is an equal-opportunity bribe-giver. At a loftier rung of the socioeconomic ladder, one finds Social Democrats who accept Soros funding and believe in civil liberties within the context of capitalism.³⁵ For these folks, the evil consequences of Soros' business activities (impoverishing people all over the world) are mitigated by his philanthropic activities. Similarly, liberal/left intellectuals, both in the U.S. and abroad, have been drawn in by the "Open Society" philosophy, not to men-

**SOROS FUNDED OTPR,
THE ORGANIZATION THAT
RECEIVED THOSE "SUITCASES
OF MONEY" IN SUPPORT OF
THE OCTOBER 5, 2000 COUP
THAT TOPPLED THE YUGOSLAV
GOVERNMENT.**

tion the occasional funding plum.

The New Left in the United States was a social democratic movement. It was resolutely anti-Soviet, and when Eastern Europe and the USSR fell, few in the New Left opposed the destruction of the socialist systems. The New Left did not mourn or protest when the hundreds of millions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia lost their right to jobs, housing at reasonable and legally protected rents, free education through graduate school, health care and cultural enhancement. Most belittled any suggestion that the CIA and certain NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy or the Open Society Fund had actively participated in the annihilation of socialism. These people felt that the Western determination to destroy the USSR since 1917 was barely connected to the fall of the USSR. For them, socialism failed of its own accord, because it was flawed.

As revolutions, such as the ones in Mozambique, Angola, Nicaragua or El Salvador were destroyed by proxy forces or were stalled by demonstration "elections," New Left pragmatists shrugged their shoulders and turned away. The New Left sometimes seemed to deliberately ignore the post-Soviet machinations of U.S. foreign policy.

Bogdan Denitch, who had political aspirations in Croatia, was active within the Open Society Institute, and received OSI funding.³⁶ Denitch favored the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Croatia, NATO bombing of Bosnia and then Yugoslavia,

and even a ground invasion of Yugoslavia.³⁷ Denitch was a founder and chair for many years of the Democratic Socialists of America, a leading liberal-left group in the U.S. He has also long chaired the prestigious Socialist Scholars Conference, through which he was key to manipulating the sympathies of many toward support for NATO expansion.³⁸ Other Soros targets for support include Refuse and Resist the ACLU, and a host of other liberal causes.³⁹ Soros added another unlikely trophy when he became involved in the New School for Social Research in New York, long an academy of choice for left intellectuals. He now funds the East and Central Europe Program there.⁴⁰

Many leftists who were inspired by the revolution in Nicaragua sadly accepted the election of Violetta Chamorro and the defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990. Most of the Nicaragua support network faded thereafter. Perhaps the New Left could have learned from the rising star of Michael Kozak. He was a veteran of Washington's campaigns to install sympathetic leaders in Nicaragua, Panama and Haiti, and to undermine Cuba—he headed the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.

After organizing the Chamorro victory in Nicaragua, Kozak moved on to become U.S. Ambassador to Belarus. Kozak worked with the Soros-sponsored "Internet Access and Training Program" (IATP), which was busy "creating future leaders" in Belarus.⁴¹ This program was simultaneously imposed upon Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. IATP operates openly with the support of the U.S. Department of State. To its credit, Belarus expelled Kozak and the Soros-Open Society/U.S. State Department crowd. The government of Aleksandr Lukashenko found that for four years before moving to Minsk, Kozak was instrumental in engineering the flow of tens of millions of dollars to the Belarus opposition. Kozak was creating a united opposition coalition, funding websites, newspapers and opinion polls, and tutoring a student resistance movement similar to Yugoslavia's Otpor. Kozak brought in Otpor leaders to instruct dissidents in Belarus.⁴² Just before September 11, 2001, the U.S. was revving up a demonization campaign against President Aleksander Lukashenko. Demonizing Lukashenko has temporarily taken a back burner to the "war on terrorism."

Through OSI and HRW, Soros was a major supporter of the B-92 radio station in Belgrade. Soros funded Otpor, the organization that received those "suitcases of money" in support of the October 5, 2000 coup that toppled the Yugoslav gov-

ernment.⁴³ Human Rights Watch helped legitimize the subsequent kidnapping and show trial of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague by saying nothing about his rights.⁴⁴ Louise Arbour, who served as judge at that illegal tribunal, is presently on the Board of Soros' International Crisis Group.⁴⁵ The Open Society/Human Rights Watch gang has been working on Macedonia, calling it part of their "civilizing mission."⁴⁶ Expect that republic to be "saved" to finish the total disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

DEPUTIES OF POWER

Soros has actually stated that he considers his philanthropy moral and his money management business amoral.⁴⁷ Yet those in charge of Soros-funded NGOs have a clear and consistent agenda. One of Soros' most influential institutions is the International Crisis Group, founded in 1986. ICG is headed by individuals from the very center of political and corporate power. Its board includes Zbigniew Brzezinski, Morton Abramowitz, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe; and Richard Allen, former U.S. National Security Adviser. Allen is noteworthy for quitting Nixon's National Security Council out of disgust with the liberal tendencies of Henry Kissinger; recruiting Oliver North to Reagan's National Security Council, and negotiating missiles for hostages in the Iran-Contra scandal. For these individuals, "containing conflict" boils down to U.S. control over the people and resources of the world.

In the 1980s and 1990s, under the aegis of the Reagan Doctrine, U.S. covert and overt operations in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia were in the works. Soros was openly active in most of these places, working to buy off would-be revolutionaries, or subsidize politicians, intellectuals and anyone else who might come to power when the revolutionary moment had passed. According to James Petras:

By the early 1980s the more perceptive sectors of the neoliberal ruling classes realized that their policies were polarizing the society and provoking large-scale social discontent. Neoliberal politicians began to finance and promote a parallel strategy 'from below,' the promotion of 'grassroots' organizations with an 'anti-statist' ideology to intervene among potentially conflictory classes, to create a "social cushion." These organizations were financially dependent on neoliberal sources and were

directly involved in competing with socio-political movements for the allegiance of local leaders and activist communities. By the 1990s these organizations, described as "nongovernmental," numbered in the thousands and were receiving close to four billion dollars world-wide.⁴⁸

In *Underwriting Democracy*, Soros boasts about the "Americanization of Eastern Europe." According to his account, through his education programs he began to establish a young cadre of Sorosian leaders. These Soros Foundation-educated young men and women are prepared to fulfill the functions of so-called "influence agents." Thanks to their fluent knowledge of languages and their insertion into the emerging bureaucracies in target countries, these recruits would philosophically smooth the inroads for Western multinational corporations.

Career diplomat Herbert Okun, on the Europe Committee of Human Rights Watch, along with George Soros, is connected to a host of State Department-linked institutions, from USAID to the Rockefeller-funded Trilateral Commission. From 1990 to 1997, Okun was executive director of something called the Financial Services Volunteer Corps, part of USAID, "to help establish free market financial systems in former communist countries."⁴⁹ George Soros is in complete accord with the capitalists who are in the process of taking control of the global economy.

NON-PROFIT PROFITEERING

Soros claims not to do philanthropy in the countries in which he is involved as a currency trader.⁵⁰ But Soros has often taken advantage of his connections to make key investments. Armed with a study by ICG, and with the support of Bernard Kouchner, chief of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), Soros attempted to acquire the most profitable mining complex in the Balkans.

In September 2000, in a hurry to take the Trepca mines before the Yugoslavian election, Kouchner stated that pollution from the mining complex was raising lead levels in the environment.⁵¹ This is incredible considering that he cheered when the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia rained depleted uranium on the country and released more than 100,000 tons of carcinogens into the air, water and soil.⁵² But Kouchner had his way, and the mines were closed for "health reasons." Soros invested \$150 million in an effort to gain control of Trepca's gold, silver, lead, zinc and cadmium, which make the property worth

\$5 billion.⁵³

As Bulgaria was imploding into "free-market" chaos, Soros was busy scavenging through the wreckage, as Reuters reported in early 2001:

*The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) invested \$3.0 million in [Bulgarian high-tech company] Rila, the first firm to benefit from a new \$30 million facility set up by the EBRD to support IT firms in central and eastern Europe.... Another \$3.0 million came from U.S. private investment fund Argus Capital Partners, sponsored by Prudential Insurance Company of America and operating in central and eastern Europe...Soros, who had invested around \$3.0 million in Rila and in 2001 invested another \$1.0 million...remained its majority owner.*⁵⁴

FRAMING THE ISSUES

His pose as a philanthropist gives Soros the power to shape international public opinion when social conflict raises the question of who are the victims and who are the malefactors. Like other NGOs, Human Rights Watch, Soros' mouthpiece on human rights, avoids or ignores most organized and independent working class struggles.

In Colombia, labor leaders are routinely killed by paramilitaries working in concert with the U.S.-sponsored government. Because those unions oppose neoliberal economics, HRW is relatively silent. In April of this year, HRW's Jose Vivanco testified before the U.S. Senate in favor of Plan Colombia:⁵⁵

*Colombians remain committed to human rights and democracy. They need help. Human Rights Watch has no fundamental problem with the United States providing that help.*⁵⁶

HRW equates the actions of the Colombian guerrilla fighters struggling to free themselves from the oppression of state terror, poverty and exploitation with the repression of the U.S.-sponsored armed forces and paramilitary death squads, the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia). HRW validated the Pastrana government and its military, whose role was to protect property rights and maintain the economic and political status quo. According to HRW, 50% of civilian deaths are the work of the government-tolerated death squads.⁵⁷ The correct number is 80%.⁵⁸

HRW essentially certified the election and ascendancy of the Uribe government

in 2002 as well. Uribe is a throwback to the Latin American dictators the U.S. supported in the past, although he was "elected." HRW had no comment about the fact that the majority boycotted the election.⁵⁹

SOROS FUNDS WORKED TO DEFEAT POPULAR ASPIRATIONS FOLLOWING THE END OF THE DUVALIER DICTATORSHIP BY UNDERMINING HAITI'S FIRST ELECTED LEADER, JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE.

In the Caribbean Basin, Cuba is another opponent of neoliberalism that has been demonized by Human Rights Watch. In nearby Haiti, Soros-funded activities have worked to defeat popular aspirations following the end of the Duvalier dictatorship by undermining Haiti's first democratically elected leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. HRW's Ken Roth helpfully chimed in with U.S. denunciations of Aristide as "undemocratic." To demonstrate his idea of "democracy," Soros foundations were commencing operations in Haiti complimentary to such unseemly U.S. activities as USAID's promotion of persons associated with FRAPH, the notorious CIA-sponsored death squads which have terrorized the country since the fall of 'Baby Doc' Duvalier.⁶⁰

On HRW's web site, Director Roth criticized the U.S. for not opposing China more vigorously. Roth's activities include the creation of the Tibetan Freedom Concert, a traveling propaganda project that toured the U.S. with major rock musicians, urging young people to support Tibet against China.⁶¹ Tibet has been a pet project of the CIA for many years.⁶²

Roth has recently pressed for opposition to Chinese control over its oil-rich western province of Xinjiang. With the colonialist "divide and conquer" approach, Roth has tried to convince some of the Uighur religious minority in Xinjiang that the U.S./NATO intervention in Kosovo holds promise as a model for them. As late as August 2002, the U.S. government has given some support in this endeavor as well.

U.S. designs on this region were signaled clearly when a *New York Times* article on Xinjiang Province in western China described the Uighurs as a "Muslim majority, [which] lives restively under Chinese rule." They "are well versed in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia last year which



October 21, 1996, Presidential Palace, Tbilisi, Georgia. President Eduard Shevardnadze, right, greets George Soros. Both played key roles in the downfall of the USSR. Both are now playing key roles in the destabilization of Russia through the instrument of Chechnya.

some celebrate for liberating the Muslims in Kosovo; they fantasize about a similar 'rescue' here."⁶³ The *New York Times Magazine* noted "Recent discoveries of oil have made Xinjiang extremely attractive to international trade," while comparing the conditions for its indigenous population to those in Tibet.⁶⁴

INNUMERACY

When Sorosian organizations count, they seem to lose track of the truth. Human Rights Watch asserted that 500 people, not over 2,000, were killed by NATO bombers in the 1999 war in Yugoslavia.⁶⁵ They said only 350, not over 4,000, died as a result of U.S. attacks on Afghanistan.⁶⁶ When the U.S. bombed Panama in 1989, HRW prefaced its report by saying that the "ouster of Manuel Noriega...and installation of the democratically-elected government of President Guillermo Endara brought high hopes in Panama..." The report neglected to mention the number of casualties.

Human Rights Watch prepared the groundwork for the NATO attack on Bosnia in 1993 by the false rape-of-thousands and "genocide" stories.⁶⁷ This tactic of creating political hysteria was necessary for the United States to carry out its Balkan policy. It was repeated in 1999 when HRW functioned as the shock troops of indoctrination for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia. All of Soros' blather about the rule of law was forgotten. The U.S. and NATO made their own law, and the institutions of George Soros stood behind it.

Massaging of numbers to provoke a

response was a major part of a Council on Foreign Relations campaign after September 11, 2001. This time it was the 2,801 killed in the World Trade Center. The CFR met on November 6, 2001, to plan a "major public diplomacy campaign." CFR created an "Independent Task Force on America's Response to Terrorism." Soros joined Richard C. Holbrooke, Newton L. Gingrich, John M. Shalikashvili (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and other powerful individuals on a campaign to make the Trade Center dead into tools for U.S. foreign policy. The CFR report set out to make the case for a war on terrorism. George Soros' fingerprints were all over the campaign:

Have senior-level U.S. officials press friendly Arab and other Muslim governments not only to publicly condemn the 9/11 attacks, but also to back the rationale and goals of the U.S. anti-terror campaign. We are never going to convince the publics in the Middle East and South Asia of the righteousness of our cause if their governments remain silent. We need to help them to deflect any blow-back from such statements, but we must have them vocally on board.... Encourage Bosnian, Albanian, and Turkish Muslims to educate foreign audiences regarding the U.S. role in saving the Muslims of Bosnia and Kosovo in 1995-99, and our long-standing, close ties to Muslims around the world. Engage regional intellectuals and journalists across the board, regardless of their views. Routinely monitor the regional press in real time to enable prompt responses... Stress references to the victims (and ideally, named

*victims to personalize them) whenever we discuss our cause and goals.*⁶⁸

Sorosian innumeracy: counting to bolster and defend U.S. foreign policy.

Soros is very worried about the decline in the world capitalist system and he wants to do something about it, now. He recently said: "I can already discern the makings of the final crisis.... Indigenous political movements are likely to arise that will seek to expropriate the multinational corporations and recapture the 'national' wealth."⁶⁹

Soros is seriously suggesting a plan to circumvent the United Nations. He proposes that the "democracies of the world ought to take the lead and forge a global network of alliances that could work with or without the United Nations." If he were psychotic, one might think he was having an episode. But the fact is, Soros' assertion that "The United Nations is constitutionally incapable of fulfilling the promises contained in the preamble of its charter," reflects the thinking of such reactionary institutions as the American Enterprise Institute.⁷⁰ Though many conservatives refer to the Soros network as left-wing, on the question of U.S. affiliation with the United Nations Soros is on the same page as the likes of John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, who, with "[M]any Republicans in Congress—believe that nothing more should be paid to the UN system."⁷¹ There has been a decades-long rightwing campaign against the UN. Now Soros is leading it. On various Soros web sites one may read criticism of the United Nations as too rich, unwilling to share information, or flawed in ways that make it unfit for the way the world should run according to George Soros.

Even writers at *The Nation*, writers who clearly ought to know better, have been influenced by Soros' ideas. William Greider, for instance, recently found some validity in Soros' criticism that the United Nations should not be a venue for "tin-pot dictators and totalitarians...treated as equal partners."⁷² This kind of Eurocentric racism is at the heart of Soros' hubris. His assumption that the United States can and should run the world is a prescription for fascism on a global scale. For much too long, Western "progressives" have been giving Soros a pass. Probably Greider and others will find the reference to fascism excessive, unjustified, even outrageous.

But just listen closely to what Soros himself has to say: "In old Rome, the Romans only voted. In the modern global capitalism, the Americans only vote. The Brazilians do not vote."⁷³

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Massacre in Jenin

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE STAGE-MANAGEMENT OF IMPERIALISM

Sara Flounders

On a fact-finding trip to the West Bank and Gaza, one of our delegation's main goals was gaining entry to Jenin. For most Palestinians a trip to Jenin during that period would have been impossible. Even a U.S. passport didn't guarantee travel through the numerous roadblocks and closures on the way. We left the outskirts of Ramallah on foot at early dawn on May 23, 2002. To avoid Israeli roadblocks and lines of tanks, we met a driver in a village, then drove through back roads and across fields far to the east up the Jordan valley, headed first for Nablus.

But an Israeli assassination operation was under way in Nablus. The city was under total curfew, tightly sealed—no exceptions. A call to a doctor in Nablus confirmed there was no way in and no way for anyone in Nablus to move that day.

The call also made clear that Israel could no longer enforce total isolation or operate with total impunity. Cell phones and computers mean that even in the midst of total lockdown it is possible to hear exactly what is happening miles away on a street corner, from the buzz of an Apache helicopter to giant bulldozers crushing cinderblock homes.

Just the day before, the IDF had swooped into Jenin once again to carry out an assassination, killing three Palestinians. Firing a missile from a U.S.-supplied Apache helicopter, the IDF executed its target—plus two innocent bystanders.

As we arrived in Jenin, a funeral for those assassinated the previous day was under way. Children with flags gathered as young girls in pinstripe uniforms carrying book bags picked their way home through rubble. Their uniforms were clean even though some of the homes they entered had only three walls.

Rashid Mansur, Director of the Emergency Committee for the Relief and Rebuilding of Jenin Camp, took us atop a mosque overlooking what was the center of Jenin Camp so we could see the scale of destruction. Mansur pointed to the ruins of a home about 100 feet away; the remains of the roof lay on the ground. "Everyone fled that home except one disabled relative. The IDF bulldozers began their work. His family

pleaded with the IDF to let them remove him before they bulldozed the house. They just went on, burying him alive. The family still has been unable to retrieve the body." Hardly a building still standing was free of

It's justified and in fact essential to learn from every possible source—even how the German army fought in the Warsaw Ghetto, said one IDF officer.

holes gouged by tank rounds.

Mansur informed us that there had been 55 funerals with burials. Of the known dead, 17 were fighters the rest were civilians. Another 40 to 50 people are unaccounted for and presumed under the rubble. "The stench of death hung over the camp for many days," he told us.

This description corresponds to an April 18 CNN interview by Christianne Amanpour with Terje Roed-Larsen, the UN special envoy to the Middle East.¹

The smell was horrible—decaying corpses below the rubble. And we saw, for instance, a 12-year-old boy being—with some people digging with their hands—they were digging him out, and his completely, demolished body. We saw, for instance, two brothers who were digging out their father and their other brothers below the rubble, the corpses in pieces. It was horrible, an absolutely unbelievable scene.

What happened in Jenin was no isolated incident. It is part of a systematic policy for the Sharon government. A few days earlier in Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza at the Al-Awda Hospital run by the United Health Work Committee, Dr. Abu Sitta had explained to us Sharon's policy. In 1971,

General Ariel Sharon attacked Jabalya Camp with tanks and bulldozers. Hundreds of homes in the narrow streets of the camp were bulldozed to create broad avenues that would allow Israeli tanks to move with ease through the center of the camp. The occupiers allowed no rebuilding on the avenues. Today they are called "Sharon's boulevards."

TWO STORIES OF JENIN

The story of Jenin can be told two ways. One is of the resistance of poorly armed guerrillas who fought to the death rather than surrender to a powerful occupation army. Their heroism was such that Israeli progressive journalist Uri Avnery wrote that, "the Palestinian nation was born in Jenin."

The other way—and equally true—is of a civilian population trapped by the fire of that occupation army, massacred by it. The IDF, the Israeli regime of Ariel Sharon, the U.S. government and the powerful corporate media did their best to insist there was "no massacre" in Jenin and to prevent an investigation. Why was this so important to them? How did they do it?

Israel and the U.S. feared the impact of international condemnation. For example, the *Guardian* of London wrote on April 17:

"Israel's international reputation slumped to its lowest point for two decades yesterday, amid condemnation in Britain and Europe of the Israeli army's behavior at the Palestinian refugee camp in Jenin in the West Bank."²

Under Jordanian rule in 1953, Jenin Camp was established as a refugee center within the municipal boundaries of the city

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May 2002, Jenin. Merkava tanks of the Israeli "Defense" Force await orders from Tel Aviv.

of Jenin. Its inhabitants gradually replaced the emergency tents that once provided shelter with cement homes, most the size of the original small UNRWA tent. They dug basements in some places adding second, third and even fourth floors.

As we walked through this wasteland and along narrow alleys, people, drawn by the camera and microphone, told us their stories. An elderly woman said, "I was made a refugee in 1948. I was driven out in 1967. I'm not moving again." She was camped with her whole family in front of the two remaining walls of her home, tending a cooking pot over an open fire.

A young woman, a student, called us over. "This was my home," she said as she pointed to a pile of rubble. We saw two boys, 9 and 11 years old, sorting through wreckage on the ground. "This was where we lived," they said. "We go to school near where we are sleeping now, but we come here every day to look for our things." School was five miles away. "My mother's sister was inside," we heard. "My cousin was trapped." Again and again in places of packed earth or rubble, we heard descriptions of homes that had been demolished with someone still inside.

A man who walked with a cane described his terror as Israeli troops used him as a human shield. They forced him to enter buildings and rooms in front of the troops to check for fighters. As he backed out of a

room, the troops would toss in a grenade.

Four members of one family described how they crawled from building to building seeking an exit as the Israeli bulldozers moved in unannounced in the middle of the night to clear houses. Their own home was pushed over just as they entered the basement of the small cinderblock home next door.

Mansur recounted his 15-year-old son's arrest and detention, with hundreds of other camp residents, saying this made him the 4th generation in his family to spend time in Israeli jails. He also told us the Israelis used 25,000 IDF troops and 270 Israeli tanks against 13,000 refugees, very few of whom were armed.

The *New York Times* described the scale of the attack in Jenin and the type of weapons used: "The mismatch in force of arms was stark." The Israeli Army used:

Vulcan anti-aircraft guns, able to shoot 3,000 rounds a minute, inside the camp. It used Cobra helicopters with thermal detection capability to fire TOW missiles—intended for use against tanks on open battlefields—through walls of houses, some with noncombatants inside. It deployed scores of Merkava tanks and armored vehicles equipped with machine guns. It used bulldozers to raze civilian homes, crushing more and more of them with less warning, Palestinians said.

*Buzzing drones and balloons carrying cameras monitored the fighting from above, and from a hilltop encampment just outside Jenin, officers coordinated the combat, using detailed maps and sophisticated communications.*³

But a statement published in the major Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*, more than two months before the attack on Jenin, shows that Israeli military planners intended exactly the scale of destruction that unfolded:

*In order to prepare properly for the next campaign, one of the highest Israeli officers in the territories said not long ago, it's justified and in fact essential to learn from every possible source. If the mission will be to seize a densely populated refugee camp, or take over the Casbah in Nablus...then he must first analyze and internalize the lessons of earlier battles—even, however shocking it may sound, even how the German army fought in the Warsaw Ghetto.*⁴

The quote shows how Israel now seeks to learn the tactics of the Nazi Army of occupation in Poland, while recognizing that Palestinians would choose the resistance of the besieged Jewish community of the Warsaw ghetto.

The Warsaw Ghetto uprising began on

April 19, 1943, when 2,000 SS troops entered the Jewish ghetto of Warsaw, home to 60,000 people. The Nazi troops met machine-gun fire and Molotov cocktails and suffered 200 casualties on the first day. In a month of fighting, the Nazis totally leveled the ghetto.

The scale of the Israeli Army's destruction of Jenin was hardly an isolated incident. During the same days, the IDF forces

Helicopters are strafing civilian residential areas, systematic shelling by tanks has wounded hundreds, bulldozers are razing refugee homes...

in Nablus had carried out a similar offensive. As they had planned, large sections of the ancient Casbah of Nablus were reduced to rubble. Tanks, giant bulldozers and helicopter gunships were used in the center of 'Old Nablus.' The entire West Bank was under military occupation. Tanks patrolled city streets in Ramallah, Bethlehem and Tulkarm.

Again the *New York Times*, April 11, 2002, reported conditions throughout the West Bank. "It is safe to say that the infrastructure of life itself and of any future Palestinian state—roads, schools, electricity pylons, water pipes, telephone lines—has been devastated."

But the Israeli offensive in Jenin became a focus of international attention because there was such protracted and fierce resistance that the siege lasted for ten days. The IDF shut off water and electricity, prevented access to hospitals, fired on ambulances, and denied access to journalists and aid agencies. Desperate residents pleaded over cell phones for water, food, or help in moving the injured.

Pressure on the UN to act escalated quickly because Israeli forces were shelling refugee camps that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency had administered for 54 years. UNRWA, a UN agency, was issuing almost daily press releases describing the horror in the refugee camps as the IDF assault destroyed its schools and health clinics and fired on its ambulances

and food trucks, turning them away from West Bank camps. Even members of its staff were rounded up.

By April 7, UNRWA Commissioner General Peter Hansen said the IDF had made the Jenin and Balata refugee camps

...a hellish battleground...we are getting reports of pure horror—helicopters are strafing civilian residential areas, systematic shelling by tanks has wounded hundreds, bulldozers are razing refugee homes...food and medicine are running out, ambulances don't have passage...a humanitarian disaster is in the making.

By April 10, UNRWA described "catastrophic conditions" in Jenin. Its April 16 report to the UN used the term "monumental destruction."

The major media reported casualty figures on Jenin from Israeli military figures. CBS Evening News reported April 12: "The Israeli army estimates that it killed 100 to 200 people in eight days of fighting. ABC Nightline reported April 11 that the IDF "estimates 100 Palestinian fighters were killed there but refused to say where the bodies are, and they continue to bar news people from the camp." By Israel's own admission, thousands of Palestinian men had been rounded up throughout the West Bank. UN Special Envoy Roed-Larsen in an interview at Jenin Camp described the situation as, "horrific beyond belief."⁵ Some of the most damning reports came from the UN's own agencies and from Israeli military forces.

DISTRACT, DELAY, DERAIL

Arab members of the UN Security Council, pressed to act by the exploding mass movements in their own streets, as a bloc proposed a resolution that called for sending a multinational force to defend the Palestinians from the Israeli onslaught throughout the occupied West Bank. They also proposed organizing an inquiry into Israeli occupation crimes in the West Bank. Clearly the resolution would be a major embarrassment unacceptable to the United States.

The U.S. government financially, militarily, politically and diplomatically supports Israel and its continuing attacks on the Palestinian people. That's because Washington considers Israel one of the best defenders of U.S. corporate interests in the region.

On April 4, the U.S. pushed through UN Security Council Resolution 1403, "welcoming the mission of the U.S. Secretary of State to the region as well as

efforts by others...to bring about a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

Washington claimed it was brokering a deal to end the Israeli siege. U.S. Special Envoy General Anthony Zinni was in Israel during the entire Israeli offensive. Secretary of State Colin Powell was in Israel supposedly to discuss 'peace' as news coverage of Jenin reached world attention. Although both U.S. officials attended commemorations of Israeli casualties, neither made any attempt to go to Jenin. Israel could hardly have denied either of them the access it denied the UN.

Arab countries called on the Bush administration to intervene to restrain Israel. Washington did not want to be in the position of publicly vetoing an Arab resolution in the UN Security Council that called for strong UN action at a time of international outrage. So a back-room deal was made to avoid a U.S. veto, give the appearance of some movement and yet ensure that no significant action was authorized. The stronger Security Council resolution of the Arab Group was withdrawn and the U.S. crafted the watered-down Resolution 1405 that passed with unanimous support on April 19.

Israeli leaders initially claimed they welcomed the U.S.-worded resolution because their hands were "clean," they had acted in "self-defense." While Israel stalled, Secretary of State Colin Powell publicly backed up the Israeli claim that no massacre had taken place. On April 24, speaking before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Powell said, "clearly people died in Jenin...I've seen no evidence that would suggest a massacre took place."⁶

This became the official position. No investigation was needed because no massacre had taken place. While the outside world, even relief agencies, were barred from the camp the Israelis began a series of demands. They demanded further changes in the composition of the delegation for "balance," the addition of military personnel, and insisted that no interviews or interrogation of any Israeli troops could take place. Finally they decreed that the fact-finding team could reach no conclusions, nor call for any specific action. While these issues were debated, all members of the expanded fact-finding team were put on hold.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan acquiesced to each new Israeli demand. Yet Israel still denied the UN team entry



May 2002. Jenin.

into the refugee camp. Israel could not have taken any of these actions without the full support of Washington.

Even UN members who had initially made very strong reports, such as UN Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen began to backtrack under heavy pressure.

I have been totally misrepresented in parts of the Israeli media, evidently quoting me wrongly, saying that I stated that there was a massacre in Jenin. I said nothing of the sort.... There was a stench of decaying bodies there which was absolutely awful. But that does not imply that I said that there was a massacre there. These are horrors of war, and I cannot judge if there was a massacre or not. And this is why everybody should now be relieved that there will be a fact-finding mission which will find out what happened there. And after that we will all judge.⁷

Finally, on May 3, two weeks after the unanimous passage of the U.S.-drafted resolution, Kofi Annan officially disbanded the "fact-finding" team because Israel would not allow entry even after every Israeli demand had been accepted.

Tunisian representative to the UN Nouredine Mejdoub stated in a special Security Council session on May 3,

Let us imagine that an Arab state had committed an act many times less grave than those perpetrated by Israel. Immediately a coalition force would have been formed, the rule of law would have been invoked, the binding nature of council resolutions would have been reaffirmed and sanctions would have been imposed.⁸

The Bush administration, which scripted and then dropped its mild resolution on Jenin after just two weeks, is nevertheless still demanding full enforcement of sanctions resolutions imposed on Iraq—12 years after Iraqi troops left Kuwait.

Yet even after the UN disbanded the fact-finding team and dropped any implementation of its resolution, the U.S. was faced with a political problem. It was beyond dispute that the Palestinian refugees in the densely populated cinder block housing in the center of Jenin had been attacked with tanks and missiles and their homes then bulldozed into rubble. And there was still the stench of the charge that Israeli troops had committed "massacres" in Jenin and in other camps. This is where another arm of U.S. policy comes in.

ENTER HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

On the very day that the UN Secretary General moved to disband the fact-finding team, it was hardly treated as news. All the corporate media were conveniently running banner headlines stating that "no massacre" had taken place in Jenin. They gave as the objective authority for this finding the organization Human Rights Watch.

This let the IDF and the U.S.—which was author of the Security Council resolution and primary supporter of Israel—off the hook.

In fact, the Human Rights Watch report identifies 52 Palestinians killed during the Israeli operation and devotes 42 pages to describing a whole series of "possible" war crimes and violations of international law that the Israeli forces committed. But all this is buried in a report on their web site that few will ever see.

The story that CNN, BBC, AP, AFP, network TV, news magazines and all the other corporate media reported globally in bold headlines and sound bites was that a Human Rights Watch investigation had confirmed "No Jenin massacre." As CNN reported on May 3, "Human Rights Watch found no evidence that Israeli troops massacred Palestinian civilians in Jenin...said Peter Bouckaert, senior researcher for the group and a member of the investigative team." This was the news in a sound bite.



May 2002, Jenin. "Sharon, you only make us stronger."

It was reinforced in countless articles.

The news reports were based on an interview which Peter Bouckaert gave to the *Washington Post* on April 26, live from Jenin as he released the report. His words exactly echoed Colin Powell's statement the week before and Israel's position.

In the news coverage this sounded like it was the finding of an "official" inquiry, with no further investigation needed. This was not the first time HRW has stepped in to reinforce U.S. policy with a veneer of apparently unbiased non-governmental judgment.

Who is Human Rights Watch and how were they able to gain access to Jenin for an inquiry at the very time that Israel was denying entry to a delegation chosen by the UN Security Council?

Human Rights Watch was supposedly created to monitor "human rights abuses" worldwide. In reality, it is an institution that has acted at every turn to reinforce the policies of the United States and justify its "humanitarian interventions." It is composed almost entirely of U.S. citizens and its board includes multimillionaires, former U.S. government officials and mainstream academics.

Human Rights Watch began as Helsinki Watch in 1975. It was a powerful Cold War instrument against the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc countries of Eastern Europe. Its network became a web of support for pro-capitalist forces and political dissidents in every country.

Multibillionaire George Soros has played a major role in the development of Human Rights Watch and in linking it with his own personal NGO network, Open Society Institute. Aryeh Neier, the director

first of Helsinki Watch and then Human Rights Watch moved on to head the Open Society Institute. Many other directors share positions and change titles within a small world of U.S.-based NGOs.

HRW's Middle East North Africa division has used its position to build support for the continuing U.S. war and sanctions against Iraq. According to the reports of four major UN agencies (WHO, FAO, UNICEF, WFP), UN Security Council sanctions, kept in place at U.S. insistence, have caused the deaths of over 1.5 million Iraqis. Withholding food and civilian supplies is a war crime. However, Human Rights Watch has proposed that to help weaken Saddam Hussein and "encourage Iraqi officials to overthrow him. Saddam Hussein be indicted by an international court for war crimes." (HRW press release, January 5, 2000). If the U.S. objective is an invasion of Iraq, Human Rights Watch is only too happy to oblige with reports and suggestions.

Human Rights Watch claims its reports are objective, balanced and evenhanded. When it comes to Palestine this has meant equating the violence of the illegal Israeli occupation with the resistance of Palestinians to overwhelming military force. Once Human Rights Watch declared that "no massacre" had occurred in Jenin, the demand for an inquiry and international action against Israeli crimes virtually disappeared. Media coverage shifted sharply. The Bush administration made a new round of demands on the Palestinians to condemn violence while calling Ariel Sharon "a man of peace" and expressing sympathy for Israeli "self-defense" measures. HRW statements echoed these shifts.

WHAT IS A MASSACRE?

The word "massacre" cannot be trivialized into an argument over semantics. The decision to reject evidence of a massacre at Jenin was a political decision to immunize Sharon, the IDF, Israel, and their U.S. backers from responsibility. Webster's Unabridged (1998) defines massacre as:

"killing with indiscriminate violence, killing a number of people where much resistance can not be made and reckless murders."

This is an apt description of IDF actions at Jenin: precisely the truth that Human Rights Watch, Israel and the U.S. government are so anxious to dispel.

SOME UNDISPUTED MASSACRES

- **Boston Massacre, 1770:** British troops shoot into a crowd of protesters, killing five.
- **Sand Creek Massacre, 1864:** 700 Colorado volunteers attack an unarmed camp of 500 Arapaho and Cheyenne elders, women and children with small arms and howitzers, killing over 150.
- **Ludlow Massacre, 1914:** Colorado National Guard machinegun a tent camp of striking miners and their families, killing 20.
- **Qibya Massacre, 1953:** IDF soldiers commanded by Ariel Sharon killed 67, mainly women and children.
- **Sharpeville Massacre, 1960:** At a demonstration opposing racist pass laws like those imposed by Israel on Palestine, apartheid troops opened fire, killing 69.
- **Tlatelolco Massacre, 1968:** At a demonstration against rent increases resulting from plans to host the Olympic Games, Mexican police and federal troops surround Tlatelolco Square, trap the crowd and open fire, killing over 300.
- **My Lai Massacre, 1968:** US Army soldiers commanded by Lieutenant William Calley kill 504 Vietnamese women, elders and children. No return shots fired.
- **Sabra and Shatila Massacre, 1982:** Ariel Sharon was found guilty by an Israeli government commission for his involvement in this massacre in Lebanon, in which up to 2,000 Palestinian civilians were killed.

POSTSCRIPT

In "Colombia Human Rights Certification III," HRW quotes without comment the definition used by the office of Public Advocate (Defensoria del Pueblo) of Colombia: "the killing of three or more people at the same place and at the same time." <www.hrw.org/press/2002/02/colombia0205.htm>

When Israeli tanks rolled back into the cities of the West Bank after a two-week pullback from the siege of President Yassir Arafat in his compound in Ramallah, HRW was silent. Twenty-four hour curfews lasted for days; targeted assassinations took place with increasing frequency. Human Rights Watch was silent.

After the shift by the Bush administration to more open support of Israel, HRW's condemnation of violence on the part of Palestinians became far stronger and more prominent than its mild rebuke of Israel.

No statement was made condemning the concrete wall under construction dividing the entire West Bank. New walls and trenches filled with barbed wire surround whole towns, Palestinians cannot move in or out. New Israeli regulations deny Palestinians the right to leave their village or town of residence for any reason. Visits to an aged parent, work or a medical emergency are rejected. The accelerating land expropriations, house demolitions, the continuing mass arrests, and the hundreds in detention received no investigation or condemnation from Human Rights Watch.

HRW's statement released June 19 makes no criticism or even any mention of Israeli violence or occupation. The entire statement is a condemnation of Palestinian actions. It opens: "Yesterday's suicide bombing attack on a bus in Jerusalem is an atrocity for which there is no justification, Human Rights Watch said today...Human Rights Watch has repeatedly called on Palestinian leaders to stop the attacks and bring those responsible to justice."

For all its many declarations of support for democracy and democratically elected governments, HRW had not a word of criticism for Bush's demand that democratically elected President Yassir Arafat be

replaced with a politician more to the U.S. and Israel's liking. In 1996 President Arafat was elected by 87% of the popular vote in an election that international observers, including former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, declared to be free and fair. Needless to say, HRW made no statements

HRW had not a word of criticism for Bush's demand that democratically elected President Yassir Arafat be replaced with a politician more to the U.S. and Israel's liking.

concerning voting irregularities in George W. Bush's election.

After having played a pivotal role in U.S.-Israeli damage-control operations by declaring "No Massacre" at exactly the moment that the UN Security Council fact-finding delegation was disbanded because of Israeli intransigence, HRW swung back into action for some late mop-up work in early August by publicly attacking what it called weaknesses in the UN General Assembly Report on Jenin.

United States policymakers have many instruments at their disposal. The most effective are those organizations that seem to have an independent voice. However, these organizations have on their boards

the directors of major corporations, policy think tanks, media outlets and academic institutions. Such organizations are thoroughly committed not to human rights but to U.S. corporate rule of the world.

Those corporations have a big stake in total U.S. domination of the Middle East. The oil of the Gulf region and the military contracts that subsidize the largest U.S. corporations are the largest source of profit. The consumer and labor markets are huge and growing.

The abandoned UN resolution—and hundreds more passed and then ignored—together with the Human Rights Watch whitewash, confirm once again that the future of Palestine depends heavily on the commitment of solidarity activists around the world. Palestinians are paying the ultimate price for their basic human rights. History will record whether they paid in vain, or whether we stood with them in their struggle.

NOTES

1. CNN, April 18, 2002.
2. *Guardian* (London), April 17, 2002.
3. *New York Times*, April 21, 2002.
4. *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), January 25, 2002.
5. CNN, April 18, 2002.
6. *Arutz Sheva, Israel National News*, April 25, 2002.
7. CNN, April 22, 2002.
8. United Nations Press Release, <www.un.org/News/Press/doc/2002/sc7391.doc.htm>.

FURTHER READING

For an insightful look at how Amnesty International failed to deal with Jenin, see: Dennis Bernstein and Francis Boyle, "Massacre at Jenin," *CovertAction Quarterly*, no. 73, Summer 2002.

U.S. Aid to Israel: Profits to the Merchants of Death

U.S. aid to Israel has averaged \$15 million daily for the last 50 years—one third of the foreign aid budget. Less widely understood is that over 60% of U.S. aid to Israel goes to U.S. armaments corporations. From 1997 to 2002, over \$5 billion in U.S. aid to Israel went to Lockheed Martin, including \$2.5 billion for 50 F-16 fighters, and \$2 billion for support contracts, spare parts, low altitude and infrared night targeting systems, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. Boeing sells Israel Apache helicopters. United Technologies sells Blackhawk helicopters. Raytheon sells Patriot missiles. Northrop Grumman sells radar. Exxon/Mobil sells jet fuel. The list goes on and on and on. The last thing U.S. corporations need is peace.

SOURCE

Jordan Green, "Arming the Occupation: A Chronology of U.S. Military Aid and Weapons Contracts to Israel, 1995-present," *Institute for Southern Studies* (Durham, North Carolina) April 4, 2002.

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Bosnia to Bondsteel & Beyond

BALKANIZATION, AMERICAN STYLE

Diana Johnstone

The self-styled "humanitarian" intervention in Yugoslavia provided a particularly blatant example of the U.S. policy of allying with whatever local forces can break up independent states in strategic locations. The Balkans are a strategic gateway to the Middle East, across the Black Sea and the Caspian to Central Asia and its vast natural resources. From the Balkans to China, gaining a foothold against other local forces can mean favoring Islamic fundamentalism, as in Bosnia, and ruthless armed criminal bands, notably in Kosovo. Or both. As a possible trial run for future aggression farther to the East, the 1999 "Kosovo war" has left the western Balkans fragmented into mutually hostile mini-states and protectorates, too weak and demoralized to adopt independent policies. Moreover, ongoing U.S. support for the murderous "Kosovo Liberation Front" (UÇK) promises still more war in the region. Meanwhile, the United States armed forces lord it over the ruined region from their mammoth new base in southern Kosovo, Camp Bondsteel. Rapidly constructed on unilaterally confiscated land, Camp Bondsteel shows why the United States insisted that any negotiated solution to the Kosovo problem must include NATO occupation. With the acquisition of a major military post and imposition of a protectorate, the "humanitarian" Kosovo war turns out to have been a war of conquest, no different from past colonial wars with noble pretexts.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN BOSNIA

The paradoxical alliance between expansionist Western power and retrograde Islamic fundamentalism is a continuation of British policy toward the Middle East. In the 19th century, the struggle to throw off Turkish Ottoman rule favored the enthusiastic spread of modern secular and democratic ideas in the Balkans and the Middle East. Egypt in the Arab world and Serbia in the Balkans were centers of this movement. Egypt in particular seemed destined to lead a modernizing transformation of the Muslim Arab world. Islamic fundamentalism was a virulent form of indigenous reaction against such progressive trends. The most corrupt and reactionary forces were

often favored by Western powers—notably the British—as easier to manipulate and ultimately control. An economically docile obscurantist regime seemed preferable to a more dynamic enlightened leadership aspiring to manage affairs without Western guidance. Saudi Arabia is the centerpiece

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF NATO COUNTRIES, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, WILL BE TO SERVE AS STAGING AREAS FOR AMERICAN WARS IN THE BALKANS, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE GULF.

of this alliance between the Anglo-Americans and Islamic fundamentalism.

In 1991, the destruction of Yugoslavia began when Germany forced its European partners to recognize the non-negotiated secessions of Slovenia and Croatia. All diplomatic observers warned that Croatian secession risked setting off a bloody conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which as part of Nazi-sponsored Greater Croatia had been the scene of the most horrendous massacres of Serbs perpetrated by Croatian Ustashi fascists, abetted by a Muslim SS division. With the help of professional public relations agencies, a man reputed to have been part of an ultra-right Muslim youth group during World War II, Alija Izetbegovic, was portrayed in the West as the champion of "multicultural" Bosnia against the racist nationalism of the Serbs. This misrepresented both Izetbegovic's political philosophy and the reality of the complicated conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, marked by mutual fears and outbursts of frightful brutality on all sides. (See my article "Collective Guilt and Collective Innocence," *CovertAction Quarterly*, no. 68, Fall-Winter 1999.)

To his own countrymen, Izetbegovic had made clear his belief that once a country had a Muslim majority, it should

be ruled according to Islamic tenets. Islam, he insisted, rejects the Western secular division between religion and political power. In Bosnia, demographic trends had recently caused the Muslim population to exceed that of the Serbs and might soon constitute an absolute majority. The prospect of having to live as a minority in an Islamic state was unacceptable to the Serbs, who as Christians had for centuries been reduced to serf status under the Ottoman Empire, which accorded all social, economic and political privileges to Muslims.

To head off a civil war, European Community diplomats made an attempt to broker a compromise. The "Lisbon accord" called for decentralizing Bosnia-Herzegovina into cantons. The cantonization proposal was signed on March 18, 1992, by Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban on behalf of the Muslim, Serb and Croat communities respectively. It was a compromise to avoid civil war. It would have created a more unitary republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina than the one that emerged from the Dayton accords after four and a half years of war. However, it did not satisfy Izetbegovic because, in the words of United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann, it would have "denied him and his Muslim party a dominant role in the republic." Ambassador Zimmermann hastened to call on Izetbegovic in Sarajevo to discuss the Lisbon accord. "He said he didn't like it, I told him, if he didn't like it, why sign it?" Zimmermann recalled later.¹ Without the promise of superpower backing, Izetbegovic might have felt obliged to accept compromise. Apparently only too glad to be encouraged to hold out for more, Izetbegovic reversed himself and withdrew his support for the Lisbon accord.

Oddly enough, the very same people who rejoiced to see multicultural Yugoslavia torn to pieces adopted "multicultur-

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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al Bosnia" as the cause of the century that must be defended at all costs, including war. Any talk of partition, even cantonization, was widely denounced as a betrayal of the ideal of multiculturalism. No peace deal could be accepted which failed to maintain Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified, centralized state. This was in accordance with the interests of the Muslim party which aspired to govern a large, united territory. Izetbegovic's Muslim party was against partition, for the simple and obvious reason that it would reduce the size of a predominantly Muslim state.

STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE

With Alija Izetbegovic and his Muslim party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the United States government had found its own client (or pawn) to back in the silent rivalry between Western powers over the remains of Yugoslavia. If Germany had its own client, Croatia, the United States now had the Bosnian Muslims. In violation of a UN arms embargo, the Clinton administration secretly helped Izetbegovic arm his military forces, with considerable input from Islamic states and Mujahedin fighters.

To the world, the Bosnian Muslim cause was portrayed as defenseless martyrdom for the sake of "multiculturalism." Innocent supporters of the "multicultural" cause called for "lifting the arms embargo," unaware that it was being systematically violated by a U.S.-backed airlift in cahoots with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Above all, the Muslims won the propaganda war from the outset. Bosnia-Herzegovina's first ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Sacirbey, was a well-connected American citizen. The Sacirbegovic (Sacirbey) family were politically active anti-communist Muslims who emigrated to the United States when Mohammed was seven years old. His father ran the U.S. branch of Izetbegovic's SDA party. The young Sacirbey already lived in New York when he was given the high-profile UN post in the spring of 1992. The Izetbegovic and Sacirbegovic families belonged to the Muslim upper class (the "beg" in Bosnian names comes from the Turkish title "bey") who had enjoyed elite privileges during the centuries of Ottoman Turkish rule and might be considered more safely anti-communist than the Bosnian Serb descendants of downtrodden peasants.

Being allied with the Bosnian Muslims had obvious political and geostrategic advantages for the United States. It helped cement Washington's crucial strategic alliance with Turkey, as well as with other Muslim countries in the arc reaching across Central Asia to the petroleum



Greg Gibson/AP Photo

Tuesday, November 23, 1999. Living large, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. President Clinton and daughter Chelsea break bread with Task Force Falcon Commander Brig. Gen. Craig A. Peterson (center).

reserves of the Caspian region. The Turks were described as the "key nation" in the region, and this was "bad news for the Serbs."² Bosnia also provided a miniature "Muslim versus Slav" conflict as an experimental rehearsal for greater conflicts that may develop along the southern rim of the former Soviet Union, and all the way into China.

The pro-Muslim Bosnia policy facilitated practical cooperation between the Clinton administration and the Muslim countries that financed the Muslim cause and furnished both arms and fighters—notably, a number of the same Mujahedin that the United States had supported in Afghanistan in pursuit of Zbigniew Brzezinski's strategy to weaken the Soviet Union along its "soft underbelly," that is, the predominantly Muslim southern tier.

Bosnia also provided a useful demonstration that, despite unshakable support for Israel and the ongoing destruction of Iraq, the United States was not anti-Muslim. The creation of a religiously defined Muslim state could help normalize Israel's status as a religiously defined Jewish state. The Bosnian Muslim connection received strong political support from segments of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. because it promised to strengthen the crucial strategic U.S.-Israeli-Turkish alliance in the Middle East. This attitude was very frankly expressed in a January 1996 column by *New Republic* editors Jacob Heilbrunn and Michael Lind who wrote:

...instead of seeing Bosnia as the eastern frontier of NATO, we should view the

Balkans as the western frontier of America's rapidly expanding sphere of influence in the Middle East....The fact that the United States is more enthusiastic than its European allies about a Bosnian Muslim state reflects, among other things, the new American role as the leader of an informal collection of Muslim nations from the Gulf to the Balkans. The regions once ruled by the Ottoman Turks show signs of becoming the heart of a third American empire.³

The two editors predicted with remarkable foresight that: "The main purpose of NATO countries, for the foreseeable future, will be to serve as staging areas for American wars in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Gulf."

PETRODOLLAR DIPLOMACY

Champions of mythical "multicultural" Bosnia could occasionally be heard to lament that their cause lacked support from Western powers because Bosnia had no oil. In reality, Bosnia's friends had lots of oil, and lots of dollars. As a result, the cause never lacked support. Since many Muslim states, from Saudi Arabia to Brunei, are important sources of oil and petrodollars, cooperation with them in a holy cause could only be good for business. While officially enforcing the arms embargo, the Pentagon in reality ensured the regular flow of arms to the Bosnian Muslims by turning a blind AWACS eye to clandestine flights of a fleet of black C-130 Hercules transport aircraft delivering military equipment into the "safe area" at

Tuzla. With attention turned away, the truth is allowed to come out in official reports:

In both Afghanistan and the Gulf, the Pentagon had incurred debts to Islamic groups and their Middle Eastern sponsors. By 1993 these groups, many supported by Iran and Saudi Arabia, were anxious to help Bosnian Muslims fighting in the former Yugoslavia and called in their debts

by a vast panoply of semi-governmental "non-governmental organizations" which absorb most of the "donations" and constitute a permanent lobby within the Western countries from which they come for the continuation of such arrangements.

SACRIFICING PEACE

Izetbegovic expected this war and had been actively preparing for it. At a February

into action to secure Muslim territory in the spring of 1992. In the long run, they stood to make up for their initial disadvantage in heavy arms by controlling the largest of Bosnia's many arms factories and above all by help from abroad. In 1992, several thousand Islamic "holy warriors" entered Bosnia, mostly with accreditation from humanitarian organizations based in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Muslim countries. A principal channel for illegal arms smuggling into Bosnia was the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), founded in 1987 by Elfatih Hassanein to encourage the rebirth of Islam in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Hassanein belonged to Sudan's ruling National Islamic Front and was an old friend of Izetbegovic. "Bosnia, in the end, must be Muslim Bosnia. Otherwise everything has lost its meaning and this war was for nothing," he declared in a 1994 interview.⁶

Some 5,000 Islamic volunteers came via Vienna to fight for Izetbegovic, many of them veterans of the CIA-backed wars in Afghanistan, as well as members of the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), responsible for massive massacres of Algerian civilians. They did not come to fight for "multiculturalism." Described as "pretty good fighters and certainly ruthless" by U.S. officials, some 4,000 of these volunteers were assigned to the Bosnian Army's 3rd Corps with headquarters in Zenica, a center of Islam and arms manufacture. A special "Al Mujahed" unit was registered in August 1993 under direct command of Izetbegovic. The best-armed unit in the 3rd Corps, it was credited with the Muslims' greatest victories against the Serbs in the spring of 1995, as well as with the habit of beheading Serbian soldiers. The emir, or commander, of Al Mujahed during the successful 1995 campaign was an Algerian member of the GIA close to Osama bin Laden.⁷

Thousands of Islamic supporters were granted Bosnian citizenship and passports under the loose wartime Law on Citizenship. Izetbegovic gave orders to issue passports to "everyone who has helped our cause." Allies of Osama bin Laden were given boxes of blank passports to distribute as they saw fit. All that seems to have been missing was bin Laden himself, although that is not certain. "If bin Laden does not have a Bosnia-Herzegovina passport, then he has only himself to blame," commented a Bosnian newspaper editor. "He should have asked for it in time."⁸

Only after the Dayton accords, fear for the safety of U.S. forces moved the Clinton administration to put pressure on Izetbegovic to sack Cengic as deputy



AP Photo

February 1, 2002. Albanian rightwing guerrilla of the "Shadows" unit poses near Skopje, Macedonia.

with the Americans. Bill Clinton and the Pentagon were keen to be seen as credit-worthy and repaid in the form of an Iran-Contra style operation—in flagrant violation of the UN Security Council arms embargo against all combatants in the former Yugoslavia.

The result was a vast secret conduit of weapons smuggling through Croatia. This was arranged by the clandestine agencies of the U.S., Turkey and Iran, together with a range of radical Islamist groups, including Afghan Mujahedin and the pro-Iranian Hizbullah.⁴

The Bosnian Protectorate designed by the United States at Dayton in late 1995 solidified the strategic alliance with Turkey (Israel's main partner in the Eastern Mediterranean) and with the oil-rich Muslim states. The Bosnian settlement was the first experiment in a new model of non-sovereign statelet, run essentially by the new globalization instruments: official organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (with total authority over the Bosnian economy) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (with massive administrative powers) aided

1991 meeting of the SDA, Izetbegovic's close associate Hasan Cengic proposed a strategy to prepare for the future independent state.⁵ This strategy had three parts:

- international public relations in favor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an endeavor entrusted to handsome, English-speaking Haris Silajdzic;
- Muslim control of the Interior Ministry, meaning the police; and
- a Muslim military organization.

Cengic, imam of the mosque in the Croatian capital, Zagreb, took charge of the military part. Later he was granted the rank of general and became Izetbegovic's deputy defense minister. His job involved obtaining money, arms and volunteers from Muslim countries. In May 1991, ten months before the proclamation of independence that set off civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cengic gave written instructions to SDA party faithful from all over the Republic to form Muslim brigades under command of General Sulejman Vranja, an officer still on active duty in the Yugoslav People's Army. This clearly treasonable activity was kept secret at the time.

Thus Izetbegovic's Islamic party, the SDA, had its own armed forces, which went

defense minister and to expel the Islamic Mujahedin, whose presence had been studiously ignored throughout the conflict. Not surprisingly, Izetbegovic was more loyal to his Muslim friends than to Washington. The Cengic family is one of the powerful semi-feudal clans dividing up power in Izetbegovic's Bosnia, with control over the Gorazde enclave and a major share in trafficking. Although the December 1995 Dayton peace accord ordered all foreign forces to be repatriated by January 19, Mujahedin settled in villages north of the Islamic stronghold of Zenica, barring outside visitors and imposing strict Islamic law.⁹ In February 1996, NATO occupation forces announced discovery of an Islamic "terror arsenal" including fragmentation bombs disguised as children's toys. Subsequently, occasional incidents indicated that the hard core continued to prepare car bombs and other attacks. After the September 2001 World Trade Center attacks, U.S. attention was finally drawn to the bin Laden connection in Bosnia that had been there all the time. The U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo were even temporarily closed in fear of terror attacks from their Muslim "allies" in Bosnia.

In August 1999, the *New York Times* reported that Bosnia's leaders had outfoxed the close scrutiny of the international community running the Bosnian protectorate to steal as much as a billion dollars from public funds or international aid projects.¹⁰ Since almost all the aid went to the Muslim part of Bosnia, that is where it disappeared. "Rampant corruption has discouraged foreign investment," the *Times* noted, citing various examples, including the theft of \$450,000 in relief aid from Saudi Arabia by the mayor of Sanski Most, Mehmed Alagic. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Bank in Sarajevo managed to lose track of tens of millions of dollars deposited by international agencies and ten foreign embassies. The President's son, Bakir Izetbegovic, was allotted a prime source of bribery money: control of the City Development Institute that decides who has a right to live in 80,000 publicly owned apartments in Sarajevo, many of which were expropriated from Serbs or Croats, and were turned over to members of the SDA. Bakir Izetbegovic's assets included 15 percent of the state airline, Bosnia Air, and he reportedly took a cut of the extortion money paid out by local shopkeepers to Sarajevo gangsters.¹¹

In January 2002, Bosnian authorities asked the United States to extradite the former Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Sacirbey, to face criminal charges for allegedly embezzling

\$610,980 from Bosnia's UN mission, including over \$90,000 earmarked for the U.S.-run program to "Train and Equip" Bosnia's Muslim forces. Sacirbey defended what he acknowledged was "convoluted" bookkeeping as necessary to mislead Croat and Serb officials imposed by international administrators on Bosnia's Muslim government.¹²

GREATER BOSNIA?

In the 1990s, a decisive public relations success of the Izetbegovic party was to identify "Muslim" with "Bosnian," so much so that many people in the West had the impression that the real "Bosnians" were Muslims who had been invaded by Serbs from Serbia. United States officials took to referring to the Muslims as "Bosnians." In reality, the United States was not supporting "the Bosnians," but Izetbegovic as a leader of SDA, which was not so much a "Bosnian" party as a Muslim party, with an important and particularly militant branch outside Bosnia, in the Novi Pazar region of southwestern Serbia. While most "Muslims" of Bosnia were not particularly devout, more fundamentalist Muslims could be found in the southwestern part of Serbia known as the Sandzak of Novi Pazar, where Turkish rule had lasted into the twentieth century. Some of these Muslims joined Izetbegovic's party, calling themselves "Bosniaks," even though they had never lived in Bosnia. Much of the most militant leadership of Izetbegovic's Islamic party was provided from among the thousands of recent immigrants to Sarajevo from the Sandzak. The fact that Izetbegovic enjoyed the active support of these Muslims from outside Bosnia, against a large part of the indigenous Bosnian Muslim population, was ignored by Western media which insisted on describing the Bosnian conflict as a Serbian "invasion."

Led by the extreme Islamist Sulejman Ugljanin, the SDA has meanwhile come to power in the Sandzak itself and proceeded to dismiss Serbs from public office. An estimated thousand Serbs have left the main town of Novi Pazar after losing their jobs, and Serbs are reportedly selling their property and leaving the region out of growing fear. As in Kosovo, the exodus of Serbs increases the proportion of Muslims, thus strengthening their demand to secede from Serbia. Ugljanin has given top jobs to his relatives and associates and openly declares that Sandzak should become independent on the way to joining Bosnia.

The plain fact is that supporting Izetbegovic never meant supporting an independent multicultural "Bosnia," but

supporting cross-border Islamic fundamentalism. Without so much outside interference, the Bosnian Muslims would probably not have chosen Izetbegovic as their president. A more popular leader was Fikret Abdic, the local entrepreneur who in the 1960s managed to transform a backward agricultural cooperative into a modern business called Agrokomerc, bringing prosperity to the Bihac pocket, a Muslim enclave in the western point of Bosnia. Thousands of jobs were created, roads were paved, and homes were provided with electricity and running water for the first time. Despite getting into trouble for finan-

AFTER 9/11, U.S. ATTENTION WAS FINALLY DRAWN TO THE BIN LADEN CONNECTION IN BOSNIA THAT HAD BEEN THERE ALL ALONG. THE U.S. AND BRITISH EMBASSIES IN SARAJEVO WERE EVEN TEMPORARILY CLOSED IN FEAR OF TERROR ATTACKS FROM THEIR MUSLIM "ALLIES" IN BOSNIA.

cial manipulation on behalf of his business, Abdic came in first among Muslim candidates in the 1990 elections, ahead of Izetbegovic. Why Izetbegovic rather than Abdic was chosen as the Muslim member of Bosnia's three-man presidency remains unclear. The SDA leader thereupon stayed firmly in office even though the presidency was supposed to rotate annually between the three communities. As war grew nearer in late 1992, Abdic "was in favor of negotiating and compromising with Croats and Serbs to achieve a settlement, and scathing about those Muslims who wanted to block any such settlement."¹³ Had U.S. leaders really been so much in favor of the "ethnic coexistence" they kept proclaiming as their ideal, Abdic should have been their man. However, he spoke no English and had no American partisans working for him in Washington.

As Izetbegovic led the country into war, Abdic withdrew to the Bihac pocket, and in the autumn of 1993 made his own deals to keep the peace with surrounding Croats and Serbs. In 1995, with help from foreign Mujahedin and the U.S.-backed Croatian offensive that emptied the neighboring Bosnian Krajina of its Serb population, Izetbegovic's Islamic fundamentalist

forces conquered the Bihac pocket. Abdic and thousands of moderate Muslims fled abroad.

GREATER ALBANIA

Similarly, in Kosovo the United States brushed aside Albanian nationalist leaders willing to negotiate with Serbia over the status of their province, and instead backed an armed group of outlaws closely linked to the international traffic in heroin and sex slaves. Described as "terrorists" by U.S. officials in early 1998, by the end of the year the "Kosovo Liberation Army" (UÇK) was working hand in hand with the CIA and U.S. "verifiers" in Kosovo to coordinate the forthcoming NATO bombing of Serbia and forced occupation of Kosovo by NATO troops. After NATO officially "disarmed" the UÇK, its leaders and aggressive operations have continued to enjoy U.S. support and protection, even as they "ethnically cleanse" Kosovo of Serbs and Gypsies, spread war into neighboring areas of southern Serbia, and gradually extend "Greater Albania" into Macedonia. The UÇK wants an ethnically pure Albanian territory, not an Islamic state. Religion seems to matter little. Nevertheless, as nominal Muslims who regularly blow up and set fire to Christian churches and monasteries in Kosovo, they are supported by the same Islamic network that supported Izetbegovic. Money pours in to construct new mosques and lavish homes for Albanians, while the dwindling Serb population can venture out of wretched ghettos only under armed escort.

Two incidents illustrate the U.S. role:

- **The Aracinovo withdrawal.** On June 26, 2001, the attempt of the UÇK to seize control of the largely ethnic Albanian town of Aracinovo in northeastern Macedonia was failing after three days of fighting with Macedonian security forces. Before the Macedonian authorities could reoccupy the town, the United States forced them to pull back to allow NATO to evacuate the heavily armed Albanians. The reason, as revealed by the German newspaper *Hamburger Abendblatt* (June 28, 2001) and later confirmed by Dutch researchers, was that 17 American military advisers from MPRI were among the Albanian rebels. MPRI (Military Professional Resources, Inc.) is the firm of privatized retired U.S. officers whose foreign contracts have included training the Croatians to drive the Serbs from the Krajina, the Macedonian army to defend itself from the UÇK and—as this incident revealed—the UÇK to attack Macedonia. As big money contributors to U.S. election campaigns know, if you back both sides you're sure to win.

- **The Bondsteel escape.** On February 16,

2001, Albanian terrorists detonated a remote-control bomb deliberately placed to blow up a bus carrying civilians from the Serbian city of Nis to the Orthodox Christian enclave of Gracanica for a religious commemoration. Children were among the eleven Serbs killed outright and 40 others seriously injured in the blast. Outrage was so great that for once, serious detective work by United Nations

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FORTHCOMING NATO BOMBING
OF SERBIA.**

police led to the arrest of four Albanians, of whom only one was detained and charged. To prevent militant Albanians from storming the Pristina jail to free him, UN police turned the suspect, Florim Ejupi, over to the Americans at Camp Bondsteel. The U.S. base covering 40 square kilometers is a heavily guarded fortress ringed by three rows of barbed wire, observation towers and floodlights. Prisoners wear fluorescent orange jumpsuits, like those of the hapless Al Qaeda prisoners in Guantanamo. Nevertheless, Florim Ejupi "escaped" in May and has not been heard of since.

The Germans, who had their own ideas about how to reorganize the Balkans, are watching with some irritation as the United States turns the region into a forward base of yet undefined operations. German politicians are complaining openly that the United States is supporting the UÇK because it counts on a grateful "Greater Albania" to be a reliable strategic ally.¹⁴ As predicted, Europe is indeed being reduced to a staging area for American wars.

NOTES

1. Interview with Zimmermann by David Binder, "U.S. Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing Partition in 1992," *New York Times*, August 29, 1993.

2. "The central focus of U.S. policy is Turkey, which Washington recognizes as the major regional power with considerable potential for expansion. America's policy is explained by its strategic and economic interests in the

Mediterranean and the Middle East—from now on, the Turks are the key nation in the region. This is bad news for the Greeks and bad news for the Serbs." Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 183.

3. Jacob Heilbrunn and Michael Lind, "Third American Empire, With a Balkan Frontier," *International Herald Tribune*, January 4, 1996.

4. Richard J. Aldrich, "America Used Islamists to Arm the Bosnian Muslims: The Srebrenica report reveals the Pentagon's role in a dirty war," *The Guardian* (London), April 22, 2002. The source is the section on "Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992–1995" by Professor Cees Wiebes in the April 10, 2002 report on Srebrenica by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Amsterdam.

5. Cengic recounted this in a November 1996 interview in the Bosnian Muslim publication *Liljan*.

6. A Western diplomat calls Elfatih Hassanein "Izetbegovic's bagman"; John Pomfret, *Washington Post*, September 22, 1996.

7. Craig Pyes, Josh Meyer & William C. Rempel, "Bosnia Seen As Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists," *Los Angeles Times*, October 7, 2001; Zeljko Rogosic, "Vast Investigation in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Nacional*, (Zagreb), September 27, 2001. The GIA commander lent to the Bosnians was Abdelkader Mokhari, nom de guerre Abu el Maali.

8. Senad Advic, editor in chief of *Slobodna Bosna* (Free Bosnia), quoted in *Nacional*, article cited above.

9. R. Jeffrey Smith, "A Bosnian Village's Terrorist Ties; Links to U.S. Bomb Plot Arouse Concern About Enclave of Islamic Guerrillas," *Washington Post*, March 11, 2000, p. A1; Alix Kroeger, "Bosnia's Holy Warriors Ready to Fight Evictions," *The Observer* (London), July 23, 2000.

10. Chris Hedges, "Leaders in Bosnia Are Said to Steal Up to \$1 Billion," *New York Times*, August 17, 1999.

11. Hedges.

12. R. Jeffrey Smith, "High-Profile Bosnian Accused of Fraud," *Washington Post/International Herald Tribune*, September 7, 2001.

13. David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), p. 87.

14. "Mazedonien: Das Doppelspiel der Amerikaner," *Der Spiegel*, July 30, 2001.

PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENT

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The Law of Posse Comitatus

POLICE AND MILITARY POWERS ONCE STATUTORILY
DIVIDED ARE SWIFTLY MERGING

Lynne Wilson

Terrorism is escalating to the point that Americans soon may have to choose between civil liberties and more intrusive means of protection...

—Former Secretary of Defense
William S. Cohen
Army Times, October 27, 1998

President Bush unveiled his broad “Homeland Security” department proposal in mid-July, including “a review of the law that could allow the military to operate more aggressively within the United States.”¹ The proposal champions a “greater involvement of military personnel” in “domestic preparedness and response efforts.”² Prior to this broad proposal, Department of Defense (DoD) officials repeatedly stated that they had no intention to recommend rewriting or repealing the Posse Comitatus Act,³ a post-Civil War statute that restricts the military’s ability to participate in civilian law enforcement.⁴ That cautious approach has now been openly abandoned.

At this point, it may not matter. Not much of the Posse Comitatus Act is left to repeal. Whatever viewpoint you come at it from, whether from the perspective of an Army Delta Force commander or an anti-globalization activist, the Posse Comitatus Act no longer provides the strong wall between the military and domestic law enforcement for which it was originally intended.⁵

“The military has been dragged into various internal security roles for a long time now,” recently commented Peter Kraska, an expert on the militarization of local police.⁶

BACKGROUND

The Posse Comitatus⁷ Act states simply:

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to exe-

*cute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.*⁸

Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878 to end military occupation of the defeated Southern states during the Reconstruction period. Southern Democrats had complained bitterly about the oppressive use of the military in a law enforcement role.⁹ The Act incorporates a founding American principle of keeping the nation’s military forces separate from and subordinate to the “Civil Power.”¹⁰

The Act embodies the long-standing principle in Anglo-American law that there should be a total separation of military from civil law enforcement.¹¹ As one southern Senator stated during debates over the Act, “whenever you conclude that it is right to use the Army to...discharge those duties that belong to civil officers and to the citizens, then you have given up the character of your Government; it is no longer a government for liberty...it has become a government of force.”¹²

That the Act provides much less of a shield against a “government of force” than its framers intended is the result of complex factors. Part of what has led to the erosion of military/civil law enforcement separation is the language of the Act itself. Unlike a constitutional provision such as the Fourth Amendment, it does not have the status of Supreme Law and can be amended or repealed or excepted by a simple congressional majority. Also unlike the Fourth Amendment, courts have consistently admitted, rather than excluded, evidence obtained in violation of it.¹³

The Posse Comitatus Act is relatively narrow in its scope. For example, the Act appears to prohibit indirect involvement such as the supply of support, training, intelligence and equipment to civilian law enforcement. But courts have consistently interpreted its language to proscribe only direct military involvement in the execution of laws.¹⁴ Only one court has interpreted the Posse Comitatus Act broadly, finding the Act “absolute in its command and explicit in its exceptions.”¹⁵ When

applied in the context of an individual case, most courts essentially look the other way when a military officer is involved.¹⁶

Furthermore, the Act only applies on its face to two military branches, the Army and the Air Force. It has been held to apply to the Navy and Marines by DoD regulation.¹⁷ It does not apply to the Coast Guard.¹⁸

Because the federalized National Guard is part of either the Air Force or the Army, it is covered by the Act.¹⁹ When acting as a militia, however, a state’s National Guard is exempt from the Act’s proscriptions.²⁰ By definition, state militias are armed and trained separately from regular armed forces.²¹ Under this “State Militia” exemption, state National Guard troops are free to make arrests and to conduct otherwise prohibited searches at airports and elsewhere.

Congress has approved the direct use of military troops during civil disturbances.²² These provisions grant the President the authority to use military troops to enforce civilian laws where a state has requested assistance or is unable to protect its citizens or property. An order to disperse must first be given. This statutory exception potentially encompasses any civil disturbance that might arise from “terrorist activity.”²³ It was used to justify the presence of active duty Army personnel in Los Angeles during the 1992 rioting subsequent to the Rodney King incident. The mere potential for a “civil disturbance” or a terrorist attack at the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta drew over 10,000 U.S. troops and only a faint protest from Congress.²⁴

On its face, the Act only provides criminal sanctions as a remedy for violations. However, no one has ever been prosecuted for violating it.²⁵ Criminal prosecution by the government is the only remedy, as the

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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3:00 p.m. Friday September 27, 2002. Washington, D.C. anti-globalization demonstration. National Guard troops unloading in front of the World Bank. Troops deployed at the building.

act by its terms does not give individuals the right to sue. Although attempts have been made to obtain civil damages for violations of the Act, recovery has only been successful against military officials for violating a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights under *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents*.²⁶

Courts have also consistently upheld military involvement in local law enforcement where a military purpose such as a "sting" operation justified the involvement.²⁷ Consistent with the act's language, courts require the active involvement of military officers at the request of local law enforcement before a violation will be found.²⁸ Such cases are almost nonexistent. Under this interpretation, U.S. Army Delta Force involvement during the 1999 Seattle anti-WTO protests did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act because the involvement occurred at the request of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, not the mayor of Seattle.²⁹

THIS JUST IN

One of the most hawkish congressional enthusiasts for Bush's plans to send U.S. troops to the streets of Baghdad is Joseph Biden, Democrat of Delaware. Apparently he wants to see the same troops on the streets of U.S. cities. Interviewed on Fox News on July 21, he strongly endorsed giving power of arrest to U.S. soldiers. Posse Comitatus, said Biden "has to be amended." Even Mr. Homeland Security Tom Ridge begged to differ.

WOUNDED KNEE

Prior to the "War on Drugs," military involvement in local law enforcement efforts was a relatively rare occurrence. The key exceptions were the use of military equipment and advisers during the large student demonstrations of the early 1970s and in the 1973 American Indian Movement occupation at Wounded Knee, South Dakota.³⁰ Criminal litigation arising out of Wounded Knee did much to simultaneously clarify and confuse what military behavior does and does not constitute a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. The litigation also illustrates how fluid the boundaries of the Act are.

During AIM's takeover of the Pine Ridge Reservation at Wounded Knee, Army officers and the South Dakota National Guard supplied local law enforcement officials with military equipment including ammunition, weapons, flares, and armored personnel carriers. Mechanics from both the Nebraska and the South Dakota National Guards repaired and maintained the personnel carriers.

The U.S. government charged four AIM defendants with obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §231(a)(3), an offense requiring interference with any "law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties."³¹ Each federal court assumed that the National Guards had been federalized and were thus subject to the Act.

Each of the four defendants argued that the government could not prove "lawful performance" because civil reliance on military assistance at Wounded Knee violated the Posse Comitatus Act. Although

NOW THE CHALLENGE

"My concern is that our government, in attempting to assure the security of our own citizens, will so roll back all human rights safeguards that the CIA will in fact receive a broad green light for engaging and collaborating in acts of torture abroad...Enough damage has been done in our names in Latin America."

—Jennifer Harbury

(Quoted in Latin America Solidarity newsletter "Interconnect," September 2002.)

the four federal courts looked at the same evidence, each came to a separate conclusion. The Banks court granted the motion for acquittal on the obstruction charges, stating that civil law enforcers had used the military "as a posse comitatus or otherwise."³² The Jaramillo court held that while the Act does not *per se* prohibit the furnishing of military equipment such as armored personnel carriers, advice rendered by military officers and the equipment maintenance performed by military personnel so "pervaded" the activities of civilian personnel that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether law enforcement officers were lawfully engaged in the performance of their duties.³³

The Red Feather court agreed that "direct active use" of military materiel violates the Act. But the Red Feather court went further to list what "active" military roles are forbidden in civil law enforcement: arrests, seizing evidence, searching persons or buildings, investigating crimes, interviewing witnesses, pursuing escaped prisoners and searching for suspects.³⁴ In addition, the Red Feather court held as acceptable certain "passive" military roles that indirectly aid civil law enforcers, including the presence of military personnel giving advice or recommendations on tactics or logistics, delivering and maintaining military materiel, training civilian officials in the use and care of equipment and conducting aerial reconnaissance.³⁵

Significantly, the McArthur court, like the Red Feather and Jaramillo courts before it, concluded that the Act forbade neither the military's giving materiel or equipment to civil law enforcers, nor the lending of military advisers.³⁶ However, although three of the four Wounded Knee courts came to this conclusion, none



3:00 p.m. Friday September 27, 2002. Washington, D.C., in front of the World Bank. Zoom sequence: 1, 2, 3: You're in the Army now...or the DC Metropolitan Police, depending on the mood of the regime.



agreed on the standard to be applied to determine when the Act has been violated.

The disagreement among the Wounded Knee courts has created confusion about the Act's parameters. Four different levels of military involvement have been ruled to be acceptable:

- as long as citizens are not subjected to military compulsion;³⁷
- if it does not involve direct active use of troops in civil law enforcement;³⁸
- presence of military personnel must not pervade or influence the actions of civil officials;³⁹ and
- mere presence of military advisers is unacceptable involvement.⁴⁰

On appeal, the federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Wounded Knee convictions. In so doing, however, it merely agreed with the McArthur court's rationale that so-called "passive" military involvement is not prohibited. It did little to clarify what military activities, especially in the context of a mass protest, cross the Act's boundaries.⁴¹

AMENDMENTS

Then came the Drug War in the early 1980s. This was the beginning of an almost obsessive congressional determination to insert a military presence into domestic drug law enforcement, regardless of Posse Comitatus. After the inconsistencies of the Wounded Knee cases, confusion persisted in the courts over what level of military involvement constituted a violation of the Act.⁴² Of particular concern was just where "active" participation ended and "passive" participation began. Because of conflicting court interpretations, military authorities expressed reluctance

to assist civil law enforcement in the drug war even if the aid might be considered "legally proper."⁴³

Congressional hearings were held in 1981 to consider whether amendments to the Act were needed that would more clearly enable the military to "passively" provide intelligence, materiel, transport services, and training to local law enforcement agencies. In debating the proposed amendments, members likened drug smugglers to an "invading army" that was pitted against local law enforcers so lacking in resources that they could interdict only 15% of the then \$80 billion worth of drugs flowing into the country annually.⁴⁴

Congress passed amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act as part of the DoD Authorization Act of 1982.⁴⁵ The amendments passed over the numerous objections of civil liberties groups. Most important of these was the prediction that even passive military assistance, such as the provision of equipment and equipment operators on a routine basis, would unduly threaten the civil-military separation.⁴⁶ Further, the ACLU warned that permitting military personnel to train civilians in the operation of military equipment would allow the military to assume functions that should be the responsibility of police academies.⁴⁷

The 1981 amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act permit the military to provide civilian law enforcement officials with information,⁴⁸ equipment and facilities⁴⁹ as well as training and advice.⁵⁰ They further give military personnel limited authority to actually operate or maintain equipment made available to civilian forces in certain situations such as aerial reconnais-

sance when enforcing drug laws.⁵¹ Courts have interpreted these amendments as permitting the use of both military equipment and military operators to assist local police officers in searches for drugs.⁵²

Later amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act include a 1987 requirement that the Secretary of Defense conduct an annual briefing for local law enforcement personnel in each state regarding the "information, technical support, and equipment and facilities available to civilian law enforcement from the Department of Defense."⁵³ This section also requires that the DoD make available to these law enforcement officials a comprehensive list of all the "suitable" military equipment available.

In addition, Congress specifically amended the Act in 1993 to provide procedures for states (and local agencies) to purchase "law enforcement equipment suitable for counter-drug activities" through the Department of Defense.⁵⁴ What these amendments have meant is the proliferation of local police use of military equipment (flash-bang grenades, assault rifles, armored personnel carriers) that are accouterments of war. Anyone who has participated in anti-globalization protests such as those in Seattle or Washington, DC, has witnessed the proliferation of armored personnel carriers as weapons of intimidation. The use of such equipment is permissible under both amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act as well as court interpretations that approve of the use of military equipment by civilian law enforcement.

Other courts have gone further to say

(continued on p. 23)



Life under siege. December 1, 1999. Seattle. Following declaration of a "No Protest Zone," Washington National Guard troops patrol the streets.

DAVID COLE ON DOUBLE STANDARDS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

On Wednesday, July 21, a federal court in Washington, D.C., dismissed a legal challenge by British and Kuwaiti citizens imprisoned by the military on Guantánamo. It ruled that, unlike U.S. citizens, foreigners outside our borders have no right to challenge the legality of their detention by U.S. officials. The U.S. is free to detain them without charges, without a hearing, and without any court review.

The day before, a British court ruled that its government could not hold foreigners suspected as terrorists without charges, because to do so discriminated between foreign citizens and British nationals in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights.

These opposing decisions crystallize a central issue in the ongoing war on terrorism: Do aliens and citizens deserve the same basic rights protections, or should our government be free to impose on foreigners burdens that we would not tolerate for citizens? Since 9/11, we've detained aliens without charges, tried them in secret proceedings, subjected them to ethnic profiling, and made them deportable for wholly innocent associational activity. Vice President Cheney and others have argued that noncitizens don't deserve the same rights as citizens, and that therefore we can do to them what

we wouldn't do to ourselves.

That's a politically tempting argument, because it allows us to trade the liberties of immigrants for the security of the rest of us. We, the citizens, need not sacrifice our rights—we can sacrifice theirs instead.

But trading immigrants' liberties for our own security is wrong, counterproductive, and virtually certain to come back to haunt us. It's wrong because with the exception of the right to vote, the Constitution extends the Bill of Rights to all persons. These are human rights, not privileges of citizenship. Every international human rights treaty, not just the European Convention, prohibits discrimination between citizens and noncitizens.

The tradeoff is also counterproductive from a security standpoint. If we are going to identify and capture alleged Al Qaeda terrorists, we need full cooperation from Arab and Muslim communities, both here and abroad. Every time we impose on them treatment that we're not willing to tolerate for ourselves, we deepen the divide of distrust between those communities and U.S. authorities.

And what the government does to immigrants today paves the way for what it will do to citizens tomorrow. The McCarthy era of the 1940s and 1950s, in which

thousands of Americans were tarred with guilt by association, was simply an extension to citizens of a similar campaign against alien radicals forty years earlier. The same is true of the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent during World War II, which treated citizens as we had long treated "enemy aliens." Already in this war, military justice, introduced as limited to aliens, has been extended to U.S. citizens labeled "enemy combatants," as the government asserts the right to hold them in military custody, without charges, incommunicado, without access to a lawyer, and without judicial review.

So while it may seem convenient to trade immigrants' liberties for our security, we should resist the temptation. For reasons of principle, security, and self-interest, we should only impose on aliens the treatment that we are willing to impose on ourselves.

This commentary was originally broadcast on National Public Radio's "All Things Considered" in July 2002. David Cole is professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. He is most recently author of Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security (2002).

(continued from p. 21)

that there are no limits on a state governor's powers to use the National Guard "to execute the laws."⁵⁵ Further, courts have also said that all a governor has to do is to "generally authorize" use of the National Guard, leaving implementation and supervision up to local police.⁵⁶ At least one state court has held that such an arrangement (almost by definition) does not violate a state constitutional requirement that the "military must at all times be subordinate to civil authority."⁵⁷

COUNTER-TERROR AND BEYOND

In January 1999, the Department of Defense asked President Clinton to appoint a "military leader" in the event of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil. The powers of this "Homeland Defense Command" leader were left unclear.⁵⁸ Also left unclear was just how far the U.S. Army can exercise "Homeland Security" law enforcement activities in light of what is left of the Posse Comitatus Act.⁵⁹

We now have a "terrorist attack" and the formation of a new "Homeland Security Department" seems imminent. What is left of the Posse Comitatus Act is being bent into strange contortions. At least 1,600 federalized National Guard troops now patrol "homeland security" activities along U.S. borders under the supervision of federal law enforcement agencies. These troops are considered exempt from the Act since they are somehow no longer part of the Army or Air Force once deputized and are rather under the operational control of a federal law enforcement agency.⁶⁰ State-controlled National Guard troops patrol airports.⁶¹ The Senate Armed Services Committee has recommended expanding the use of federally funded state National Guard troops to perform other "homeland security" activities "as has been the practice for more than a decade in connection with counter-drug activities" authorized under 32 U.S.C. §112.⁶²

Other congressional discussions encompass the last Posse Comitatus barrier, that of involving the U.S. Army directly in routine state and local law enforcement activities of search, seizure and arrest. Last October, Senator John Warner (R-Va) ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, openly questioned the value of retaining the Posse Comitatus Act.⁶³ Most military leaders don't even want the burden. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz rejected a suggestion that Army Delta Force troops be used to provide airliner security by saying: "This is fundamentally a civil function. It doesn't require all the exotic training that Delta Force members have. It

requires law enforcement training that our people don't have."⁶⁴

But the last wall erected by the Posse Comitatus Act has more to do with our basic values and the democratic principles on which our country was founded and by which we profess to live than it does with the practicalities of training. As former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated bluntly, military involvement in civilian law enforcement is "extremely repugnant to a democratic society."⁶⁵ It is truly a frightening thought that Americans might out of fear of terrorism choose "a more intrusive means of protection" over democracy, civil liberties and egalitarian values.

NOTES

1. Elizabeth Becker, "Bush Is to Propose Broad New Powers in Domestic Security," *New York Times*, July 16, 2002.
2. Becker.
3. U.S.C. §1385.
4. Becker quotes Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: "We're not looking for any long-term or short-term change with respect to Posse Comitatus." The Clinton administration agreed: "[T]he military is not to conduct domestic law enforcement without explicit statutory authority, and we strongly believe no changes should be made to Posse Comitatus." Defense Secretary William Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," *Washington Post*, July 26, 1999.
5. See Major Craig T. Trebilcock [U.S. Army Reserve], "The Myth of Posse Comitatus," October 2000, <www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/trebilcock>.
6. See Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units," *Social Problems*, v.44, February 1997.
7. "Posse comitatus" is literally the power of a sheriff to summon the assistance of a county's entire population above the age of 15 to help keep the peace or to pursue and arrest felons. 1 W. Blackstone, *Commentaries*, pp. 343-44.
8. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385.
9. David Adams, "Internal Military Intervention in the United States," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 32, no. 2 (1995), pp. 197-211.
10. The Declaration of Independence castigates King George for "quartering large Bodies of Armed Troops among us...Standing Armies, without the consent of our Legislatures. He has affected to render the Military independent of, and superior to, the Civil Power."
11. Roger Hohnsbeen, "Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement," 54 *George Washington Law Review* 404 (1986).
12. *Congressional Record* 4247 (1878) (statement of Sen. Hill).
13. *U.S. v. Wolffs*, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979) (no suppression of marijuana seized by Army investigators); *Harker v. State*, 637 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1981) (violation of Act did not entitle defendant to application of exclusionary rule); *State v. Danko*, 548 P.2d 819 (Kansas 1976) (search of auto by military violated Act but no

CIA IN THE DOCK: HARBURY v. DEUTCH

Today the United States Supreme Court has ruled that my constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts by various federal officials must be dismissed because it was not adequately pleaded in the original complaint. Specifically, it was not sufficient to simply state that the Defendants intentionally deceived me by claiming they had no information about my husband, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, in order to prevent me from going to court to save his life. The complaint should have set forth exactly what legal claims I would have brought at the time. Although the example of the intentional infliction of emotional distress was raised later, the Court noted that this claim is still alive and well in the United States District Court. Accordingly, I must return to the lower court to fully pursue this and other claims which are still pending there, including a number of tort claims as well as claims based on international law.

In short the case of Harbury v. Deutch is alive and well in the District Court, minus my claim of access to the courts, which has been dismissed on the technical grounds of pleadings requirements.

I am pleased with and respectful of the Supreme Court's highly limited and thoughtful opinion. This case was taken up shortly after the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001, when many government officials, in an apparent loss of perspective, sought to cancel all human and civil rights, a situation which would leave us as little better than the Al Qaeda itself. Calls for the legalization of torture were being pressed upon us, despite the fact that our Founding Fathers made it clear that our new nation was to leave far behind it the rack and screw and the Star Chamber that had driven so many from Europe. At the Supreme Court itself, the U.S. Government's main claim was that federal officials must have the right to lie outright to the American public. A mere "no comment" was claimed inadequate; intentional deception was urged as a political necessity. None of these arguments was accepted by the Court.

The Supreme Court today has well served its historic function of upholding the law and standing its ground, no matter the temporary excesses or political convenience of the times. There has been no bow to torture or official deceit. The withholding of crucial information that could save the life of a secret prisoner suffering torture at the hands of CIA-paid operatives has not been authorized or validated. I will return to the United States District Court as instructed, and pursue my claims for torts and violations of international law. An act of torture is an act of terrorism. I must press for justice, or others will die as my husband did, either thrown from a helicopter or dismembered and scattered across a sugar cane field, all paid for by U.S. tax dollars and protected with U.S. secrecy. Here it must end.

—Jennifer K. Harbury, June 20, 2002

Jennifer Harbury is an attorney with Texas Rural Legal Aid. Her husband was kidnapped, tortured and murdered in 1992 by paid CIA agents in Guatemala.

exclusion of evidence so obtained was allowed).

14. *Taylor v. State*, 645 P.2d 522 (Oklahoma 1982) (exclusionary rule applied where military officer directly participated in search for drugs and pulled a gun on defendant during arrest).

15. *Wrynn v. U.S.*, 200 F.Supp. 457; 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). (U.S. could not be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for alleged negligence of Air Force helicopter operators assisting local police in search in violation of the Act).

16. *U.S. v. Bacon*, 851 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988) (even if Army undercover agent acted in violation of Act, no exclusion of testimony was allowed in cocaine conspiracy case); *Hildebrandt v. State*, 507 P.2d 1323 (Oklahoma 1973) (military investigators not prohibited from testifying regarding LSD purchase from defendant).

17. 32 C.F.R. §213.2 (1992); Department of Defense Directive 5525.5.

18. *U.S. v. Chaparro-Almeida*, 679 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 1156 (1982); *Jackson v. State*, 572 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1977).

19. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3078, 8078; *Perpich v. Department of Defense*, 496 U.S. 334, 344 (1990) (National Guardsmen lose status as members of state National Guard when "drafted into federal service by the President").

20. *U.S. v. Benish*, 5 F.3d 20, 26 (3rd Cir. 1993) (Pennsylvania National Guard not in federal service at time of marijuana surveillance).

21. *Black's Law Dictionary* (1999), p. 1008. The Constitution recognizes a state's right to form a "well-regulated militia" but also grants Congress the power to activate and govern a federal militia to "enforce compliance with its laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cls. 15 & 16.

22. U.S.C. §§331-334.

23. Trebilcock.

24. "Business, Capitol Hill Question Military's Role in Olympics," *Defense Week*, July 22, 1996.

25. The Department of Justice (Attorney General) would be in charge of such a prosecution.

26. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See *Bissonette v. Haig*, 800 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1986) (reversing trial court's dismissal of complaint filed by residents of Pine Ridge Indian Reservation during 1973 Wounded Knee occupation) and *Wrynn v. United States*, 200 F.Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).

27. *State v. Nelson*, 260 S.E.2d 619 (N.C. 1979) (upholding felony convictions of defendant soldiers stationed at Ft. Bragg). See also *State v. Sanders*, 281 S.E.2d 7 (N.C. 1981) (military street patrol conducted solely for the purpose of removing personnel back to Fort Bragg); *State v. Trueblood*, 265 S.E.2d 662 (N.C.App. 1980) (defendant Army officer's drug dealing was of direct concern to military).

28. *Applewhite v. United States Air Force*, 995 F.2d 997, 1001 (10th Cir. 1993) ("since there was an independent military purpose to the [Air Force Office of Special Investigation's] conduct [an off-base "sting" operation], there was necessarily no willful use of any part of the Air Force as a posse to execute civilian laws").

29. Details of the Army Delta Force involvement in Seattle are documented in "Urban Warrior," a documentary film by Matt Ehling, released July 2002 by ETS Pictures.

30. See *Scheuer v. Rhodes*, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (civil rights claims by Kent State students not barred by the Eleventh Amendment); *Burton v. Waller*, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirming jury verdict for defendant Mississippi State Patrol officers where Jackson State plaintiffs did not sustain causation burden of proof).

31. *U.S. v. Banks*, 383 F.Supp. 368 (D.S.D. 1974); *U.S. v. Jaramillo*, 380 F.Supp. 1375 (D.Neb. 1974); *U.S. v. McArthur*, 419 F.Supp. 186 (D.N.D.); *U.S. v. Red Feather*, 392 F.Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975); *aff'd sum. nom. U.S. v. Casper*, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied*, 430 U.S. 970 (1977).

32. *Banks*, 383 F.Supp. at 375.

33. *Jaramillo*, 380 F.Supp. at 1379, 1381.

34. *Red Feather*, 392 F.Supp. at 925.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *McArthur*, 419 F.Supp. at 194-95.

37. *McArthur*, 419 F.Supp. at 194-95.

38. *Red Feather*, 392 F.Supp. at 923.

39. *Jaramillo*, 380 F.Supp. at 1379-80.

40. *Banks*, 383 F.Supp. at 375.

41. *U.S. v. Casper*, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976) (military assistance to civilian authorities at Wounded Knee did not violate the Act).

42. *People v. Blend*, 175 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Cal. App. 1981) (expressly recognizing lack of agreement among jurisdictions both federal and state).

43. U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1785.

44. See Posse Comitatus Act Hearings, reprinted at 127 Cong.Rec. 14,982 (1981) (statement of Rep. Zeferetti); 14,986 (Rep. Shaw); 14,984 (Rep. Railsback); 2003 (Sen. Nunn).

45. Codified at 10 U.S.C. §371-378 ["Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies"].

46. *Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing on H.R. 3519 Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary*, 97th Congress, 1st Session 39, 42 (1981) (statement of Prof. Christopher Pyle).

47. ACLU Letter to House Judiciary Comm. Chairman Peter Rodino (June 8, 1981).

48. U.S.C. §371.

49. U.S.C. §372.

50. U.S.C. §373.

51. U.S.C. §374.

52. *U.S. v. Garcia*, 909 F.Supp. 334, 339 (D.Md. 1995) (Defense Secretary designated military dogs "equipment" requiring military "operators"); *Ezenwa v. Gallen*, 906 F.Supp. 978 (M.D.Pa. 1995) ("ionscon" reading to detect heroin conducted by Delaware National Guard).

53. U.S.C. §380 [Enhancement of Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials].

54. U.S.C. §381.

55. *Wallace v. State*, 933 P.2d 1157, 1161 (Alaska App. 1997) (approving local police department's use of Alaska National Guard to execute search warrants).

56. *Ibid.* See also *State v. Valdobinos*, 858 P.2d 199, 204 (Washington 1993) (no need for governor to personally authorize plan where powers are exercised through an intermediary).

57. *State v. Valdobinos*, 858 P.2d 199, 204 (Washington 1993) (upholding convictions for cocaine delivery and conspiracy). The defendants had raised the possibility that use of the National Guard "at all relevant times under the control of, and supervised by, local police authorities" violated Washington Constitution, art. 1, §18.

58. William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "Pentagon Seeks Command for Emergencies in the U.S.," *New York Times*, January 28, 1999.

59. Eric V. Laron & John E. Peters, "Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security," *The Rand Corporation*, 2001 at Appendix D [Overview of Posse Comitatus Act]. Laron and Peters list the many exceptions that apply.

60. Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Barnes, U.S. Army (Ret.), "Despite the Posse Comitatus Act, Are Federal Soldiers About to Deploy as Deputized Border Patrol and Customs Agents?" February 2002, <www.homelanddefense.org/journal/Commentary>. Questions "shaky legal rationale" originating with Rehnquist's 1970 opinion letter.

61. Post-9/11, Bush asked state governors to call up state National Guard troops to patrol airports because such troops are not subject to Posse Comitatus. Kristin Patterson, "Guardsmen to Remain in Airports Longer," *The National Guard Association of the United States' Newsroom*, March 13, 2002, <www.ngaus.org/newsroom>.

62. Calendar No. 370, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 Report," Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, May 15, 2002.

63. Carl Peckinpough, "Is Posse Comitatus Passe?" *Federal Computer Week*, January 7, 2002.

64. Quoted in "Military Resists Domestic Role," *Government Executive Magazine*, November 1, 2001, <www.govexec.com/features>.

65. Quoted in "U.S. Military Taking on New Role," *WINDS-Military Police for Civilians*, June 26, 1997, <www.thewinds.arcsnet.net>.

Please, please, please, please...

DON'T FORGET TO TELL US WHEN YOU CHANGE
PALATIAL RESIDENCES. OTHERWISE, YOU'RE GONNA
MISS AN ISSUE. ABSOLUTELY MUST NOT HAPPEN.

Brown & Root Services

ENGINEERING OPPRESSION FOR OVER 50 YEARS

On July 26, 2002, the Department of Defense (DoD) awarded Brown & Root Services, an engineering firm based in Houston, Texas, a \$9,700,000 contract to construct a 204-unit Detention Camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Each of Brown & Root's modular steel units will measure 6 feet 8 inches long by 8 feet wide. A bed, toilet and hand basin with running water will be included in each cell. If all goes on schedule, work will be completed by October 2002.

Brown & Root will add the new cells to the existing Camp Delta facility, where the CIA and its military counterparts have been detaining and interrogating an estimated 564 Al Qaeda and Taliban "unlawful enemy combatants" since April 2002. It's uncertain, however, how many cells Brown & Root will ultimately build, as its contract is renewable over four years, and could total a whopping \$300,000,000. This renewable contract does, however, imply that the CIA is planning to indefinitely detain many more so-called illegal combatants. And the number of captured terrorist suspects is certain to increase, as the eternal war on terror spreads from Afghanistan to the 60 countries designated by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice as harboring suspected terrorists.

The Pentagon claims the Brown & Root contract was "competitively procured," but that's a flagrant lie, considering that Brown & Root is the engineering division of the Halliburton Company, where Dick Cheney served as chairman and CEO right after resigning as George I's Defense Secretary, up until he joined rampaging George II's regime. During the years that Cheney served as Halliburton's CEO, the company received an estimated \$2.5 billion in government contracts, and now that he's in the catbird seat, Halliburton's coffers will only continue to grow, as the scope of U.S. military action widens.

It is not just American money that's pouring into Brown & Root: The British Ministry of Defence paid Brown & Root, its fifth largest defense contractor, \$410 million to supply large tank transporters to bolster England's imperial escapades.

Kickbacks occur in many ways, and our presidents and their political associates

have always found ways to benefit from the wars they wage. Brown & Root, for example, financed Lyndon Johnson's election to the U.S. Senate in 1948, back in the days when political payoffs were strictly cash and carry. In return Johnson steered numerous defense contracts in its direction, enabling Brown & Root to pioneer Texas's ascent as America's preeminent

*For one to go to
Con Son was never to be
seen again.*

—Vietnamese saying, circa 1970

military-industrial welfare state. During the Vietnam War, LBJ also made sure that Brown & Root received more than its fair share of lucrative contracts to build roads, airports, harbors, military bases, pipelines and barracks from one end of South Vietnam to the other. Those Vietnam contracts helped Brown & Root expand its operations around the world, and today it employs some 20,000 people and operates in more than 100 countries.

But there is something sinister about Brown & Root. Like its parent company, Halliburton—which, under Cheney, sold products and services to the Islamic Republic of Iran—Brown & Root has always been willing to skirt the edge to make a buck. Over the years Brown & Root has formed close relationships with the CIA and Special Forces: Wherever they go, Brown & Root is there, too, building facilities and providing cover for covert operations. Brown & Root does not admit it provides cover, but several individuals directly involved in such operations have made the assertion.¹ Case in point: Brown & Root was in Macedonia in 1999, building barracks at a military base for some 700 U.S. troops, including the 10th Special Forces Group, for which it seems to have a special affinity.²

Brown & Root is a non-partisan, war-mongering outfit and espionage arm of the CIA, and after Lyndon Johnson gave way to Richard Nixon, it received a contract to

Douglas Valentine

build prison detention facilities for the CIA on Con Son Island in South Vietnam.

The "tiger cage" scandal broke in 1970 when Donald Luce, a member of the World Council of Churches and an accredited newspaper reporter, led a congressional delegation to Con Son Prison, where the tiger cages were located. Con Son Prison was on an island in the South China Sea, and it was South Vietnam's largest holding cell for civilian prisoners—as many as 10,000 prisoners were held there with no legal rights, as part of the CIA's infamous Phoenix Program, with its grotesque An Tri "administrative detention" laws.

Originally known as the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation/Screening Interrogation and Detention (ICEX/SIDE) Program, Phoenix was a CIA-run computerized, management-by-objective driven counterinsurgency program that required its "coordinators" to neutralize (assassinate, imprison, or make to defect) 1,800 Vietnamese every month. Like the "unlawful combatants" being held at Guantanamo Bay, people arrested under the Phoenix Program were indefinitely detained until disposed of by military tribunals or "province security committees."

As Don Luce knew, remote Con Son Prison was the worst of the Phoenix detention facilities in South Vietnam. It was also a "re-education camp," and prisoners there were subjected to CIA psychological warfare operations, from the pro-government propaganda of the Bang Song theatrical company, to MKULTRA-type medical experiments. Most troubling of all were reports that death row inmates, peaceniks, draft dodgers, recalcitrants who refused to salute the South Vietnamese flag, and those who couldn't pay a big enough bribe to the Con Son commandant, were kept in a facility known as the "tiger cages."

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Doug Valentine's published work includes *The Hotel Tacloban*, *The Phoenix Program*, and *TDY*. He is currently working on *The Strength of the Wolf: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics 1930-1968*. He lives with wife Alice in Longmeadow, Massachusetts. Contact the author at: <www.douglasvalentine.com>

That is what Luce wanted to know about, and through his persistence, he got permission for a congressional delegation to visit Con Son on July 2, 1970. The delegation included Congressmen William Anderson and Augustus Hawkins, and Hawkins' aide (now Senator) Tom Harkin of Iowa. Senior Public Safety Adviser Frank Walton served as the delegation's host, and Luce served as interpreter.

Unknown to Walton, Luce had a map showing the location of the tiger cages. Luce led the delegation past some vegetable gardens to a wooden door separating Camp Four from Camp Six. When Walton started shouting protests at this departure from the guided tour, a guard inside opened the door, revealing two barracks of 60 cells each—the tiger cages.

The tiger cages were stone compartments built by the French colonial administration in the 1930s. Each compartment was approximately five feet wide, six feet long, and nine feet high. External slat doors allowed access to each cell at ground level. The cellblock was covered by a peaked roof. Large windows provided ventilation above the cells in the attic area. There were iron grates at the top of the cells, creating a sort of ceiling. There was a catwalk between the cell tops in the middle of the cellblock attic, so the guards could view the prisoners below, and, when necessary, throw buckets of lime upon them as a form of "sanitary torture." There was one mat and one bucket for sanitation in each cell.

There were 82 men and 312 women in the tiger cages when the U.S. congressional delegation visited. The delegation spent an hour talking with prisoners, and later reported that some were suffering from tuberculosis. Others had sores from the lime baths and partial paralysis from being shackled, and others were malnourished, suffering from gangrenous feet, and life-threatening dysentery.

The CIA immediately sprang into action, and arranged for former CIA officer Philip M. Crane, then a Congressman from Illinois, to make a follow-up visit. In a report dated July 20 Crane dutifully said, "The cells in the tiger cages were well-ventilated, well lighted and relatively cool."³ Public Safety Adviser Walton accused the Congressmen of interfering in Vietnamese affairs. The *New York Times* buried the scandal in a brief article that was repudiated by U.S. authorities. Luce was accused of being a Viet Cong agent and expelled from Vietnam in May 1971, after his apartment had been ransacked by secret police searching for his records.⁴

Donald Bordenkircher, the senior

USAID Public Safety Program Officer in charge of correctional facilities in Vietnam, suggests that Luce was actually a CIA agent working for CIA officer William Colby, the senior American Pacification official in South Vietnam. At the time, Henry Kissinger was secretly negotiating with the North Vietnamese, and the living conditions of American prisoners in Hanoi was a sticking point. Indeed, upon returning home, Congressman Hawkins expressed the hope that American POWs were being better treated in Hanoi.

The Public Safety Program was just a small part of Phoenix, thus expendable, says Bordenkircher, while "the more substantive programs (covert activities) of Phoenix could continue to flourish undaunted."⁵

Meanwhile, Colby ordered the demolition of the tiger cages and the construction of a new "reformation" cellblock, or segregation unit, which was built by Brown & Root.

According to Bordenkircher, Pacific Architects and Engineers was hired to draw the architectural plans, and Brown & Root got the contract to build the new cellblock. The plans were in place by October and work began in January 1972. But Brown & Root fueled the scandal by using prison labor to knock down the old tiger cages and build the three new cellblocks. In addition, the 288 new isolation units built by Brown & Root, which the prisoners called "cow cages," were worse than the tiger cages. According to Bordenkircher, "The old tiger cage buildings were definitely better. Modifications had to be made to the [Brown & Root] buildings. They trapped heat like an oven. Heavy duty exhaust fans had to be installed at each end [by Brown & Root] to provide air flow, and the access doors, at the end and center of each building, required installation of louvers for low level ventilation."⁶

The destruction of the tiger cages and the construction and renovations of the Brown & Root "cow cages" were paid for with \$400,000 of CIA Phoenix money, masked as Food For Peace funds.

Americans were responsible for maintaining the tiger cages. Brown & Root built the "cow cages," and Pacific Architects and Engineers built the CIA's secret interrogation and detention centers. From top to bottom, Americans were responsible for the wretched Vietnamese prison system, through the Phoenix Program, with its "administrative detention" rules that allowed for arrest without due process or legal representation. Prisoners were interrogated, held indefinitely without trial, and even executed based on a tip from an anonymous informer. Phoenix, with its

'neutralization' quotas packed the prison system to overflowing, then blamed the Vietnamese for abuses.

This phenomenon is indicative of the sickness infecting America—a sickness worse than anthrax, a sickness that can be traced back to the Vietnam syndrome, and the need to prove that we could have won if it weren't for the peaceniks—much like what happened in Germany after World War I.

For almost a year now, the national security brass has been engaged in a sham debate about whether detainees should be tortured, and if so, how. Meanwhile, Brown & Root, and dozens of other defense contractors, view Bush and Cheney's eternal "war against terror" as a godsend. All that's required to keep it going is to abide by Attorney General John Ashcroft's request, and create detention camps for U.S. citizens he and his adviser on administrative detention, Viet Dinh, deem to be "enemy combatants." In yet another ironic twist, Dinh, whose father worked under the U.S. in Vietnam, is now part of the U.S. security and intelligence complex.

The Bush II regime is prepared to turn America into the same sort of police state the CIA tried to create in Vietnam. If it is allowed to happen, their lust for Phoenix-like omnipotence will degrade this society, until torture, political repression, and assassination are accepted as facts of U.S. life. Today at Guantanamo Bay, we see Phoenix emerging from its Vietnam ashes. When it is fully grown, it will be unleashed by the CIA against the American people through the new Department of Homeland Security, and Brown & Root will be right pleased to build Ashcroft's detention camps, using your tax dollars.

NOTES

1. Author interviews with Special Forces soldiers (1986-87).

2. Laura Rozen, "The Big Buildup," *Salon.com*, April 20, 1999, <www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/04/20/kosovo_buildup/>; see also congressional testimony of journalist Wayne Madsen regarding U.S. involvement in crimes against humanity in Rwanda. Madsen testified that Brown & Root has recently built a secret military base on the Rwanda-Congo border, and has been training RPF soldiers there. <www.glob.co.zw/Military/genocide_and_covert_operation>

3. Bordenkircher, Don and Shirley, *Tiger Cage: An Untold Story* (West Virginia: Abbey Publishing, 1998 [self-published]), p. 136.

4. Douglas Valentine, *The Phoenix Program* (New York: William Morrow, 1990), pp. 348-49.

5. Bordenkircher, p. 135.

6. Bordenkircher, p. 183.

Argentina

BETWEEN DISINTEGRATION & REVOLUTION

Throughout the early and mid-nineties, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the G-7 countries, all praised Argentina's liberalization program as an economic model for the Third World. Then President Carlos Menem and Economic Minister Domingo Cavallo promised the Argentine people that they would soon become part of the "First World."

Today, Argentina is in total disintegration. Not only is the economy in its fifth year of recession/depression, but its banking system has collapsed, the unemployment rate has skyrocketed, and over half the population lives below the poverty line.

No country in contemporary Latin American history has fallen swifter and further into mass poverty and experienced as prolonged an economic collapse as Argentina. Though most Latin American countries have applied neoliberal policies, none has been as thorough and rapid as Argentina. Moreover, no Latin American country was as industrially advanced or had as diversified an economy. Finally, Argentina had the highest standard of living in the region, the most qualified and skilled labor force, and the political leadership most determined to follow the precepts of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the G-7.

Argentina is a test case for the efficacy or failures of the neoliberal approach under optimal conditions: a willing government, a well-developed infrastructure, a skilled labor force, long-term links to world markets, and a significant middle class with Euro-American patterns of culture and consumption.

The number of Argentines below the poverty line has grown geometrically: Ten years ago there were less than 15%, two years ago it was 30%. In June 2002 the percentage exceeded 50%. In that month, Eduardo Duhalde's regime acknowledged 18.2 million people (51%) below the poverty line. Of these, 7.8 million are indigents according to SIEMPRO (Spanish acronym for System of Information, Monitoring and Evaluation of Social Programs), an official institution under the jurisdiction of the President. Children and

adolescents living in poverty number almost 8.2 million. Between January and May 2002, the number of poor grew by 3.8 million, or 762,000 a month, or 25,000 a day. The rate of indigence is growing even faster. In 1998, 29% of the poor were indigent; in June 2002, 43%. The massification of extreme poverty is manifested in the high rates of child malnutrition—over 58% in Matanzas, a working-class suburb of Buenos Aires. In the

IN 1997, THE UNITED NATIONS PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT CALCULATED PER CAPITA ANNUAL INCOME AT \$8,950. IN MARCH 2002 IT WAS \$3,197.

interior there are numerous reports of children fainting in school for lack of food, and over 60% of newborns in Misiones suffer from anemia—a direct result of government cutbacks to meet G-7 and IMF demands.

INTO THE ABYSS

Apart from the top 10% of the population, all working sectors and pensioners have experienced an average 67% income decline. In 1997, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) calculated per capita annual income at \$8,950. In March 2002 it was \$3,197. The decline affects all regions of the country. If we use as rough indicators of "class" the different regions of the province of Buenos Aires, we can approximate the social impact of the crisis. The income in the capital city of Buenos Aires, which we can take as largely middle class, saw the average fall from \$909 a month in December 2001 to \$363 in March 2002; in the working-class suburbs (*conurbano*) of the city of Buenos Aires income fell from \$506 to \$202; in the province of Buenos Aires, from \$626 to \$250. The largest decline is among workers in the informal sector (work without benefits or employment protections) and among pensioners. In the capital, income of the "informals" dropped from \$643 to

James Petras
Henry Veltmeyer

\$257; in the working class suburbs from \$334 to \$134; in the province from \$394 to \$158. Among pensioners the decline was from \$437 to \$175 in the capital; from \$320 to \$128 in the working-class suburbs and from \$360 to \$144 in the province. The situation is far worse in the other provinces, where pay scales are lower, unemployment is higher, and where there are frequently three to six month delays in payment of salaries and pensions.

For the working and middle classes, the loss of formal employment means a sharp decline in income. Employed wage earners in the private sector of the capital earned \$904 in December 2001. Those who were forced into under-employment were earning \$257 in the informal sector three months later. A 30% rise in prices during the same period accompanied the skyrocketing loss of jobs.

The decline of income among the different occupational categories indicates both the absolute and relative decline of the middle class, a clear process of proletarianization. Bank employees in the capital have seen their income decline by nearly 60%, from \$1,081 to \$432 per month, and public employees have experienced a drop from \$1,144 to \$458 per month. As of April 2002, income of the former middle class did not cover the basic necessities of rent, food, transport, school and health expenses.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

James Petras has 50 books and 375 scholarly articles to his credit. His work has been translated into 28 languages. *Globalization Unmasked* (with Henry Veltmeyer) is his most recent book. His web site: <www.rebellion.org/petras> (Spanish), and <rebellion.org/petrasenglish> (English).

Henry Veltmeyer teaches Sociology and International Development at St. Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, Mexico. Recent publications include: *América Latina: Capital Global y la Perspectiva Del Desarrollo Alternativo*, and *Globalization Unmasked*.



Alexandra Guille

April 22, 2002. Supreme Court, Buenos Aires. An unemployed activist named Negra makes her point with the political/culinary percussion system currently popular in Argentina. She is part of a demonstration of workers from the Zanon ceramics factory, fighting to nationalize Argentina's largest tile-making factory before the owner declares bankruptcy, throws 400 workers on the streets, and strips remaining assets for immediate capital flight.

If we take the figure of \$400 as the cutoff for the poverty line and \$250 as the cutoff line for indigence, we find that every occupational category in the working class in the suburbs of greater Buenos Aires is below the poverty line and several categories are "indigent."

Those whose main income is a pension are indigent in all geographical sectors, as are all unemployed workers (30% of the labor force) living in the suburbs and greater Buenos Aires. Even if we assume that some workers classified as unemployed are actually working in the informal sector, almost all are near or below the line of indigence. The massive growth of unemployment to 30% nationally, from 40–60% in the working-class suburbs, and even higher in some of the former one-industry towns of the interior, is reminiscent of the worst years of the U.S. depression of the 1930s and of Weimar Germany in the 1920s.

Accompanying and interrelated to the impoverishment of the mass of the middle and working classes is the concentration of wealth in the ruling and upper middle classes and foreign capitalists and bankers. In 1974 the top 10% received 28% of national income, in 1992 slightly over 34% and in 2001 over 37%, while the poorest 10% received 2.2% in both 1974 and 1992 and 1.3% in 2001—before the devaluation and sharp increase of unemployment.

Together the upper classes—the ruling elite plus the upper middle class—receive 53% of declared income. Because the

upper classes were able to withdraw their funds (estimates run as high as \$40 billion) from the banks and send their money outside the country, avoiding the confiscation of December 2001, the percentage of wealth in the hands of the upper classes is probably close to 80%.

In that confiscation, the government froze all bank accounts, and subsequently converted them to pesos. The conversion rate in June 2002 was 3.5 pesos to the dollar. In effect, the accounts were reduced from \$45 billion to approximately \$13 billion and declining. The regime's attempt to convert the remainder into state bonds redeemable in ten years at 2% interest would devalue these personal savings accounts even further, given the 30% rate of inflation for the first quarter of 2002. This attempt by the regime to swindle the account holders out of their savings was prevented by massive demonstrations by the impoverished middle class—the pot-banging *cacerolazos*—which threatened the Congress and stormed the banks.

MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS

During the first three months of 2002, industrial activity declined by over 18%. Textiles and manufacturing were down 48% over the previous year. The number of plant closures accelerated throughout the 1999–2002 period, reaching unprecedented levels in the last trimester of 2001 and the first half of 2002. Unused industrial capacity was running at more than 50% in most sectors of the economy,

including metal, textiles and auto parts.

Between 1990 and 1998, the foreign debt grew from \$58 billion to \$140 billion. Over the same period the cumulative sum of capital flight plus interest payments rose from \$75 billion to \$197 billion. In other words, external borrowing largely financed capital flight and part of the mushrooming debt payments, leaving a net deficit in capital flow. This eroded the economy's capacity to sustain growth and subsequently led to the recession, further budget cuts, and later turned the recession into a depression. The foreign and domestic elites' massive withdrawal of funds—aided and abetted by the foreign banks—led to the confiscation of savings of millions of Argentines and the virtual collapse of the financial system. Throughout 1999–2001, IMF loans merely served to pay back private banks and the IFIs, while exacerbating the debt problem, deepening the recession, and lowering living standards. In order to get short-term loans, Argentina was paying 16% over U.S. Treasury notes as late as August 2001. Once the fall took place, neither the IFIs nor the G-7 were willing to lend new money, unless the central government repealed its Economic Subversive Law (a law designed to prosecute illicit banking practices), abolished the provincial currencies which kept the local economies afloat, and fired several hundreds of thousands of health, educational and other public employees.¹

The key concern of the IFIs with repealing the Economic Subversive Law was that it was an instrument to prosecute G-7 banks that were involved in the illegal transfer of over \$50 billion in the year 2001–02. In June 2002, under IMF pressure, the law was repealed. While the IMF blamed the Argentine "savers" for the financial crisis—by making panic withdrawals—substantial data demonstrate that the private, principally foreign-owned banks had already consummated a massive transfer of funds out of the country and were not willing to re-capitalize the banks. Furthermore, the IMF and World Bank pressured the Argentine government to assume the private banks' obligations to their depositors and issue ten-year state-guaranteed bonds in lieu of direct payments to holders of savings accounts. Lacking funds and facing total unwillingness of foreign bank corporations to re-capitalize their Argentine subsidiaries, the foreign and national private banks claimed to be on the verge of bankruptcy, at exactly the moment that the rightful claimants attempted to withdraw their savings.

The immediate cause for the collapse of Argentine capitalism was the role of the

foreign-owned banks and the IFIs, led by the IMF, in emptying the Argentine financial system. The longer-term reasons are rooted in regressive structural changes including privatization, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), open markets, and quasi-criminal "deregulation" of the economy. All these led to the collapse of domestic production, wholesale pillage of the economy, and the confiscation of millions of saving accounts.

In the months leading up to the crisis, the ten leading banks moved approximately \$27 billion out of the Argentine financial system. This system operated on two levels: a formal system of deposits and loans and an "informal sector" where mega-accounts operated, largely to launder funds and carry out speculative activity in the financial sector. The "other" categories in February 2001 amounted to \$57 billion in assets and \$60 billion in obligations. By November the totals of "others" declined to \$25 billion for assets and \$35 billion in obligations. A closer analysis reveals that of the \$25 billion decline in assets, over 74% of it took place among the ten biggest banks. The IMF loans to Argentina served to cover the growing drain of resources out of the financial system by the financial elites, while imposing harsher cuts in public spending and investment. The triple phenomena of deepening economic depression, financial flight, and growing indebtedness were caused by the alliance of the IFIs, the foreign and local big financiers, and the foreign-owned banks. The small and medium Argentine depositors were victims of a covert financial swindle, and not the perpetrators, as the apologists charged. Their desperate and belated effort to withdraw their savings was a reaction to the financial swindle executed by the financial elite. Most small and medium savers, however, were not successful. Bank liabilities after the flight of big accounts and the drying up of overseas credits far exceeded their assets; with the economic crisis, many of their outstanding loans were delinquent and there was no way that headquarters would inject new funds to cover the demands of depositors. The government intervened to "save the banks" by freezing all deposits and preventing depositors from recovering any of their savings. The gross class character of the government's financial rescue plan infuriated the dispossessed middle and lower classes. The subsequent devaluation of the peso in effect robbed them of two-thirds the face value of their frozen savings and depressed their incomes, while the upper middle and ruling classes who got their money out of the financial system were able to lower

their cost of living, production and consumption by a commensurate 65%.

"FREE" TRADE

Argentine industry was pressured both by inexpensive consumer imports from low-wage areas (Asia) as well as upmarket goods from high-tech, large-scale, heavily subsidized Euro-American manufacturers. The liberal argument that "competition" would make Argentine enterprises more "efficient" was false—few Argentine companies had the scale and financing to compete with the top U.S. and European multinationals, and even the lowest paid Argentine workers could not compete with a Chinese worker earning a dollar a day. The rapid lowering of barriers also precluded any preparation for competition, and the lack of reciprocity in lowering subsidies and barriers in the U.S. and Europe prevented Argentine companies that were competitive from capturing overseas markets.

Historically, the U.S. and EU countries have undergone a gradual process of selective liberalization, in stark contrast with the Argentine experience. Free convertibility in Europe did not take place until the economies were on their way to sustained expansion—which for some did not take place until well into the 1960s. Trade barriers, including quotas, tariffs and non-traditional constraints (health barriers, unfair trade and anti-dumping rules) are still frequently and extensively used to protect non-competitive sectors. Mass state subsidies and fiscal deficits are used to promote exports and to stimulate domestic growth.

PUBLIC FIRESALE

The Menem regime gave the appearance of an "affluent regime" thanks to heavy borrowing and windfall income from the selloff of public properties. Most of the inflows of capital raised upper class consumption and facilitated wholesale corruption by the entire political class and their entourages of public officials, judges, customs officers, police, and military officials. Foreign bankers were willing to lend because the interest rates were 10 to 20 points above the Euro-U.S. rates and there was easy liquidity given free convertibility, and the de facto dollarization of the economy ensured monetary stability. Thus, each step of the liberalization process weakened the fundamentals of the economy: The domestic economy shrank, entrepreneurs fled into apparently lucrative financial-speculative activity, debt payments skyrocketed, the loans-for-privatization deals were approaching their limits, and external flight of capital accelerated as the upper classes sensed that the whole liberal edifice would eventu-

ally collapse, leaving neither a productive system nor monetary resources to revive it.

Crucial to the collapse of the bubble economy was the behavior of the Argentine big bourgeoisie. Powerfully ensconced in the Menem regime, they were the initial

MENEM'S REGIME HAD THE APPEARANCE OF AFFLUENCE, THANKS TO HEAVY BORROWING AND THE SELLOFF OF PUBLIC PROPERTIES WHICH FACILITATED WHOLESALE CORRUPTION BY THE ENTIRE POLITICAL CLASS.

beneficiaries of the privatization process and the loans from overseas lenders. They were also the group that dictated economic policy. The Menem regime's point of reference for developing the liberal agenda was, first and foremost, the dominant classes in Argentina who had investments overseas, were tightly linked to overseas banks via joint investments in privatized banks and via foreign loans, and who demanded a peso easily convertible into dollar equivalence. Liberalization to the maximum allowed this "transnational" Argentine bourgeoisie to buy public banks and enterprises on the cheap and sell them to foreign capital. Deregulation of the banks allowed massive transfers of funds out of the country and the laundering of illicit gains. Cheap imports, easy loans and fast exits of funds were the Argentine elite's definition of liberalization.

For obvious reasons the G-7 countries and the IFIs were wildly enthusiastic: They gained control over banks and deposits, lucrative telecommunications, airlines, oil and other money-earning public enterprises. They encouraged the regime to proceed full speed ahead with reckless abandon.

As the domestic economy, particularly in the provinces, collapsed, the provincial governments ran up huge debts—partly to finance corrupt political machines to sustain the national government, and partly to avoid provincial popular revolts. Unlike South Korea, China, and Japan, large-scale corruption did not grease the wheels of national production: Bribes greased the hands that sold off lucrative public enterprises to foreign investors who stripped assets and reduced local production in favor of large-scale speculative activity. There was an inverse relation: As corrup-

tion grew, industry declined, tax receipts were negligible and competitiveness became an empty slogan.

Meanwhile, foreign investors moved in on the agro-industrial sectors, retail trade (mega malls), real estate and hotels, in association with a small nucleus of the Argentine economic elite and sectors of

WHAT U.S. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY PAUL O'NEILL MEANS BY "POLITICAL WILL" IS PRECISELY TO OVERRIDE THE SURVIVAL OF 33 MILLION ARGENTINES TO SATISFY OVERSEAS BANKERS.

the kleptocratic political class, headed by the extended Menem family and its political entourage.

The first major adverse effect was the slashing of employees in the process of preparing public enterprises for privatization. The state fired hundreds of thousands of workers in the telephone, railroad, and waterworks sectors, assuming the economic costs and taking responsibility for repressing the ensuing protests. Many cities in the interior, like the petroleum city of Neuquen, were turned from prosperous cities to ghost towns, with 30-40% unemployment rates. Promises of "alternative employment" were never kept, as provincial and local officials linked to the central government either stole the funds outright or used them to finance their political machines, through expansion of unproductive "administrative" jobs.

The "centralization" of legislative and executive powers in the presidency—in his very person—and the dictatorial methods Menem used to legislate (most industries and banks were privatized via presidential decrees) facilitated rapid and extensive liberalization.

DISINTEGRATION & DESTITUTION

U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill weighed in on the side of the IMF's "final squeeze," endorsing the IMF bailout of the bankers and the takeover of the remaining sectors of the economy. But he demanded, in typical euphemistic language, "a political solution." He called for a strong authoritarian regime capable of ramming the mass job firings, budget cuts and abolition of local currencies policy down the throats of the impoverished Argentines. O'Neill questioned "the leadership capacity" of

the Duhalde government. According to an interview, O'Neill said Argentina's problem boiled down to a single question: Will the Argentine government do what it has to do, namely, implement the IMF policies?² What O'Neill and others in the IFIs and G-7 mean by "political will" is precisely to override the interests and survival of thirty-three million Argentines, elected congressional officials, governors, and mayors, and force upon them further bankruptcies and unemployment—to push beyond the 53% poverty level to satisfy overseas bankers and investors.

Probably the most obscene remarks came from Anne Krueger, second in command at the IMF, a U.S. appointee and a former Stanford professor. In an interview in the *Financial Times*, she claimed that "the Argentine authorities are not sufficiently realistic as they should be." Realism, according to Krueger, means that in the midst of a depression, cut public spending, lower living standards and increase unemployment. The "realism" referred to is the world of finance capital and its voracious appetite to squeeze even more interest payments from bankrupt provinces, businesses and public treasuries; to withdraw more savings from Argentina with impunity.

The U.S. embassy staff in Argentina went even further. Political attaché Michael Matera claimed the crisis was due not only to Argentina's political leaders but to the entire Argentine people. "The viewpoint of international economists is incompatible with the national mentality of the Argentines. Argentineans have a collective incapacity to change; they are immature and paranoid."³ The racist ideology explicit in such statements is inescapable.

The style and substance of Argentine relations with the G-7 speaks to a new imperialism: the pillage of the economy, the growth of vast inequalities, economic stagnation followed by a profound and enduring depression, and the massive impoverishment of the population as a consequence of the greatest concentration of wealth in contemporary Argentine history. The new imperialism works directly through the inter-state system and subsidiary financial institutions like the IMF to dictate policy. The April mission of the IMF, with its public pronouncements on every aspect of the Argentine economy, the blatant dictates of the U.S. embassy and the G-7 economic ministers, strongly resonate with the colonial relationship of the past.

In a trip to Tucuman Province in April 2002, we visited the vast *villas de miseria*, or slums, and spoke to the multitude of poor and destitute. They told us that between

2001 and 2002, in just one year, the number of children suffering from malnutrition increased sixfold. The combination of mass firings, inflation, and the cutoff of food rations turned the poor into destitute, unable to meet even their basic food needs.

A week later, while meeting with a delegate from the bank workers' union in Buenos Aires, we were informed that the banks were planning massive firings. A month later, on May 19, a newspaper close to the financial elite, *La Nacion*, reported that banks were planning to fire two-thirds

THERE WERE 51 ROAD BLOCKAGES IN 1998, 252 IN 1999, 514 IN 2000 AND NEARLY ONE THOUSAND IN 2001. IN 2002, THE BLOCKAGES WERE OFTEN COMBINED WITH GENERALIZED UPRISINGS.

of their employees (80,000 of the 120,000), and reduce the pay of remaining staff.

By early July the streets were noisy with demonstrators, crime was rampant, university professors with three positions (*catedras*) were making \$200 a month, highways were blocked and the pot-banging impoverished retirees and former middle class were meeting to demand the ouster not only of the regime, but of the entire political class.

The deepening polarization in Argentina has taken a variety of social and political forms: a national uprising that overthrew the De la Rúa regime in December 2001; permanent rebellion in the provinces; constant mass mobilizations of the unemployed (*piqueteros*); and popular assemblies (*caceroleros*) in the impoverished middle and working class neighborhoods.

On December 19 and 20, 2001, hundreds of thousands of Argentines took to the streets to protest the government's declaration of a state of siege banning public demonstrations, the confiscation of \$40 billion in savings, the deepening recession and 23% unemployment rate. The uprising which finally forced President De la Rúa to resign and exit from the presidential palace via a helicopter was the culmination of a series of mass road blockages by the unemployed *piqueteros*, pot-banging neighborhood marches and assemblies, provincial mobilizations and

attacks on governors, mayors and federal officials. While each of the particular mass actions has its own specific social base, forms of direct action, and priority demands, they all converge in rejecting repayment of the foreign debt, implementation of IMF austerity programs, and the confiscation of savings.

The mass unemployed workers' movement was the detonator for the uprising of December 19/20, even if the organized unemployed were not a decisive force on the day of the ouster of the President. The unemployed workers' movements (MTDs, for *Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados*) have spread throughout Argentina and escalated over the past six years as the recession has turned into a depression and millions of former unionized factory workers have become 'long term' unemployed. The MTDs are organized territorially—by barrio, municipality, and more recently across municipalities, and in some cases as competing national organizations. Their main tactics are to barricade major highways, blocking the transportation of goods, services, and labor to and from industries, banks and other sectors. Their demands invariably include state-financed jobs and food. They are usually autonomous from the main trade unions and political parties, though there are important exceptions. The MTDs usually meet in assemblies in their neighborhoods to decide on tactics, demands, and the distribution of jobs secured in successful struggles. By early 2002, over 200,000 unemployed workers were organized, though many more workers and underemployed participate in the street blockages and marches. The MTDs draw support from rank and file trade unionists, regional trade union leaders and the Marxist parties. The MTDs clearly spearheaded the opposition to the neoliberal regime in the absence of any sustained opposition from the political parties and the official trade unions.

Several theoretical points emerge from an analysis of the MTDs. First, the idea that the unemployed, outside the factories, cannot be organized because they are too dispersed, fragmented and without social leverage is false. The MTDs demonstrate that their common social situation, the leadership from below rooted in formerly unionized workers expressing themselves through popular assemblies in horizontal structures can succeed in organizing in the midst of a depression, despite the hostility and indifference of the entire trade union and political party leadership.

The activist mass has become in large part "feminized" as women are in most cases the head of the household and have taken the lead in organizing the barricades and the logistical support systems (road-



May 1, 2002. Buenos Aires. International Workers Day. A large coalition of activists takes over the main boulevard chanting in unison: "Resistance to neoliberalism is global. We are everywhere."

side soup kitchens). Women from working class families bring to the MTDs the experience of two decades of neighborhood organizing, first via neighborhood reform schemes of the various regimes and over the past seven years through the autonomous militant MTDs. The road blockages have evolved from sporadic, quasi-spontaneous actions into systematic, organized activities coordinated among thousands of unemployed. There were 51 road blockages in 1998, 252 in 1999, 514 in 2000, and nearly a thousand in 2001. In 2002 the road blockages were often combined with generalized uprisings, particularly in the provinces of the interior, but also in the greater Buenos Aires region. In January 2002, for example, road blockages accompanied popular mobilizations in Cordoba, Santa Fe, Chaco, Misiones, Santiago del Estero, Salta and Formosa. The combined struggles included both the demands of the MTDs and those of other protesting sectors, such as back pay for public employees, housing for the homeless, an end of the confiscation of savings, and food distribution. In some cases municipal buildings were sacked, supermarkets were raided, and governors' mansions and state legislatures were occupied.

It is clear that the *piqueteros* are not all that they appear to be, unemployed workers fighting for social justice. Particularly the Peronist party, now in power, has used the job subsidies to try to divide the MTDs, handing out job application forms via their barrio ward bosses and organizing thugs to disrupt local meetings. In addition, local Peronist bosses have hired some unem-

ployed to assault and intimidate assemblies in popular barrios, though they seldom attempt to threaten the MTDs.

The radical MTDs are dispersed throughout the country and in the greater Buenos Aires region. They include Anibal Veron, General Mosconi, Almirante Brown, Teresa Rodriguez, Solano—the names of the communities in which they are based—and many others, including regional affiliates of the CCC (*Coordinadora de Colectivos Clasistas*) which have a militant confrontational style of social action, advocate total blockage of highways, and have retained autonomy from all the trade union confederations.

However, the radical MTDs are themselves internally divided along political lines, with the Trotskyist Workers Pole (*Polo Obrero*), the Communist "Land and Liberation" (*Tierra y Liberacion*) and other formations competing for hegemony. The result is that the radical MTDs at best have only tactical alliances, while more often than not they are in conflict, even to the point of separate negotiations with the regime.

THE UPRISING OF DECEMBER 2001

The usually ubiquitous red flags and banners of the Marxist Left, dissident trade unions and *piqueteros* were almost completely absent when tens of thousands of Argentineans marched to the Plaza de Mayo facing the presidential palace, the Casa Rosada, on the hot summer afternoon of December 19, 2001.

The absence of the Left on the first day of the uprising can be attributed to several



Alexandra Buitrago

May 1, 2002. "Out, Yankees!" An activist from the youth wing of the Union of Argentinian Workers (CTA) decorates the steel shutters guarding the windows of a Citibank branch on Avenida Corrientes, Buenos Aires. Ninety percent of Argentine banks are foreign and/or privately owned.

factors, both ideological and organizational. Most of the Left operated from a rigid class analysis from which it deduced political behavior. The Left was generally "workerist," in the sense that what didn't come out of the factories was suspect. This rigidity generally took the following logic: factory worker—unionization—revolutionary party—general strike—revolution. In the meantime, the unionized workers became a minority, most workers were un- and underemployed and many were organized in MTDs. Belatedly the Left turned to organize, mobilize and fragment the MTDs.

Likewise, the Left missed the dynamics of class mobility: The rapid downward mobility of the middle class, its impoverishment and proletarianization. Having lost all their savings, the middle class had nothing to lose. They had become deeply alienated from their traditional conservative moorings. They were open to a radical democratic style of street politics and direct forms of assembly-style democracy.

The Left only joined the uprising on the second day, December 20, and then only the activists and militants, as the leaders remained in headquarters strategizing. Important contingents of public sector trade unionists, *piqueteros*, Marxist activists and tens of thousands of independent radicalized middle class people poured into the streets. Thousands of young people, from lower middle class students to young unemployed *piqueteros*, joined the march and the eventual battles with the police in front of the Presidential Palace in Buenos Aires and in other major

cities. The downwardly mobile middle class demonstration was the detonator of the mass and continual assault on power. Four governments came and went in fourteen days.

The uprising was successful on several important counts. The Saa regime declared that Argentina would not meet its debt obligations. The populace was able to force the resignation of four presidents. The political class and the judicial system were delegitimized, their venality and anti-national, anti-popular character were fully exposed.

The December 19-20 mass uprising was historically unique for several reasons: It was the first time in Argentine history that a popular uprising had overthrown a bankrupt elected or dictatorial leader. It was the first time in history that the majority of Argentines had confronted and rejected the entire political class. The uprising and the solidarity that ensued led to new and creative forms of direct popular representation in the shape of barrio assemblies, and new tactics of struggle, such as pot-banging demonstrations capable of blocking state decisions adversely affecting the people. Preventing Duhalde from converting the confiscated savings accounts into the junkiest of junk bonds is one important example.

The popular assemblies increasingly relied on the work commissions to implement policy changes as the Marxist sects began to penetrate, debate, argue over tactics, programs and party turf, alienating many and recruiting few. There was a temporary retrocession from the high point of

December 2001.

The pot-banging movement has demonstrated its capacity to veto presidential nominations and decrees. The internal warfare of the Left sects undermined the assemblies' attractiveness to many participants. Despite emerging weaknesses, the political experience and the sense of power have sustained an increasingly radical and growing current of opinion among the impoverished middle class. Public opinion polls on presidential candidates in late May 2002 favored a Marxist, Luis Zamora, over any and all of the persona from the major parties.

PHOENIX OR PROMETHEUS?

In light of the complete and total collapse of the Argentine neoliberal model, several alternative models of development have emerged. One of them, Plan Phoenix, put forth by over 100 economists and political scientists, is the most widely circulated and influential in intellectual circles. The other, which we can call Plan Prometheus is not yet a formal proposal or document, but a body of demands and proposals now being articulated within the emerging revolutionary democratic organizations.

Phoenix is both a critical diagnosis of neoliberal policies and a prescription for change and development. The critical diagnosis covers a wide range of economic policies, from taxation, public spending, ALCA (Area Libre Comercio de America) and MERCOSUR (Market of the Southern Cone) to privatization and technology policy. Phoenix's main virtues are found in its criticism of the total deregulation of the economy, the indiscriminate opening to the world market, the unilateral and radical reduction of tariff barriers (without reciprocity), the loss of control over monetary policy via the de facto dollarization, the dismantling of the state as an instrument of economic policy, the great concentration of economic power, and the lack of transparency in the privatization of public enterprise. Phoenix's rejection of globalization ideologues' argument that the nation-state is no longer a viable tool for policy making is part of a new project to revitalize the role of the state in pursuit of an industrial policy which prioritizes development of the internal market and international competitiveness.

In the area of reforms, Phoenix advocates reductions in debt payments via a moratorium or reduced payments—the document is self-contradictory. Its moderate proposals have been bypassed by subsequent events, since three months after Phoenix was published the government defaulted. Phoenix favors increased taxes

on the rich, the financial groups and other "non-productive" sectors, and elimination of subsidies to privileged classes. The revenues raised would be channeled toward employment-generating investments in socially useful areas (schools, low income housing, child care centers), as well as worker training programs. The basic premise of the Phoenix document is that a coalition of political parties, productive private sectors, and civil society would be the political bases for a new regulatory regime. The state would direct financial capital to fund productive capitalism; foreign capital to reinvest profits in the national economy; and productive (as opposed to speculative) capital to invest in socially useful activities. Phoenix seeks to devise an economic policy to "reorient capital" toward the domestic market, regional (re-)industrialization and processing of raw materials to generate more value added to exports in the international markets. The priority of Phoenix would be to develop a national plan of development to reactivate the economy, fix social priorities, selectively protect local producers, seek sources of domestic funding and then negotiate with the IFIs, including the IMF. The focus would be on internal transformation and the role of the national state, not on external agreements with the IFIs.

The Phoenix document is without any connection to the powerful social movements and political uprisings that have occurred. They are not even mentioned in passing. The organized unemployed, the popular assemblies, the factory takeover movements, and the provincial rebellions—all of which have the most direct stake in the welfare, development and employment goals of Phoenix—are ignored. Instead, Phoenix looks to the discredited trade union bureaucrats of the confederations, the political parties and leaders who have been the main cause of the disaster to reenact a new national-popular coalition with foreign capital and credit from the IFIs.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ALTERNATIVE

For Plan Prometheus, the people's movements are the point of departure. First and foremost is the need for a new social coalition of the 80% of Argentines suffering a severe decline in living standards, including the 55% below the poverty line. Employed and unemployed workers alone amount to close to 50%, and the impoverished middle class includes another 20-30%. This is a broad-based coalition, which is not linked to overseas banks. This gives a socialist

state the social basis to re-nationalize the banking and financial system and provides a political base to resist pressures from the G-7 bankers. The nationalization of foreign trade would provide the state with a mechanism for reorienting foreign exchange to finance public investment and national industrialization. The re-nationalization of petroleum would provide income and revenues to stimulate job training, infrastructure and social projects generating employment. Progressive taxes and tax collection can be enforced by threats to expropriate the property of tax evaders and tax delinquents.

The state reforms proposed by the Phoenix document should be articulated through new assembly forms of popular representation and the incorporation of the new social movements (*piqueteros*) in local and municipal governments. Popular assemblies should exercise direct control of budget allocations and expenditures, an advanced form of participatory public finance. Public ownership of strategic sectors of the economy is essential to sustain redistributive policies, as the recent decades attest. With privatization the inequalities widened, and decision-making power over macro-economic policies was monopolized by powerful economic groups.

The economic crisis has cut per capita income by two-thirds. Given the scarce resources and the disintegrating productive base, only a public takeover under workers' control can expand the material base and generate greater equality. Greater equality depends on social control of the income to be distributed. Social ownership is at the center of Plan Prometheus. It combines the tax and expenditures of Phoenix but within a vastly expanded social property sector, democratically controlled by the direct producers and administered by a meritocratic public administration. The plan is Promethean because it aims at the total reconstruction of a disintegrating economy with a shattered social fabric in the face of powerful U.S.-Euro imperial adversaries. Having control over the basic economic sectors, however, means the return and reinvestment of earnings in Argentina. Debt default means the savings of over 50% of export earnings. The diversification of production and the reactivation of the economy mean that optimal use can be made of existing unused capacity—over 50% of the total. MERCOSUR, China, the Arab countries and sectors of the EU and Russia offer alternative markets to any IFI-organized boycott. Public investments in innovation,

technology, research and development can incorporate Argentina's highly trained but currently underutilized labor force. The reactivation of internal markets and selective protection of provincial producers can expand markets. Public investments in infrastructure can employ the unemployed and facilitate inter-provincial and inter-MERCOSUR trade.

Plan Prometheus incorporates the criticisms of Plan Phoenix and extends them from modifying the behavior of the private actors to transforming their structural position. Prometheus incorporates some of the specific welfare reforms of Phoenix but locates them in a more realistic political-economic property framework that avoids the constraints and threats of private/foreign non-cooperation. Prometheus replaces Phoenix's proposed national-popular social coalition with a more realistic popular coalition rooted in the really existing social movements and their interests.

CONCLUSION

As of September 2002 there is no sign of recovery or outside relief—on the contrary, the crises have deepened. The collapse of the Argentine economy and the impoverishment of the majority of its people following the zealous application of "free market" doctrine is a warning to the rest of the Third World. By early summer the Brazilian and Uruguayan economies began their descent: Uruguay is in the midst of deep recession (with 15% unemployed) and was temporarily "saved" from collapse by a \$1.5 billion IMF loan; in Brazil it took a \$30 billion loan to stave off collapse. What is called a financial "contagion" is in reality the collapse of an economic model based on U.S. pillage, local corruption and joint exploitation.

In June, during a march organized by the Anibal Veron MTD, two *piqueteros* were executed by police officers—the act videotaped. The result was a massive protest which forced President Duhalde to announce new elections for early 2003. In response to the continuing crises and the IMF refusal to provide any support, a newly organized, massive popular rebellion is in the works. Date and place to be announced.

NOTES

1. *Página 12* (Buenos Aires daily), April 14, 2002, pp. 6, 7.
 2. *Página 12*, April 12, 2002, p. 2.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- further reading
For a look at the same phenomenon by an Argentinian see: Salomon Partnoy, "Disasters of Neoliberalism," *CovertAction Quarterly*, no. 72, Spring 2002.

Smashing the Kurds

CIA ROLE IN KIDNAPPING ABDULLAH OCALAN

Kani Xulam

On February 16, 1999, the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit startled his country with the news that the Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan was in Turkey, "since 3:00 a.m. this morning."¹ "The operation," he went on to say, "has been accomplished thanks to a close and harmonious cooperation between the Turkish Intelligence Organization and the Turkish General Staff."²

If true, the Turks had reason to celebrate the exploit as they did in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and other Turkish cities by dancing in the streets to the tunes of jingoistic Turkish songs. When a reporter asked the Prime Minister, "In which country was he [Mr. Ocalan] last?" Mr. Ecevit said, "We are not going to go into any detail on this subject." As a former journalist himself, it was odd for him to add, "I ask you not to be inquisitive about it."³

The Turks, the Kurds, the reporters and many others were inquisitive about it because a number of Greek and Kenyan missions had come under heavy attack by angry Kurdish militants especially in Europe. Ms. Semsi Kilic, an associate of Mr. Ocalan in Nairobi, Kenya, had already tipped some Kurdish reporters in Europe to the news of the abduction of the Kurdish leader adding that the Greeks and the Kenyans had conspired against him.

But if the latter account was correct, and the angry Kurds thought it was, the Turkish Prime Minister was duping the reporters in Ankara for thanking the wrong parties for the "good" news. But as the real parties to the abduction spoke, gradually, it became obvious that Ms. Kilic herself had not exactly known what had really happened in Nairobi, Kenya.

The day after the abduction, the Kurds, reacting to the news in some of the European dailies that perhaps Israeli agents were also involved in the kidnapping of their leader, attacked the Israeli Consulate in Berlin, Germany.⁴ The armed Israeli guards fired live ammunition on the flag- and picture-waving Kurdish crowd. Ahmet Acar, Sema Alp, and Mustafa Kurt were killed.⁵

On February 17, the U.S. issued a trav-

el advisory reminding Americans "residing or travelling abroad...to review their personal security."⁶

The State Department was wary. Mr. Ecevit was circumspect. Regrettably, it became obvious to the Kurds that they had not learned much from history.

On February 18, the *New York Times*

DISRUPTION HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF UTMOST SECRECY, HIDING THE HAND OF THE UNITED STATES AND AVOIDING THE CUMBERSOME CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF CIA-DIRECTED COVERT OPERATIONS.

quoted the Turkish leader Ecevit at another press conference: "I will use a local expression and say, 'let us eat the grape and not ask where it came from.'"⁷

A day later, asked about the U.S. role again, he said, "I can't reveal that....But you can make your own guess."⁸

There was no need to guess. The previous day, the *New York Times* had reported on its front page, "U.S. Helped Turkey Find and Capture Kurd Rebel."⁹ A senior American official who "demanded" anonymity went on to describe how Ocalan was "discovered" in Nairobi, Kenya, and how Ankara was then alerted about its archenemy.¹⁰

Nothing was said about the Greek connection. The Kenyan missions in Europe remained closed, and Nairobi declared the Greek Ambassador to Kenya, George Kostoulas, persona non grata.¹¹ The Israelis, like the Kenyans, denied culpability and noted, "...we certainly had no part in the capture of Ocalan."¹² The Greek Embassy in Washington felt compelled to issue a press release blaming Ocalan for the misfortune that befell him.¹³

On February 20, the Kurdish daily

Ozgur Politika published an interview with Semsi Kilic, the eyewitness to Mr. Ocalan's abduction, under the byline of Cemal Ucar. Ms. Kilic blamed the Greek government, especially its foreign minister, Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, for the *cause celebre* in Turkey. His office, she told Mr. Ucar, gave us assurances that, "...with the prepared plane [at the airport], you [Ocalan] will be able to fly anywhere in Europe."¹⁴

Ms. Kilic was not allowed to accompany Mr. Ocalan. The Kenyan police who had come to escort the Kurdish leader insisted that he alone was getting the "ride." Ambassador George Kostoulas who wanted to see his guest off at the airport was equally rebuffed. To the waiting arms of the Turkish commandos the Kurdish leader was delivered in one piece.

Six days later, the Greek Ambassador wrote for his government an account of what had happened in his residence, the last stop of Mr. Ocalan's odyssey back to Turkey. That account was later leaked to the press.¹⁵ The emerging picture showed his government desperate to disassociate itself from Ocalan, the Kurds baffled and impervious to the intrigue that surrounded them, and the Ambassador himself often clueless about Athens' ultimate intention to cooperate with all but the Kurds.

No independent body has appointed a commission to undertake a study of what happened in Nairobi, Kenya.

Nevertheless, after the debacle, there was fallout in Athens. Three ministers of the Simitis administration were sacked, including the acerbic foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos. A Greek parliamentary committee that investigated the Greek side of the events blamed private Greek citizens for breaches of law in welcoming and harboring the Kurdish rebel in Greece. If the Kurds

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AP Photo

February 15, 1999. Scene on board a Turkish government plane enroute from Kenya to Turkey. Ocalan and members of a Turkish Special Forces unit. He was sentenced to death June 29, 1999. On August 2, 2002, Turkey abolished the death penalty as a prerequisite to entry to the EU. Ocalan's fate depends on a power struggle between the military, which wants EU membership, and the Turkish National Party, which wants Ocalan hanged.

were awaiting an apology, it did not come.

For the time being, a report that hit the wires on February 28, 1999, came as close to full disclosure as any fact-finding investigation that the Kurds could hope for. "Disrupting Terrorists," by Associated Press writer John Diamond, began, *Frustrated by restrictions on using military force against terrorists, the United States is turning to a lower-profile tactic. The CIA calls it 'disruption'—working with foreign law-enforcement services to harass and hamper terrorists around the world...*

*Disruption has the advantage of utmost secrecy, hiding the hand of the United States and avoiding the cumbersome congressional reporting requirements that go with CIA-directed covert operations....The recent arrest by Turkish forces in Kenya of Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan is one of the rare examples where the disruption tactic gained public notice.*¹⁶

Perhaps the most telling part of the whole Ocalan episode was the name he was given in the fake passport that the Greeks had issued him. When the Turks seized him, they confiscated the document and shared it with the world. He had the name of Lazaros. His cover was the diseased pauper in the biblical parable of the rich man and the beggar. The Greek leaders, lacking honor, treated Mr. Ocalan like a vagabond.

They were glad to be rid of him.

And the irony doesn't end with the Greeks. It actually started with the Turks. In the 1920s, the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal, assumed the last name of Ataturk, the father of Turks, for himself. He and his officials trotted the country and gave Turks and Kurds alike new Turkish last names. The name Ocalan, which means avenger, was given to Mr. Ocalan's family.

In 1998, the Turkish President Suleyman Demirel accused the Kurdish leader and his fighters of killing 5,555 Turkish personnel.¹⁷ The Kurdish losses are often dismissed, and estimates vary, but the Turkish human rights activists often cite figures of over 30,000 dead, close to four thousand Kurdish villages destroyed and some four million Kurds rendered homeless seeking refuge in large Kurdish or Turkish cities or abroad. This writer has heard more than one Kurd quip that the avenger, Mr. Ocalan, only tried to live up to his name.

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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (ACCORDING TO WASHINGTON)

Ralph G. Kershaw

On November 8, 1994, following the mass killings in Rwanda, the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). In 1995, the United Nations established the seat of the tribunal: the town of Arusha in northwestern Tanzania, a setting more familiar to those who watch PBS's "Nature," for the town sits at the foothills of Mount Kilimanjaro on the famed wildlife-rich Serengeti plain.

As stated on the official web site of the ICTR, the tribunal is empowered to prosecute those Rwandans "responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994."¹ On April

page, killing between 500,000 and 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The ICTR, for political reasons and under external pressure, chose not to investigate Tutsi massacres of Hutus from as early as 1990, when the first Tutsi invasion of Rwanda from Uganda was launched, to a counter-genocide of Hutus, which continues to this day.

Although the ICTR has prosecuted a number of noteworthy mass murderers, known in French as *genocidaires*, the tribunal has become a political tool of the current Rwandan dictatorship of RPF leader and President Paul Kagame; his erstwhile Ugandan ally, President Yoweri Museveni; a corrupt Tanzanian government; and the United States. As the Bush administration rails against any jurisdic-

late Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, have been festering in jail cells in Arusha for years while the United Nations procrastinated in ensuring a speedy trial process. For example, the dean of the Arusha internees is Andre Ntagerura, the former Rwandan Minister of Transport and Communications. He has been held in Arusha since 1997 (he was under arrest in Cameroon for one year prior to that). Ntagerura's alleged crime is that he was seen in the Rwandan town of Cyangugu meeting with leaders of Rwandan militiamen who carried out massacres and that as Minister of Transport he was somehow responsible for the fact that militiamen used government vehicles to carry out their grisly tasks.

What makes the United States look so hypocritical is the fact that the Department of Defense has loaned members of the military Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps to aid the UN prosecution team in Arusha. So while the Bush administration claims it will use its military to free any U.S. soldier or citizen from any detention by the ICC, it is perfectly willing to use its military lawyers to assist a corrupt judicial process in Tanzania. Even more appalling is the fact that some of the JAG Corps officers assigned to the UN team in Arusha have been associated with U.S. government agencies that may have been culpable in the genocide.

For example, the United States has recently nominated Dr. David Crane as lead prosecutor for an International Criminal Tribunal for Sierra Leone. Crane has, since 1977, been the Senior Inspector General for National Security Systems for the Pentagon. He was Assistant General Counsel, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) from 1996 to 1997, when the DIA was involved with Kagame's and Museveni's invasion of neighboring Zaire (now the

Not one member of Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Army has ever been indicted by the ICTR, even though there is ample evidence that not only his troops, but he himself, has been responsible for acts of genocide and international terrorism

6, 1994, the French-crewed presidential aircraft carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira back to Kigali from a summit in Dar-es-Salaam was shot down by shoulder-launched SAM-16 missiles. In 1999, a French National Assembly commission heard testimony from a number of former French ministers that the missiles were supplied to the Tutsi forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from Soviet-made Iraqi weaponry captured by U.S. forces during Operation Desert Storm.² The ministers claimed the SAMs fell into RPF hands through the Ugandan government.

All aboard the ill-fated aircraft were killed. Hutu militants, believing the plane was shot down by an invading Tutsi army from Uganda, went on a nationwide ram-

tion by the new International Criminal Court (ICC) over criminal acts committed by U.S. troops and "peacekeepers," it is perfectly content to support the ICTR as it continues its political sham trials against opponents of Rwanda's Kagame, one of Washington's closest and most ruthless military and political allies in Africa.

There are two appalling aspects to the ICTR. The first is the fact that not one member of Kagame's RPF/Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) has ever been indicted by the ICTR, even though there is ample evidence that not only have his troops, but he himself, has been responsible for acts of genocide and international terrorism. The second is that many of the accused *genocidaires*, especially those who were government ministers under the

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AP Photo/Jean-Marc Bouju

April 7, 1999, Kibeho, Rwanda. Vice President and Defense Minister Paul Kagame, center, and Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu, second from left, inaugurate a memorial crypt containing the remains of hundreds of victims of the 1994 Rwanda genocide in which approximately half a million died. According to a suppressed UN report, Kagame was directly involved in the shutdown of the presidential plane that touched off the massacres.

Democratic Republic of Congo). According to a number of press reports, the DIA was instrumental in providing assistance to Rwandan and Ugandan military units, mostly through a Joint Combined Education and Training (JCET) exercise code-named "Falcon Gorilla."³ After invading then-Zaire with DIA and other U.S. military assistance from the 3rd Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Rwandans and Ugandans carried out a number of atrocities against Congolese civilians and Hutu refugees who fled Kagame's invasion of Rwanda in 1994.

During Crane's tenure at DIA, the agency was also involved with South African and British mercenary firms Executive Outcomes and Sandline, respectively, in planning a series of coups in Sierra Leone. In 1997, the DIA hosted a symposium at the Pentagon in which representatives of both mercenary firms as well as diamond companies active in Sierra Leone participated.⁴ Soon after, Sierra Leone was wracked by coups and counter-coups. More astounding is the fact that Crane was the Chair of the U.S. Army's International and Operational Law Department at the Judge Advocate General's School from 1993 to

1996.⁵ This was during the time that the Defense Department, under the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program, provided training to 19 military and civilian officials of the RPF. Of these, 12 were officers serving in Kagame's RPA.⁶ Earlier, in 1990, Kagame, while serving as a colonel in the Ugandan People's Democratic Force, attended the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It was during this stint with the U.S. Army that Kagame's guerrilla force launched its first invasion of Rwanda from Ugandan soil.⁷

In a speech given to U.S. Army troops stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington, David J. Scheffer, the Clinton administration's Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, revealed two other U.S. JAG Corps officers involved in war crimes issues: Lieutenant Colonel Michael Newton, who served in the State Department's Office of War Crimes Issues, and Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel William Lietzau, who led elements of the State Department's war crimes negotiating team.⁸ In a February 1999 speech before a U.S. Pacific Command Conference in Hawaii,

Scheffer made clear his intent to rely on JAG Corps officers for prosecutions when he stated, "I give the JAG Corps fair warning: I hope to raid you again in the years ahead."⁹ And raid he and his successor have done.

The current Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues is Pierre-Richard Prosper. When President Bush nominated him in May 2001, no one seemed interested in his obvious conflict of interest: He was a lead war crimes prosecutor for the ICTR from 1996 to 1998. Prosper was in Arusha when the United States and its allies stonewalled and jawboned every UN official not to go beyond investigating atrocities by Rwandan Hutus or expand it to include Kagame's Tutsi forces, which might have led to Kagame himself.

Kagame is, in many ways, the key to the charade in Arusha. He has eliminated most Hutus from his Cabinet, even those who originally supported him. Any time Kagame is politically challenged by any Hutu, even former supporters, he merely threatens to issue an indictment against them for genocide and have them hauled to Arusha. Kagame's use of the ICTR as a political weapon would be similar to



April 18, 2002, Sarajevo. Pierre-Richard Prosper, left, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues speaking with reporters. With him is Beriz Belkic, Bosnian Chairman of the so-called Multiethnic Presidency of Bosnia. Prosper was a lead war crimes prosecutor for the ICTR from 1996 to 1998, precisely the period when the U.S. exerted maximum effort to curtail the UN investigation and protect its client, Kagame.

Yugoslavia's present government threatening its opponents with war crimes indictments before the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in The Hague in order to silence them. Yet more ominous are recurring reports that the Bush administration, in an attempt to disengage from international courts everywhere, will soon seek to have responsibility for the ICTR shifted from the UN in Arusha to Kagame's dictatorship in Kigali.

For now, kangaroo court politics continue at Arusha. Attempts by some defense attorneys for the ICTR to hear testimony concerning the real perpetrators of the April 6, 1994 shootdown of the "Rwanda One" aircraft have all been stymied by the judges, prosecutors, and UN administrators. These tactics go back to 1996 and 1997, when a number of UN investigators sought to determine who was responsible for the aerial assassination of two African presidents. In 1997 and 1998, when their investigation began to focus on Kagame and his RPF, the U.S., and particularly then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, pressured the chief of the ICTR, Judge Louise Arbour of Canada, to cut the

investigation off at the knees. However, the investigation was well within the UN's mandate of investigating "serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda" starting on January 1, 1994. Albright often fondly referred to the ex-Marxist and current dictators Kagame and Museveni as America's "beacons of hope" for Africa. But before Albright and Arbour were able to kill off the investigation, which might have led to an indictment against Kagame, at the very least, the UN investigators were able to come up with some rock hard evidence against Kagame and his RPF gang of terrorists.

In August 1997, the National Team leader of the UN Investigation Section of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) submitted a report with a credibility rating of 2 (defined by the UN as "possibly true, but untested").¹⁰ The UN team spoke to three Tutsi witnesses within the Kagame regime who said they were part of "an elite covert strike team known as the 'Network' and [which] with the assistance of a foreign government shot down the Presidential aircraft." The informants also

stated "Major General Paul Kagame was the overall operations commander." The three also provided "accurate descriptions of the operation together with names, ranks, and roles of each soldier involved." The UN team also reported that the three witnesses were able to "produce hard copy documents of the operation." When two of the witnesses said they would cooperate with the investigations if their safety could be assured, Judge Arbour first was positive about the prospect but quickly reversed herself in stating the issue of attacking the airplane was outside the ICTR's mandate and "would not be investigated."¹¹ It is a tenet which the ICTR abides by to this day.

A secret internal UN memorandum from 1997 revealed the names of the RPF's Network responsible for the terrorist attack on the Rwandan presidential Falcon Mystere aircraft. More amazingly, none of these individuals has been indicted and brought before the ICTR. The report describes "the Network" as a "cell of elite soldiers who are activated and deactivated from time to time to conduct special operations. One such operation was the successful rocket attack upon President

Habyarimana in 1994.” The report continues by adding, “we have also been advised that there is a distinct possibility that the same cell was responsible for the recent murders of Medecine Monde staff (3 persons) in Ruhengeri in January 1997 and UN Human Rights staff (5 persons) in Cyangugu.” Although the report contends “there is absolutely no corroboration for this last piece of information,”¹² a letter from the Spanish embassy in Tanzania to Spain’s honorary consul in Kampala, Uganda, states that an RPF terror cell, fitting the description of the one described in the UN secret memorandum, murdered Spanish priest Joaquim Vallmajo on April 2, 1994, in Kageyo, Rwanda, because the RPF found evidence of his support for the Hutus, although no arms were discovered. The document states that this was admitted to by Kagame himself to the Spanish honorary consul in Kampala. The Spanish communiqué also describes an RPF Colonel named Kanyarengwe, as having visited Father Vallmajo’s parish in Kageyo accompanied by a squadron of RPF soldiers.¹³ Four days later, the presidential aircraft was shot out of the sky over territory occupied by RPF units.

The secret UN memorandum also mentions Colonel Alex Kanyarengwe in association with the shooting down of Rwanda One. It states the RPF cell’s “assignment consisted of setting up five deployment points, two in Kigali and three around the airport perimeter in the areas of Masaka, Kanombe, and Gasogi. This assignment was communicated through meetings; never was there a specific written directive to carry out this task.” The UN memo puts at the top of the RPF cell’s chain of command Kanyarengwe, who was the chairman of the RPF in 1994 and later served Kagame as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior in 1997. Oddly, Kanyarengwe, although a founder of the RPF, is no longer in the Rwandan government.

The secret UN document also names other RPF officials involved in the terror attack on the aircraft: Paul Kagame; Colonel Steven Ndagute, Deputy Chairman of the Military High Command and a retired businessman in Rwanda’s transport business; Colonel Nyamwasa Kayumba, head of the intelligence “Network;” Captain Charles Karamba, a Ugandan who headed intelligence operations in Kigali for the RPF and reported to Colonel Kayumba (who the report states “would have received sanctions for his operations from the three key figures above him namely, Ndagute, Kagame, and Kanyarengwe).

The report also states that the RPF used three rocket sites: Masaka Hill (SAM) which was used by the attack team; Gasogi

Hill (SAM), also used by the attack team; and Camp Kanombe (rocket propelled grenades) and not required to be used by the attack team. The informants also stated the assassination was planned from three control posts: Camp Kanombe (oper-

children.” He added, “The UN Security Council had expressed its abhorrence at this terrorist attack and had directed that all information regarding the event be gathered. The ICTR Statute, Article 4, specifically included Acts of Terrorism in its list of

One UN investigator discovered that the warehouse near Kigali’s airport that was used to assemble the SAM-16s was owned by a Swiss company known to be connected to the CIA.

ational control); Kigali (field control), and Arusha (initial control regarding the presidential aircraft’s schedule). The report also states two [RPF] soldiers fired SAMs from Masaka and Gasogi Hills and that one of them survived and “may be available to the ICTR.” Later information from UN investigators revealed that Kagame silenced this particular source.¹⁴ The RPF sources also said they could provide the ICTR with hard copy evidence of the attack plan and, to no surprise, the report states the ICTR rejected the evidence.

The RPF informants identified an international array of members of the “Network,” which they claimed was active from late 1993 to early 1994. They included, in addition to Captain Karamba, Captain Deo Sekamana (described as a Burundian and second-in-charge of intelligence operations in Kigali); Lieutenant John Kambanda (a Ugandan in charge of administration); Adjutant Roger Karomba (a Rwandan); Lieutenant Kitako Kadida (a Zairian); Lt. Francis Muheto (a Ugandan); Sergeant Francis Mugabo (a Burundian); Sergeant Claude Rafifi (a Rwandan); Sergeant Faida Jeandamascene (a Rwandan); and Sergeant Sam Mwegasigye (a Ugandan). In any case, although there is sufficient evidence to charge them with an international act of terrorism, the RPF “Network” was never brought before any tribunal. One of the UN investigators was Jim Lyons, a retired FBI agent who spent most of his career investigating terrorism in the New York field office. He told a meeting convened by Georgia Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney on Capitol Hill in April 2000 that “as the Commander of Investigations, I believed that the investigation of the rocket attack was within the mandate of the ICTR. It was the spark that ignited all of Rwanda into a conflagration, which would ultimately take the lives of 700,000 to 1,000,000 men, women and

offenses. In my view, there was more than ample justification for the ICTR to consider the rocket attack as an international criminal event falling well within its jurisdiction.”¹⁵

However, when the UN investigation team began to investigate the charges by the RPF informants, they began to smell an American connection to the RPF “Network.” One UN investigator discovered that the warehouse near Kigali’s airport that was used to assemble the SAM-16s was owned by a Swiss company known to be connected to the Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁶ The UN investigator has since moved to an undisclosed location in Europe.

There is no doubt that the U.S. was providing official and unofficial aid to the RPF beginning in 1990 when Kagame was being trained here. The U.S. military attaché to Kigali, Lieutenant Colonel Richard K. Orth, on arrival in Kigali on April 7, 1994, became a virtual proconsul for the Kagame regime, staying on as attaché in Kigali for an amazingly long five-year tour of duty. If the ICC in The Hague were ever to look into the activities of an American military officer’s possible involvement in crimes against humanity, Orth should be at the top of the list. While in Rwanda, Orth lorded over a U.S. military aid program to Rwanda during the country’s two invasions of neighboring Congo and RPF massacres of Rwandans and foreign aid workers. One high-level congressional source referred to Orth as a “creep.” Another Rwandan source claimed Orth was one of Kagame’s best friends during his long tenure in Kigali. Today, Orth is not far away from his old friend. He is currently the U.S. Defense Attaché in Kampala, a stone’s throw from Kigali and a center for U.S. covert activities in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁷

Faustin Twagirimungu, an ethnic Hutu, was Kagame’s first Prime Minister. He saw

first-hand the control the U.S. exercised over the guerrilla leader. While he was Prime Minister, Twagirimungu was invited to the residence of then-U.S. Ambassador David Rawson. The date was August 15, 1995, Twagirimungu's birthday. Present at the residence were Rawson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Joseph S. Nye, Jr.; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa (and DIA officer) Vince Kern; and Orth. Twagirimungu was "informed" that the United States government had decided to cooperate with Rwanda on military issues and assist the Rwandan Army. The Prime

The U.S. has reason to be fearful of the new ICC. Unlike Arusha, it will not be infused with military JAG Corps officers and CIA elements.

Minister insisted that Kagame's RPA was not a Rwandan Army, but a "personal army of Kagame." He then asked the Americans if the U.S. was planning on setting up a joint national army of Hutus and Tutsis. The answer was "no." In two weeks Twagirimungu was out of office. Later, Twagirimungu said he came under great pressure because he let it be known that he "wasn't there just to please the RPF [but] represented all parties."¹⁸

Which brings us back to Arusha and the ICTR. Recently, there was an attempt by the defense team of former Transportation Minister Ntagerura to bring expert testimony before the ICTR. During the week of July 8, 2002, the ICTR's Third Chamber was scheduled to hear expert testimony concerning the shutdown of Rwanda One in 1994. On July 4, the three-judge panel consisting of presiding judge Lloyd George Williams, a conservative from Saint Kitts-Nevis; Yakov Ostrovsky, a Russian judge; and Pavel Dolenc, a Slovenian judge and former prosecutor for the government of Yugoslavia, rejected the testimony on the air attack as irrelevant to the trial. Those arguing against the testimony were Richard Karegyesa, the tribunal's chief prosecutor. As a Ugandan, he is a countryman of many of those accused of being involved in the aerial assassination team. Another prosecutor is Holo Makwaia of Tanzania. There are reports that Tanzania

may have been culpable in knowing about the RPF plans to shoot down Habyarimana's plane but failed to warn him. Conflicts of interest in Arusha do not end with the prosecution team and judges.

Current U.S. ambassador to Tanzania, Robert Royall, is fond of taking visiting U.S. politicians to marvel at the "justice" being meted out in Arusha. He was appointed by President Bush in 2001. Royall was the chairman of the National Bank of South Carolina and was Bush's chief campaign fundraiser in South Carolina during the 2000 campaign. His only possible connection to the unfair process in Arusha is his involvement in another questionable process: He contributed \$30,500 to the GOP in 1999-2000, including \$5,000 to the Bush-Cheney Recount Fund.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the kangaroo court in Arusha continues to ignore the shutdown of Rwanda One, one of the most egregious political assassinations of recent times. If the Canadian Prime Minister and top cabinet members from both governments had been in the Dallas motorcade with Kennedy, and had the entire official entourage been killed, this would have been a political event of roughly equivalent magnitude.

The United States continues its Janus-faced approach to international tribunals. The United States certainly has reason to be fearful of the new ICC. Unlike Arusha, it will not be infused with military JAG Corps officers and CIA elements. It may therefore decide to take a close look at the actions of Robert Orth and others like him. Kagame may not have to be fearful of Arusha but he must be nervous about the special French anti-terrorism court within the Ministry of the Interior, Paris, chaired by Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere. After years of investigating the 1994 shutdown, the judge is reportedly very close to issuing an indictment against Kagame. That would put Kagame in the same league as other successful targets of Bruguiere's prosecutions, including "Carlos the Jackal." An indictment of Kagame would also belie President Bush's much ballyhooed statements about America's "War Against Terrorism" because it would put Washington on the same side as a notorious arch-terrorist and *genocidaire*.

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United States War Machine

REVVING THE ENGINES OF WORLD WAR III

Michel Chossudovsky

The 1999 war in Yugoslavia—which coincided with the formation of GUUAM (an alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) and NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe—marked an important turnaround in East-West relations. Aleksander Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian State Duma, described the war in Yugoslavia as the “worst, most acute, most dangerous juncture since the U.S.-Soviet Berlin and Cuban missile crises.”¹ According to Arbatov:

START II is dead, co-operation with NATO is frozen, co-operation on missile defense is out of the question, and Moscow's willingness to co-operate on non-proliferation issues is at an all-time low. Moreover, anti-U.S. sentiment in Russia is real, deep and more widespread than ever, and the slogan describing NATO action—“today Serbia, tomorrow Russia,” is “deeply planted in Russians' minds.”²

Russia's military establishment had openly expressed its distrust of the U.S.: “the bombing of Yugoslavia could turn out in the very near future to be just a rehearsal for similar strikes on Russia.”³

POST-1999 MILITARY BUILDUP

Meanwhile in Washington, a major buildup of America's military arsenal was in the making. The underlying objective was to achieve a position of global military hegemony: Defense spending in 2002 was hiked up to more than \$320 billion, an amount equivalent to the entire Gross Domestic Product of the Russian Federation (approximately \$325 billion). An even greater increase in U.S. military spending was set in motion in the wake of the October 2002 bombing of Afghanistan:

More than one-third of the \$68 billion allocated for new weapons in the 2003 budget is for cold war type weapons. Several billion dollars are allocated for cluster bomb systems that have been condemned by human rights groups around the world. There is no rationale for this level of military spending other than a clear intent for the United States to be the New World Empire, dominating the globe economical-

ly and militarily, including the militarization of space...⁴

In the largest military buildup since the Vietnam War, the Bush administration plans to increase military spending by \$120 billion over a five-year period, “bringing the 2007 military budget to an astounding \$451 billion.”⁵

THE \$320 BILLION “DEFENSE” BUDGET DOES NOT INCLUDE THE ENORMOUS ESPIONAGE BUDGET, NOW OVER \$38 BILLION. THIS EXCLUDES MULTIBILLION DOLLAR EARNINGS FROM NARCOTICS ACCRUING TO CIA SHELL COMPANIES AND FRONT ORGANIZATIONS.

This colossal amount of money allocated to America's war machine does not include the enormous budget of the Central Intelligence Agency allocated from both “official” and undisclosed sources to finance its covert operations. According to *Jane's Defense Weekly*, the total FY 2003 intelligence budget is “an estimated \$38 billion” (13 percent of Russia's GDP). This amount excludes the multibillion dollar earnings from narcotics accruing to CIA shell companies and front organizations.⁶

From the overall defense budget, billions of dollars have been allocated to “refurbishing America's nuclear arsenal.” A new generation of “cluster missiles”—with multiple nuclear warheads—has been developed, capable of delivering (from a single missile launch) up to ten nuclear warheads directed at ten different cities. These missiles are now targeted on Russia. In this context, Washington has clung to its so-called “first strike” policy, in principle intended to deal with so-called “rogue states,” but in fact largely directed against Russia and China.

Meanwhile, the U.S. had developed a

new generation of so-called “tactical nuclear weapons” or “mininukes” to be used in conventional war theaters. Already during the Clinton administration, the Pentagon was calling for the use of the “nuclear” B61-11 bunker buster bomb, suggesting that because it was “underground,” there was no toxic radioactive fallout which could affect civilians:

Military officials and leaders of America's nuclear weapon laboratories are urging the U.S. to develop a new generation of precision low-yield nuclear weapons...which could be used in conventional conflicts with Third-World nations.⁷

In the 2002 war in Afghanistan, the U.S. Air Force was using GBU-28 “bunker buster bombs” capable of creating large-scale underground explosions. The official story was that these bombs were intended to target “cave and tunnel complexes” in mountainous areas in southern Afghanistan, used as a hideaway by Osama bin Laden.

Dubbed by the Pentagon as “the Big Ones,” the GBUs (“guided bomb unit”) are 5,000-pound laser-guided bombs with improved BLU-113 warheads, capable of penetrating several meters of reinforced concrete. The BLU-113 is the most powerful conventional “earth-penetrating warhead” ever created.

While the Pentagon's “Big Ones” are classified as “conventional weapons,” the official statements fail to mention that the same “bunker buster bombs” launched from a B-52, a B-2 stealth bomber, or an F-16 aircraft can also be equipped with a nuclear device. The B61-11 is the “nuclear version” of its “conventional” BLU-113 counterpart.

The “nuclear” B61-11 is categorized as a “deep earth-penetrating bomb” capa-

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January 13, 2000. Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, touches conquered soil.

ble of "destroying the deepest and most hardened of underground bunkers, which the conventional warheads are not capable of doing." Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that while the "conventional" bunker buster bombs "are going to be able to do the job,"...he did not rule out the eventual use of nuclear weapons."⁸

The Pentagon is saying that these "low-yield" nuclear weapons do not affect civilians, therefore justifying their use in the same way as conventional weapons. Also, the administration is hinting that the use of nuclear bunker busters may be justified as part of "the campaign against international terrorism," because Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda allegedly possesses nuclear capabilities and could use them against us. America's tactical nuclear weapons are said to be "safe" in comparison to those of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. Administration statements suggest, in this regard, that a so-called "low-yield" earth penetrating tactical nuclear weapon such as the B61-11 would "limit collateral damage" and therefore be relatively safe to use.⁹

These new buzzwords are being spread by the U.S. media to develop public support for the use of "tactical nuclear weapons."...Yet the scientific evidence on this issue is unequivocal: The impact on civilians of the "low yield" B61-11 would be devastating "because of the large amount of radioactive dirt thrown out in the explosion, the hypothetical 5-kiloton weapon...would produce a large area of lethal fallout."¹⁰

The military build-up initiated during the Clinton administration has gained a new momentum. A new "legitimacy" has unfolded. Increased military spending is said to be required "to uphold freedom" and defeat "the axis of evil":

*It costs a lot to fight this war. We have spent more than a billion dollars a month—over \$30 million a day—and we must be prepared for future operations. Afghanistan proved that expensive precision weapons defeat the enemy and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them...My budget includes the largest increase in defense spending in two decades—because while the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay.*¹¹

The Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") not only includes the controversial "Missile Shield" but also a wide range of "offensive" laser-guided weapons with the capability of striking anywhere in the world, not to mention instruments of weather and climatic warfare under the High Altitude Auroral Research Program (HAARP). The latter has the ability to destabilize entire national economies through climatic manipulations, without the knowledge of the enemy, at minimal cost and without engaging military personnel and equipment as in a conventional war.¹²

Long-term planning pertaining to advanced weapons systems and the control of outer space is outlined in a U.S.

Space Command document released in 1998, entitled "Vision for 2020." The underlying objective consists of: "dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment...The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea and air superiority will lead to Full Spectrum Dominance."¹³

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, POST-9/11

In the wake of September 11, the so-called "war on terrorism" is also being used by the Bush administration to redefine the assumptions underlying the use of nuclear weapons. The concept of "nuclear deterrence" has been scrapped. According to John Isaacs, President of Council for a Livable World: "They're trying desperately to find new uses for nuclear weapons..."¹⁴

The new approach became evident when the *Los Angeles Times* published portions of the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The leaked report states that nuclear weapons "could be used in three types of situations: against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons..." or "...in the event of surprising military developments."¹⁵

In this top-secret domain, there has always been an inconsistency between America's diplomatic objectives of reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on the one hand, and the military imperative to prepare for the unthinkable, on the other.

Nevertheless, the Bush administration plan reverses an almost two-decade-long trend of relegating nuclear weapons to the category of weapons of last resort. It also redefines nuclear requirements in hurried post-9/11 terms.¹⁶

While identifying a number of so-called "rogue states," the not-so-hidden agenda of the Bush administration is to deploy and use nuclear weapons against Russia and China in the context of America's expansionary policy into Central Asia, the Middle East and the Far East.

The report says the Pentagon should be prepared to use nuclear weapons in an Arab-Israeli conflict, in a war between China and Taiwan, or in an attack from North Korea on the south. They might also become necessary in an attack by Iraq on Israel or another neighbor. The report says Russia is no longer officially an "enemy." Yet it acknowledges that the huge Russian arsenal, which includes about 6,000 deployed warheads and perhaps 10,000

smaller "theater" nuclear weapons, remains of concern. Pentagon officials have said publicly that they were studying the need to develop theater nuclear weapons, designed for use against specific targets on a battlefield, but had not committed themselves to that course.¹⁷

The thrust of the NPR, presented to the U.S. Congress in early 2002, has been endorsed by the Republican Party:

[C]onservative analysts insisted that the Pentagon must prepare for all possible contingencies, especially now, when dozens of countries, and some terrorist groups, are engaged in secret weapon development programs...They argued that smaller weapons have an important deterrent role because many aggressors might not believe that the U.S. forces would use multi-kiloton weapons that would wreak devastation on surrounding territory and friendly populations.

"We need to have a credible deterrence against regimes involved in international terrorism and development of weapons of mass destruction," said Jack Spencer, a defense analyst at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington. He said the contents of the report did not surprise him and represent "the right way to develop a nuclear posture for a post-Cold War world."¹⁸

ENCIRCLING CHINA

In the wake of the 1999 war in Yugoslavia, the Clinton administration boosted its military support to Taiwan against China, leading to a significant military buildup in the Taiwan Straits. Taiwan's Air Force had previously been equipped with some 150 F-16A fighter planes from Lockheed Martin. In this regard, the Clinton administration had argued that military aid to Taiwan was required to maintain "a military balance with the People's Republic of China" as part of Washington's so-called policy of "peace through deterrence."¹⁹

U.S.-built Aegis destroyers equipped with state-of-the-art surface-to-air missiles, ship-to-ship missiles, and Tomahawk cruise missiles were delivered to Taiwan to boost its naval capabilities in the Taiwan Straits.²⁰ Beijing responded to this military buildup by taking delivery in 2000 of its first Russian-built guided missile destroyer, the Hangzhou, equipped with SS-N-22 Sunburn antiship missiles, "capable of penetrating the state-of-the-art defenses of a U.S. or Japanese naval battle group."²¹

Military assumptions have been radically changed since September 11. The Bush administration has scrapped the "peace through deterrence" doctrine. The post-9/11 military buildup in the Taiwan Straits

is an integral part of Washington's overall military planning, which now consists of deploying "on several fronts."

Supported by the Bush administration, Taiwan has been "conducting active research aimed at developing a tactical ballistic missile capable of hitting targets in mainland China...The alleged purpose of these missiles is to degrade the PLA's [People's Liberation Army] strike capability, including missile infrastructure and non-missile infrastructure (airfields, harbors, missile sites, etc.)."²² In turn, U.S. military presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan (and in several former Soviet republics) on China's western border, are being coordinated with Taiwan's naval deployment in the South China Sea.

China has been encircled: The U.S. military is present in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits, in the Korean Peninsula and the Sea of Japan as well as in the heartland of Central Asia and on the western border of China's Xinjiang-Uigur autonomous region. So-called "temporary" U.S. military bases have been set up in Uzbekistan (which is a member of the GUUAM agreement with NATO), in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, where airfields and military airport facilities have been made available to the U.S. Air Force.

The 2002 NPR states the Bush administration's willingness to use nuclear weapons against China if there were a confrontation in the Taiwan Straits. China, because of its nuclear forces and "developing strategic objectives," is listed as "a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency." Specifically, the NPR lists a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan as one of the scenarios that could lead Washington to use nuclear weapons.²³

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AXIS

The 1999 war in Yugoslavia contributed to reinforcing strategic, military and intelligence ties between Washington and London. After the war in Yugoslavia, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen and his British counterpart, Geoff Hoon, signed a "Declaration of Principles for Defense Equipment and Industrial Cooperation" so as to "improve cooperation in procuring arms and protecting technology secrets" while at the same time "easing the way for more joint military ventures and possible defense industry mergers."²⁴

Washington's objective was to encourage the formation of a "trans-Atlantic bridge across which DoD [U.S. Department of Defense] can take its globalization policy to Europe...Our aim is to improve interoperability and war fighting effectiveness

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AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

via closer industrial linkages between U.S. and allied companies." (The agreement was signed, according to a Pentagon official, shortly after the creation of British Aerospace Systems (BAES) which resulted from the merger of BAe with GEC Marconi. British Aerospace (BAe) was already firmly allied to America's largest defense contractors Lockheed Martin and Boeing.²⁵

In the words of President Clinton's Defense Secretary, William Cohen, the agreement "will facilitate interaction between our [British and American] respective industries so that we can have a harmonized approach to sharing technology, working cooperatively in partnership arrangements and, potentially, mergers as well."²⁶ BAES was already firmly allied with America's largest defense contractors, Lockheed Martin and Boeing.²⁷

The hidden agenda behind the Anglo-American "trans-Atlantic bridge" is to eventually displace the Franco-German military conglomerates and ensure the dominance of the U.S. military industrial complex (in alliance with Britain's major defense contractors).

Moreover, this integration in the area of defense production has also been matched by increased cooperation between the CIA and Britain's MI-5 in the sphere of intelligence and covert operations, not to mention the joint operations of British and U.S. Special Forces.

The British military-industrial complex has become increasingly integrated into that of the U.S. In turn, significant rifts emerged between Washington and Bonn. Franco-German integration in aerospace and defense production is ultimately directed against U.S. dominance in the weapons market. The latter hinges upon the partnership between America's Big Five and Britain's defense industry under the trans-Atlantic bridge agreement.

Since the early 1990s, the Bonn government had encouraged the consolidation

of Germany's military industrial complex dominated by Daimler, Siemens and Krupp. Several important mergers in Germany's defense industry took place in response to the mega-mergers between America's aerospace and weapons producers.²⁸ Already in 1996, Paris and Bonn had set up a joint armaments agency with the mandate "to manage common programs [and] award contracts on behalf of both governments."²⁹ Both countries had stated that they "did not want Britain to

**THE EURO AND THE DOLLAR:
TWO FINANCIAL AND
MONETARY SYSTEMS
COMPETING WORLDWIDE FOR
CONTROL OVER MONEY
CREATION AND CREDIT.**

join the agency."

In turn, France and Germany now control Airbus Industrie which is competing against America's Boeing. (Britain's BAES owns the remaining 20 percent). The Germans are also collaborating in the Ariane Space satellite-launching program in which Deutsche Aerospace (DASA) is a major shareholder.

In late 1999, in response to the "alliance" of British Aerospace with Lockheed Martin, France's Aerospace-Matra merged with Daimler's DASA forming the largest European defense conglomerate. And the following year, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Co. (EADS) was formed integrating DASA, Matra and Spain's Construcciones Aeronauticas SA. EADS and its Anglo-American rivals are competing for the procurement of weapons to NATO's new Eastern European members. Europe's third largest defense contractor is Thomson, which in recent years has several projects with U.S. weapons producer Raytheon.

EADS still cooperates with BAES in missile production and has business ties with the U.S. "Big Five" including Northrop Grumman. However, the Western defense and aerospace industry tends to be split into two distinct groups: first EADS, dominated by France and Germany, and second, the Anglo-U.S. "Big Six": (Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, General Dynamics, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and BAES).

Integrated into U.S. Department of Defense procurement under the Atlantic bridge arrangement, BAES was in 2001 the Pentagon's fifth largest defense con-

tractor. Under the Anglo-American "transatlantic bridge, BAES operates freely in the U.S. market through its subsidiary BAE Systems North.³⁰

The Franco-German alliance in military production under EADS opens the door for the integration of Germany (which does not officially possess nuclear weapons) into France's nuclear weapons program. In this regard, EADS already produces a wide range of ballistic missiles, including the M51 nuclear-tipped ballistic submarine-launched ICBMs for the French Navy.³¹

EURO vs. DOLLAR

The European common currency system has a direct bearing on these strategic and political divisions. London's decision not to adopt the common European currency is consistent with the integration of British financial and banking interests with those of Wall Street, not to mention the Anglo-American alliance in the oil industry (as in BP-Amoco) and weapons production ("Big Five" plus BAES). The shaky relationship between the British Pound and the Dollar is an integral part of the new Anglo-American axis.

What is at stake is the rivalry between two competing global currencies: the Euro and the Dollar, with Britain's pound being torn between the European and the U.S. dominated currency systems. Two rival financial and monetary systems are competing worldwide for control over money creation and credit. The geopolitical and strategic implications are far-reaching, because they are also marked by splits in the Western defense industry and the oil business.

In both Europe and America, monetary policy, although formally under state jurisdiction, is largely controlled by the private banking sector. The European Central Bank based in Frankfurt—although officially under the jurisdiction of the European Union—is in practice overseen by a handful of private European banks including Germany's largest banks and business conglomerates.

The U.S. Federal Reserve Board is formally under state supervision—marked by a close relationship to the U.S. Treasury. Distinct from the European Central Bank, the 12 Federal Reserve banks (of which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the most important) are controlled by their shareholders, which are private banking institutions. In other words, "the Fed" as it is known in the U.S., which is responsible for monetary policy and hence money creation for the nation, is actually controlled by private interests on Wall Street.

In Eastern Europe, the former Soviet

Union, the Balkans and Central Asia, the Dollar and the Euro are competing. Ultimately, control over national currency systems is the basis upon which countries are colonized. While the Dollar prevails throughout the Western Hemisphere, the Euro and the Dollar are clashing in the former Soviet Union, Central Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.

In the Balkans and the Baltic States, central banks largely operate as colonial-style "currency boards" invariably using the Euro as a proxy currency. What this means is that German and European financial interests are in control of money creation and credit. That is, the pegging of the national currency to the Euro—rather than to the Dollar—means that both the currency and the monetary system will be in the hands of German-EU banking interests.

More generally, the Euro dominates in Germany's hinterland: Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and the Balkans, whereas the Dollar tends to prevail in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In GUUAM countries (which have military cooperation agreements with Washington), the Dollar tends (with the exception of the Ukraine) to overshadow the Euro.

The "dollarization" of national currencies is an integral part of America's Silk Road Strategy (SRS). This strategy consists of first destabilizing and then replacing national currencies with the American greenback over an area extending from the Mediterranean to China's western border. The underlying objective is to extend the dominion of the Federal Reserve System—namely Wall Street—over a vast territory. What we are witnessing is an inter-imperial scramble for control over national currencies and credit. These are battles for economic conquest which are in turn supported by the militarization of the Eurasian corridor.

While American and German-EU banking interests are clashing over the control of national economies and currency systems, they seem to have also agreed on "sharing the spoils,"—i.e., establishing their respective "spheres of influence." Reminiscent of the policies of "partition" of the late 19th Century, the U.S. and Germany have agreed on the division of the Balkans: Germany has gained control over national currencies in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, where the Euro is legal tender. In return, the U.S. has established a permanent military presence in the region (i.e., the Bondsteel military base in Kosovo).

The rift between Anglo-American and Franco-German weapons producers—including the rifts within the Western military alliance—seem to have favored

increased military cooperation between Russia, France and Germany. Russia also signed a "long-term military cooperation agreement" with India in late 1998 which was followed a few months later by a defense agreement between India and France.

This Franco-Indian agreement has a direct bearing on Indo-Pakistani relations. It also impinges upon U.S. strategic interests in Central and South Asia. While Washington has been pumping military aid into Pakistan, India is being supported by France and Russia. France and the U.S. are visibly on opposite sides of the India-Pakistan conflict.

With Pakistan and India at the brink of war in the wake of September 11, the U.S. Air Force had virtually taken control of Pakistan's air space as well as several of its military facilities. Meanwhile, barely a few weeks into the 2001 bombing of Afghanistan, France and India conducted joint military exercises in the Arabian Sea. Also in the immediate wake of September 11, India took delivery of large quantities of Russian weapons under the Indo-Russian military cooperation agreement.

MOSCOW'S NEW SECURITY DOCTRINE

U.S. post-Soviet era foreign policy has designated Central Asia and the Caucasus as a "strategic area." Yet this policy no longer consists of containing the "spread of communism," but rather in preventing Russia and China from becoming capable of competing with the U.S. In this regard, the U.S. has increased its military presence along the entire 40th parallel, extending from Bosnia and Kosovo to the former Soviet republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, all of which have entered into bilateral military agreements with Washington.

The 1999 war in Yugoslavia and the subsequent outbreak of war in Chechnya in September 1999 was a crucial turning point in Russian-American relations. It also marked a rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing and the signing of several military cooperation agreements.

U.S. covert support to the two main Chechen rebel groups (through Pakistan's ISI) was known to the Russian government and military. However, it had previously never been made public or raised at the diplomatic level. In November 1999, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergueyev formally accused Washington of supporting the Chechen rebels. Following a meeting held behind closed doors with Russia's military high command, Sergueyev declared that "...the national interests of the United States require that the military conflict in

the Caucasus [Chechnya] be a fire, provoked as a result of outside forces," while adding that "the West's policy constitutes a challenge launched to Russia with the ultimate aim of weakening her international position and of excluding her from geo-strategic areas."³²

In the wake of the 1999 Chechen war, a new "National Security doctrine" was formulated and signed into law by Acting President Vladimir Putin in early 2000. Barely acknowledged by the international media, a critical shift in East-West relations had occurred. The document

THE FRUITS ACCRUING FROM THE COLD WAR ARE FAR FROM FULLY HARVESTED. TO IGNORE THE TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA COULD MEAN THAT A LARGE PART OF THAT HARVEST WILL NEVER BE GATHERED.

reasserted the building of a strong Russian state, the concurrent growth of the military, as well as the reintroduction of state controls over foreign capital.

The document carefully spelled out what it described as "fundamental threats" to Russia's national security and sovereignty. More specifically, it referred to "the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances [namely GUUAM], as well as to "NATO's eastward expansion" while underscoring "the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders."³³

The document confirms that "international terrorism is waging an open campaign to destabilize Russia." While not referring explicitly to CIA covert activities in support of armed terrorist groups, such as the Chechen rebels, it nonetheless calls for appropriate "actions to avert and intercept intelligence and subversive activities by foreign states against the Russian Federation."³⁴

The cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy has been to encourage—under the guise of "peace-keeping" and so-called "conflict resolution"—the formation of small pro-U.S. states which lie strategically at the hub of the Caspian Sea basin, which contains vast oil and gas reserves:

The U.S. must play an increasingly active role in conflict resolution in the region. The

*boundaries of the Soviet republics were intentionally drawn to prevent secession by the various national communities of the former USSR and not with an eye towards possible independence...Neither Europe, nor our allies in East Asia, can defend our [U.S.] mutual interests in these regions. If we [the U.S.] fail to take the lead in heading off the kinds of conflicts and crises that are already looming there, that will eventually exacerbate our relations with Europe and possibly Northeast Asia. And it will encourage the worst kind of political developments in Russia. This linkage, or inter-connectedness, gives the Transcaucasus and Central Asia a strategic importance to the United States and its allies that we overlook at huge risk. To put it another way, the fruits accruing from ending the Cold War are far from fully harvested. To ignore the Transcaucasus and Central Asia could mean that a large part of that harvest will never be gathered.*³⁵

Alongside the articulation of Moscow's National Security doctrine, the Russian state was planning to regain economic and financial control over key areas of Russia's military-industrial complex. For instance, the formation of "a single corporation of designers and manufacturers of all anti-aircraft complexes" was envisaged in cooperation with Russia's defense contractors.³⁶

This proposed "recentralization" of Russia's defense industry in response to national security considerations, was also motivated by the merger of major Western competitors in the areas of military procurement. The development of new production and scientific capabilities was also contemplated, based on enhancing Russia's military potential as well as its ability to compete with its Western rivals in the global weapons market. The National Security Doctrine also "eases the criteria by which Russia could use nuclear weapons...which would be permissible if the country's existence were threatened."³⁷

In response to Washington's "Star Wars" initiative, Moscow developed "Russia's Missile and Nuclear Shield." The Russian government announced in 1998 the development of a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles, known as Topol-M (SS-27). These new single-warhead missiles (based in the Saratov region) are currently in "full combat readiness," against a "pre-emptive first strike" from the U.S., which (in the wake of September 11) constitutes the Pentagon's main assumption in an eventual nuclear war. "The Topol M is lightweight and mobile, designed to be fired from a vehicle. Its mobility means it is better protected than

a silo-based missile from a pre-emptive first strike.”³⁸

Following the adoption of the National Security Document (NSD) in 2000, the Kremlin confirmed that it would not exclude “a first-strike use” of nuclear warheads “if attacked even by purely conventional means.”³⁹

TURNAROUND UNDER PUTIN?

Since the very outset of his term in office, President Vladimir Putin—following in the footsteps of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin—has contributed to reversing the National Security Doctrine. Its implementation at a policy level has also been stalled.

At the moment, the foreign policy directions of the Putin administration are confused and unclear. There are significant divisions within both the political establishment and the military. On the diplomatic front, the new president has sought a rapprochement with Washington and the Western military alliance in the so-called “war on terrorism.” Yet it would be premature to conclude that Putin’s diplomatic openings imply a permanent reversal of Russia’s 2000 National Security Doctrine.

In the wake of September 11, a signif-

icant turnaround in Russian foreign policy has occurred. The Putin administration, acting against the Russian Duma, has accepted the process of “NATO Enlarge-

IRONICALLY, PUTIN WAS SUPPORTING AMERICA'S “WAR ON TERRORISM,” WHICH IS ULTIMATELY DIRECTED AGAINST MOSCOW. WASHINGTON'S HIDDEN AGENDA IS TO DISMANTLE RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE EURASIAN CORRIDOR.

ment” into the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) implying the establishment of NATO military bases on Russia’s western border. Meanwhile, Moscow’s military cooperation agreement signed with Beijing after the 1999 war in

Yugoslavia is virtually on hold:

*China is obviously watching with deep concern Russia surrendering these positions. China is also concerned by the presence of the U.S. Air Force close to its borders in Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic...Everything that Mr. Putin has earned through the spectacular improvement of Russia's relations with China, India, Vietnam, Cuba and some other countries collapsed nearly overnight. What has surfaced is a primitive Gorbachev concept of 'common human values,' i.e., the subordination of Russia's interests to those of the West.*⁴⁰

Ironically, the Russian President was supporting America’s “war on terrorism,” which is ultimately directed against Moscow. Washington’s hidden agenda is to dismantle Russia’s strategic and economic interests in the Eurasian corridor, close down or take over its military facilities, while transforming the former Soviet republics (and eventually the Russian Federation) into American protectorates.

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Briefly Noted

DIANE KUNTZ, 1948-2001

Diane Kuntz, a founding member and longtime secretary of the Association of National Security Alumni (ANSA), an organization formed to expose and oppose illegal and immoral U.S. intelligence operations, died in San Diego, California, September 19, 2001, age 53. Kuntz retired as the secretary-general of the World Federation of Public Health Associations in 1999. Ms. Kuntz was a CIA operations officer 1970-78, stationed in Lima, Peru, and Paris, France. She resigned from the CIA disillusioned both with the Agency's practices and its culture, particularly its sexism.

An honors graduate of Texas State University at Lubbock, where her father, James Kuntz, taught psychology, Kuntz majored in Spanish. She had intended to enter the foreign service, but was persuaded to join the CIA instead. After leaving the CIA she attended graduate school at UCLA 1978-80, earning master's degrees in both International Health and Latin American Studies. Her mentor at UCLA was Dr. Davida Cody, an activist on health care for the poor, who got her involved in political activism, first in Los Angeles and later in Latin America. Kuntz worked in Honduras for Concern America (1981-84), monitoring and reporting on conditions in the Salvadoran refugee camps and serving as guide and resource for journalists and international observers, including members of the U.S. Congress and others concerned about Central America and the destructive U.S. role there.

On one well-publicized occasion (about which Kuntz herself rarely spoke), she and actress Bianca Jagger witnessed an attempt by a Salvadoran death squad to kidnap a group of refugees and spirit them back to El Salvador, presumably for execution. In a dramatic confrontation, Kuntz and Jagger faced down the death squad and rescued the hostages. The Honduran experience deepened Kuntz's disillusionment with U.S., especially CIA, policies and practices.

Back in the U.S., Kuntz moved to San Diego while finishing her master's thesis. There she worked with the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). Increasingly concerned with the Central American situation, she moved to Washington, DC, in the mid-1980s to work with a number of Central American and refugee organizations before joining the APHA. Her work there involved extensive foreign travel and the organization of international conferences. She loved museums, art, and the architecture of European cathedrals, but questioned the money wasted on those cathedrals at the expense of peasant populations.

When a group of former CIA and other U.S. intelligence officers announced formation of the Association of National Security Alumni, Kuntz was an early participant. Despite the demands of her APHA work, she volunteered to serve as secretary of the Association and rendered outstanding service. Association members remember her as quiet and

efficient, reluctant to speak much about her experiences but contributing greatly, both through her work as an officer of ANSA, and through her advice, to whatever success the organization had during its existence.

Kuntz's work was all the more remarkable during those years because her health was deteriorating. Increasingly painful and frequent migraine attacks made it difficult for her to function but, typically, she never complained and few outside her immediate circle knew of her condition.

Like others in ANSA, Kuntz had hoped that the Iran-Contra revelations would lead to some significant reform in intelligence system practices. She, too, suffered the letdown following the 1988 presidential elections and the realization that neither the Bush I administration nor the succeeding Clinton presidency was prepared to change existing policies. At the same time, there were significant administrative and policy changes at APHA with which she was not in agreement. These circumstances and declining health caused her to quit her job in 1998 and return to San Diego to be close to her sister Karen Kuntz and her mother, Marjorie Kuntz.

Kuntz retained her enthusiastic approach to life even as she reached its end. She loved the outdoors and music, especially the classics and the blue collar songs of Pete Seeger and Woody Guthrie. A late convert to baseball, she became an ardent fan of the San Diego Padres and spent the last evening of her life listening to a Padres game.

Diane Kuntz is survived by her sister and her mother. She is missed by all who knew her, especially by those who shared her concern and worked with her to end the abuses of the U.S. intelligence system and for international peace and justice.

—David MacMichael

FORBIDDEN TRUTH

Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie, *Forbidden Truth: U.S.-Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy and the Failed Hunt for Bin Laden* (New York: Thunder's Mouth/Nation Books, 2002).

First published in French in November 2001, the first English translation of *Forbidden Truth*, published in July of this year, has resulted in no less controversy than the original.

Brisard and Dasquie's central assertion is that the real "Axis of Evil" that gave rise to 9/11 was a combination of an international oil cartel interested in cutting a deal with the Taliban to build a pipeline through Afghanistan; the Bush Family and Dick Cheney, who had vested financial interests in such a pipeline; wealthy Saudis, including Khalid bin Mahfouz and Mohammed al-Amoudi, billionaires who contributed millions of dollars to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda front charities; The Carlyle Group, headed

by former Reagan Defense Secretary and former CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, on whose payrolls George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush have fattened themselves financially; and the intelligence services of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The book recounts a series of meetings held during early 2001 in Europe between the so-called "6+2 nations" that involved UNOCAL lobbyists, the Taliban, Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, and former U.S., Russian, German, Iranian, Pakistani, and British government officials. One of the participants at these meetings was former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, who had been working for UNOCAL on the pipeline deal with the Taliban along with Bush's current special envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad and Hamid Karzai, the current Afghan leader.

Forbidden Truth also highlights the fact that the oil-intelligence "Axis of Evil" has its roots in another scandal on which the Bush family left its fingerprints: the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) collapse and the CIA's use of the bank to illegally funnel money in the Iran-Contra affair.

Both the English and French editions of the book came in for immense criticism upon their releases. But the critics were the same corporate and media elitists who claimed there was nothing to the BCCI or Iran-Contra scandals—that both were in the domain of "conspiracy theorists" and unworthy of serious discussion. But in the case of the English edition, criticism also came from another quarter: the so-called progressive left. The *Village Voice*, David Corn of *The Nation*, and journalist Ken Silverstein savagely attacked *Forbidden Truth* and its authors as shoddy journalists and conspiracy addicts. The book did not fit into their neatly packaged Starbucks version of the origins of 9/11.

The same family that stamped its imprimatur on U.S. dealings with the Nazis during World War II; the Bay of Pigs invasion; the infamous "October Surprise" dealings with the Ayatollah Khomeini regime concerning the U.S. embassy hostages; Iran-Contra; BCCI; the 1990 green light for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait from U.S. ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie; the theft of Florida's 25 electoral votes in 2000; and using Enron as a huge Ponzi scheme to finance a presidential election could never be accused of any malfeasance concerning U.S. national security! The Bushes would never put their own self-interests above those of the country that has made them so wealthy.

In their zeal to "shoot the messenger," detractors of *Forbidden Truth* have fallen in lockstep with the corporate and military forces parading behind the Bushes to recreate the world in America's image. This book should be read by anyone seeking the truth about one of the most powerful and destructive political families ever.

—Ralph Kershaw

Back Issues

Number 1 (1978) Philip Agee on CIA; Cuban exile trial; "Consumer research" in Jamaica.

Number 2 (1978) CIA recruits diplomats; Researching CIA officers; Cuban double agent in CIA; CIA North Carolina demolition training base.

Number 3 (1979) CIA attacks *CAIB*; Top Secret Army spy manual; *CAIB* CIA poster; CIA in Mexico; Australia US spy satellite base; John Paisley mystery death.

Number 4 (1979) Spying on allies: Secret Italy cable; CIA in Spain; CIA Africa recruiting; Angola; Subversive academics in Southern Africa; CIA and human rights; CIA firearms authority; Intel. budgets; *In Search of Enemies*.

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Number 6 (1979) Caribbean; Cuban exile terrorists; CIA Nicaragua plans; CIA's "Perspectives for Intelligence"; U.S. helps South Africa surveillance; CIA cockroaches.

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Number 28 (1987) CIA, drugs, secret wars: S.E. Asia, Afghanistan, Central America, Nugan Hand; MKULTRA/Canada; Delta Force; AIDS and CBW.

Number 29 (1988) Pacific: Philippines, Fiji, New Zealand, Belau, Kanaky, Vanuatu, Maori in Hawaii; atom testing; media on Nicaragua; *Reader's Digest*; CIA in Cuba; Tibet; FBI-CIA surveils Gorbachev; Philip Agee on *Veil*; AIDS.

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Number 31 (1989) Domestic surveillance: FBI, CIA on campus; Office of Public Diplomacy; Geronimo Pratt; Lexington prison; Puerto Rico; Intl. Freedom Foundation; Disinformation.

Number 32 (1989) 10th Annv. Issue: Best of *CAIB*. 27 condensed articles: Naming Names; CIA and NSA at home, abroad, in the media; Philip Agee.

Number 33 (1990) Bush Issue: CIA Bush agents, secret team; Terrorism Task Force; Reagan's CIA; Skull and Bones; NED in Nicaragua; El Salvador election; Chile; Cuba; Repubs. & Nazis; Rise of national security state.

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O Little Town of Bethlehem...



Sunday, July 7, 2002. Life under siege. Palestinian bride Jala Abu Ajamia leaves her home to go to that of her groom, Nader al-Masri in Israeli-occupied Bethlehem. According to relatives, the wedding had been postponed 13 times due to the Israeli occupation. Few guests were able to attend thanks to military curfew, and those who did were without gifts, having nothing left to give.

Said the bride: "Today is my wedding day, and I want to die." (John Moore/AP Photo)